Trump must restart Kosovo-Serbia talks to achieve real progress

Trump must restart Kosovo-Serbia talks to achieve real progress

While the second Trump administration has shown no interest in mediating Kosovo-Serbia talks so far, it has proven unpredictable in its diplomatic initiatives. The Trump administration, for example, could eventually engage on the issue to claim a foreign policy “win” if progress on peace initiatives elsewhere proves elusive.

Written by: Agon Maliqi

In recent months, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly referred to his past mediation between Kosovo and Serbia, praising an agreement reached between them during his first term and even claiming that he prevented a war between the two countries earlier this year. The remarks raised eyebrows in the Balkans, as the region has recently not been a priority for either the United States or the European Union (EU). Does Trump’s sudden attention signal a renewed US focus on the region?

For now, Trump’s references to the Balkans seem more rhetorical than substantive. They are part of his larger effort to portray himself as a “peace president” and a skilled negotiator, while also contrasting his policies with those of the Biden administration. This year, Trump has mentioned the Kosovo-Serbia issue only in passing, indicating that it is not central to his agenda.

At first glance, there are strong reasons to doubt that a major U.S. diplomatic focus on the Balkans is on the horizon. The administration’s priorities lie elsewhere, and it has yet to settle on a coherent strategy toward Europe and Russia. Critics and those within the administration continue to clash over whether the United States should leave European security primarily to Europe, with Ukraine at the center of this debate. The State Department has not even appointed an assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.

On the other hand, the White House hosted a meeting this month between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, two countries that have recently gone to war, where a peace pledge was signed in Trump’s presence. The administration may seek to repeat this formula with other long-standing disputes. If so, then it might naturally look to the Balkans, where the United States holds significant assets and investments through NATO, and where some senior American officials have made recent advances.

During a visit to Kosovo this month by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David A. Baker, Kosovo leaders noted that there were discussions about a joint U.S.-Kosovo weapons production program. The State Department also reportedly confirmed that a $200 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) energy program in Kosovo would continue, even as MCC funding was significantly cut elsewhere. Also this month, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric, launching a bilateral strategic dialogue and calling for a reduction in tensions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are clear reasons for the continued US engagement in a region it has helped shape over the past thirty-five years. The ongoing disputes in the Balkans provide Russia with opportunities to play the role of disruptor in NATO’s neighborhood and to fragment markets and trade routes that affect American investment. And importantly, the demand for US involvement remains strong in the region – particularly in Kosovo, where distrust in the EU’s ability to manage major security challenges, such as Kosovo-Serbia relations, runs deep.

The EU-led dialogue is at a standstill

Launched in 2011 with strong US support, the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has stalled for more than a year. The problem is not a lack of agreements, but rather a plethora of unimplemented agreements.

In February 2023, the two sides agreed on a “pathway to normalization of relations.” The agreement implied de facto recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, committing Belgrade to refrain from blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organizations and accepting its documents, symbols, and institutions. In return, Kosovo pledged to create an Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities to provide greater rights and autonomy for Kosovo Serbs. A month later, the parties adopted an “implementation plan,” but the lack of agreement on the sequencing of the plan is likely to doom the deal.

Distrust of each other’s intentions, skepticism of Western assurances, and political gains from ethnic tensions have pushed both sides toward unilateral action in northern Kosovo. While Pristina dismantled Serbia’s illegal parallel structures, Serbian insurgents launched a failed armed offensive in late 2023, while most Kosovo Serbs abandoned legitimate state institutions. The result has been greater central government control over northern Kosovo, but also a deeper ethnic divide within the country and growing isolation in the international arena. The European Union imposed restrictive economic measures on Kosovo in 2023, most of which remain in force. Serbia’s EU accession process has also been frozen.

Domestic politics have exacerbated the impasse. Six months after inconclusive elections, Kosovo still does not have a new government with a mandate to negotiate. Meanwhile, Serbia has faced successive waves of student-led anti-corruption protests that have put its president, Aleksandar Vučić, on the defensive. Changes in leadership in Washington and Europe have further limited Western attention.

The Trump administration may start talks

In January, the EU appointed Danish diplomat Peter Sørensen as its new mediator in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, but he appears to lack the political support needed for a fresh start. Brussels insists there is no alternative to the 2023 agreements, which it considers legally binding and has included in the EU accession frameworks of both countries. However, the past two years have shown that accession – the EU’s main point of influence – no longer carries the weight to persuade either side to compromise.

Doubts appear to be growing in Kosovo, which is not recognized by five EU member states, that the country has a realistic path to EU accession. Given this distrust, Kosovo’s leaders are unwilling to give Serbia anything for what they see as an unattainable goal. In Serbia, the public and political elites seem increasingly disillusioned with the EU. Belgrade has effectively abandoned the accession process and has become largely unresponsive to EU pressure.

This deadlock can only be broken by an external blow. Washington still holds decisive influence over both sides. And the White House may have more leverage to call upon than the EU, as demonstrated by this month’s Azerbaijan-Armenia talks. While the second Trump administration has shown no interest in mediating the Kosovo-Serbia talks so far, it has proven unpredictable in its diplomatic initiatives. The Trump administration, for example, could eventually engage on the issue to claim a foreign policy “victory” if progress on peace initiatives elsewhere proves elusive.

The challenge, however, is to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. If the United States renews its engagement in the Kosovo-Serbia talks, it should aim for lasting solutions rather than quick fixes. This requires complementing rather than competing with EU commitments, as well as pushing toward a final, legally binding agreement centered on mutual recognition—an agreement that would allow Kosovo to fully consolidate its statehood and join (at least) Western multilateral institutions. Agreements that settle for anything less have proven to be fragile and unsustainable, simply pushing the can toward the next American administration.