BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,354, November 17, 2025
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Over the past 44 years, Israel has used its intelligence and air force capabilities to attack and incapacitate the weapons-oriented nuclear programs of Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The following analysis compares and contrasts these strikes.
An analysis published in June 2023 by Ludovica Castelli of Leicester University and Olamide Samuel of the European Leadership Network expounded in great detail on the justifiability of attacking intolerable nuclear facilities, dating back to Nazi Germany in 1943. Only two years after the article’s publication, in June 2025, Israel and the US attacked Iran’s nuclear weapons-oriented facilities. For Israel, this was the third such assault in 44 years. Like its strikes on Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, Israel’s strike on Iran adhered to its inherent doctrinal principle of destroying the illegitimate nuclear faculties possessed by its enemies. (It is worthy of note that in contrast to the intelligence that led up to these strikes, Israel’s intelligence community did not detect a progressing Libyan military nuclear program that was ultimately foiled by the US and UK in 2003.)
Back to Iraq, Syria and Iran. Israel’s destruction of Iran’s nuclear capacities was a composite strike in that it targeted three facilities rather than one. Over the course of several days, the IAF struck active and highly fortified facilities along with additional strategic installations. The attack was somewhat expected, as it took place one day after the expiration of a 60-day deadline President Trump had given Iran to renew a nuclear agreement.
The Iran strike was complemented, vitally, by a US military blow. While no retaliation was delivered by Iraq or Syria, Iran retaliated massively against Israel (though largely without result), targeting both civilian and strategic sites. Among the latter, the most conspicuous were the Nuclear Research Center in Dimona and the Biological Research Center in Ness Ziona. It is uncertain whether or not Iran’s retaliation has ceased, considering its cyber warfare capabilities.
The following chart offers a comparative analysis of the strikes against Iraq, Syria and Iran.
1. Targeted Nuclear Facility
preventive
2. Israeli Motivation
pre-fuel window
3. Enabling and Timing
Directorate (M.G. Shlomi Binder)
4. Strike Forces and Modes of Attack
5. Results of the Strikes
6. Strategic and Political Impact
7. Overall Estimate
manageable
strike doctrine
The effort by Libya, a Muslim enemy country, to run a military nuclear program was completely missed by Israeli intelligence. This failure yielded essential lessons that were laboriously projected onto the Iranian and Syrian arenas, where exceptionally meticulous intelligence monitoring was conducted by Israel. That monitoring enabled the early tracing of non-civilian nuclear elements and their eventual destruction without generating environmental pollution, a highly consequential element.
The three strikes tightly followed the long-term Israeli fundamental concept of disabling the acquisition by a foe of nuclear weapons, no matter how difficult the circumstances (distance to the targeted facilities; likely diplomatic fallout; expected retaliation by the attacked country). This cardinal rule was made manifest through pinpointed, surgical strikes, carefully timed and anchored in arduous intelligence.
With that said, there are important differences between the three cases. While the actual strikes against Iraq and Syria (rather than the intelligence operations that led up to them) were relatively uncomplicated, the attack on the Iranian nuclear alignment was extraordinarily challenging in many respects, indicating increased Israeli intelligence faculties, offensive capacities, and operational maneuverability. The attack also required utmost cooperation with the US military, which participated in the attack. The involvement of the Americans was a vital factor that differentiated the Iran strike from the earlier strikes on Iraq and Syria. In addition to assisting in the success of the strike, it had a mitigating effect on negative international reactions and diplomatic fallout, as it was a direct signal of Washington’s unwillingness to tolerate Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
While Iraq and Syria have since ceased their quest for nuclear weapons, Iran is now at a crossroads in this regard. We should expect that no matter what its true intentions may be, the Iranian regime will continue to publicly claim that it does not seek nuclear weapons.
Dr. Dany Shoham is a former senior analyst in IDF military intelligence and the Ministry of Defense. He specializes in chemical and biological warfare in the Middle East and worldwide.