US President Donald Trump signs the agreement at a world leaders’ summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13, 2025. [Suzanne Plunkett/Reuters]
Athens is closely following how the truce in Gaza develops, trying to gauge what it could mean for its role and interests, its relations with its neighbors, and the wider East Med region.
A strategic ally of Israel, with traditionally close ties with the Arab world, Greece looks forward to and publicly supports improved relations between Israel and the Arab states and, in this context, the revival of the Abraham Accords.
A participant, along with Cyprus, in the international conference on Gaza that took place on Monday in Egypt, Greece is ready to play a stabilizing role, being a part of NATO, and along with Cyprus, one of the two members of the EU geographically closest to the Middle East.
It knows the area well and could contribute in how it is developed, emphasizing, among other aspects, its keen interest in the safety and well-being of the Christian populations of the area.
In the same context, and provided the US gets back to supporting the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor, Athens and Nicosia are well placed as hubs to play a critical role in the project.
Finally, some tend to analyze every development through the “Greece-Turkey prism,” but Athens has an important regional presence on its own right – its close cooperation with Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia being a testament to that.
And despite the fact that President Trump has made no secret of his personal fondness of his Turkish counterpart, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s role in dealing with Hamas, Turkey’s overextension in the area – diplomatically and militarily – from Syria to Libya, is not necessarily welcomed by the Arab countries who have serious reservations, rooted deep in history, about the role and the neo-Ottoman intentions of Erdogan.