The Durand Line, drawn in 1893, between British India and Afghanistan, remains one of South Asia’s most politically charged borders. Established through an agreement between Sir Mortimer Durand, the then Foreign Secretary of British India, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan, the Line was designed to demarcate spheres of influence and ensure regional stability. Despite later contestations, it is an incontrovertible fact that the Durand Line was a British creation accepted by successive Afghan rulers.
Historical records show that not only Abdur Rahman Khan but also his successors, including Amir Habibullah Khan and King Amanullah Khan, recognised it as the boundary separating Afghanistan from British India. After Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the global community, including the United Nations and major powers, never raised reservations about the Durand Line’s legal status, thus affirming its standing as the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the issue has periodically resurfaced due to regional geopolitics and domestic political agendas in Afghanistan. During the 1970s, President Mohammed Daoud Khan, pursuing a nationalist and irredentist agenda, revived the “Pashtunistan” question, challenging Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Daoud’s political motives were closely tied to his need to consolidate power at home by appealing to ethnic sentiments among Pashtuns on both sides of the border. Yet, this move was less about historical rectification and more about geopolitical posturing, influenced by the Cold War rivalries and Afghanistan’s shifting alliances with the Soviet Union.
The Durand Line is not merely a colonial relic but a recognised international boundary between the two states whose legitimacy has been upheld by verifiable historical accounts and international law
In the post-2001 context, the issue re-emerged under a different guise. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban, despite Pakistan’s material and political support in the 1990s and 2000s, have demonstrated reluctance to accept the Durand Line as the international border. The Taliban’s stance is strategically motivated rather than rooted in legal or historical concerns. By keeping the border question alive, the Taliban aim to exert pressure on Pakistan, particularly in response to Islamabad’s calls for cross-border counterterrorism cooperation. Moreover, this ambiguity enables them to align tactically with Pakistan’s regional rivals, notably India, who benefit from any diplomatic and/or security friction between Islamabad and Kabul.
Equally significant is the ideological dimension underlying the Taliban’s non-recognition of the Durand Line. Their position intersects with the agenda of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a non-state actor seeking to destabilise Pakistan’s north-western borderlands. Both groups espouse a transnational Islamist vision that disregards existing state boundaries in favour of a notional ‘Islamic state’. The refusal to recognise the Durand Line, thus, serves a dual purpose: it sustains the Taliban’s ideological narrative of unity among Pashtuns and justifies the TTP to operate within Pakistan’s territory. From this angle, the border issue is less a historical dispute and more a geopolitical instrument leveraged for strategic and ideological gains.
For Pakistan, the situation demands vigilance and a comprehensive policy response. Islamabad must continue to assert the historical and legal legitimacy of the Durand Line by invoking Afghanistan’s own precedents of acceptance and the international consensus that emerged after 1947. Importantly, diplomatic engagement should be pursued with both the Afghan regime and regional stakeholders to underscore that the border’s recognition is essential for regional peace and counterterrorism efforts. Simultaneously, Pakistan should adopt an integrated approach combining border management with hard measures, if needed, economic cooperation, and people-to-people engagement to mitigate mistrust. Strengthening border fencing, enhancing surveillance, and fostering legitimate trade routes can reduce the space for militant infiltration and ideological manipulation.
Finally, the Durand Line is not merely a colonial relic but a recognised international boundary between the two states whose legitimacy has been upheld by verifiable historical accounts and international law. The challenge today lies not in renegotiating its status but in countering narratives that seek to exploit it for ideological and strategic purposes. By reinforcing historical truths, mobilising diplomatic consensus, and addressing security threats through a multidimensional policy, Pakistan can safeguard both its sovereignty and its long-term regional goals.