Israel is reportedly seeking an unprecedented 20-year security agreement with Washington outlining political commitments from Washington for billions of dollars in security assistance. Although already the largest historic recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, the proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU) has a duration that is double the time frame of past arrangements between the United States and Israel. More significantly, the potential arrangement highlights a real concern that U.S. security assistance to Israel could implicate the United States in foreign conflicts or crises and divorce U.S. military assistance from interest-based policymaking.
Israel and Security MOUs
Since 1999, the bilateral security cooperation and assistance relationship between Israel and the United States has been outlined in 10-year MOUs. This unique arrangement has committed the United States to tens of billions of dollars in security assistance years in advance and regardless of prospective changes in the bilateral relationship or strategic environment. The current MOU, signed by President Obama in 2016 and set to expire in 2028, represents more than $38 billion in security assistance, excluding the supplemental funding provided since the attacks of October 7, 2023.
The 2016 MOU outlines $3.3 billion in foreign military financing – taxpayer-funded grants for Israel to purchase U.S. defense articles and services. In addition, the 2016 arrangement also allows a portion of the funds to be used for acquisitions from Israel’s own defense industry and outlines an additional $500 million per year for cooperative missile defense development.
While MOUs represent a political pledge rather than a legal commitment, legislators have historically abided by their terms and duly appropriated funding along the lines expressed in the agreements.
Does a 20-year MOU Serve US Interests?
The proposed 20-year MOU raises questions about the strategic wisdom of structuring U.S. security assistance through such lengthy political arrangements. While multiyear agreements may be necessary to reflect the practical time horizons of particular defense cooperation projects or initiatives, blanket pledges spelling out two decades of financial commitments detached from specific operational contexts could be at odds with U.S. interests. In an increasingly volatile global security environment, MOUs with a very long time horizon, like the one proposed by Israel, risk limiting the responsiveness of U.S. foreign policy and entangling the United States in partnerships that do not reflect U.S. interests.
The depth of U.S. security cooperation partnerships should reflect the degree and durability of bilateral interest alignment, the relative importance of the partnership for U.S. strategic objectives, and the efficacy of defense cooperation as an instrument for meeting those goals. In an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical context, rapidly evolving security realities require deliberate and regular assessments of partnerships against those criteria.
A 20-year MOU with Israel runs contrary to the need for such sober, strategic assessments of U.S. partnerships. Even if such arrangements are not legally binding, a multiyear MOU creates a sense of political obligation and an unnecessary test for U.S. credibility. In the event that security circumstances demand an interest-based change in U.S. security cooperation, for example, seemingly obligatory MOUs could add substance to accusations that the United States is an unreliable ally, writ large, allowing partners to pressure the United States into maintaining the status quo.
This further complicates an already strained oversight environment, where transparency and accountability may be at odds with the pre-ordained nature of such long-term agreements. While arms transfers paid for by the assistance promised in the MOU are still subject to congressional notification and review, the sense that the United States owes assistance to its partners adds to the already hefty political pressure against meaningful scrutiny.
Moreover, by linking U.S. security assistance to such long-term arrangements, especially those that do not obligate the recipient to abide by certain conditions or meet key benchmarks, a 20-year MOU complicates U.S. efforts to deliberately craft security cooperation policies that reflect changing geostrategic circumstances or U.S. interests.
Israel’s multifront military campaign over the past three years – which has entailed military operations in five countries plus the Palestinian territories – illustrates how routinized security cooperation detached from more rigorous strategic evaluation can limit U.S. influence and entangle the United States in foreign crises. Since October 7, 2023, the largely unconditional U.S. support for Israel has enabled the Netanyahu government to operate without due consideration for U.S. interests or policy preferences. Assured that military aid was largely immune from conditions or constraints, the Netanyahu government regularly ignored or defied U.S. requests, whether that was related to ceasefire negotiations, humanitarian access, or escalatory actions such as the Israeli strike in Qatar.
Conclusion
While the divergent policies and interests of Israel and the United States are multifaceted, a twenty-year MOU does not take such conflicting views into account and illustrates how easily U.S. security assistance can be seen as an entitlement rather than an instrument of foreign policy. For security cooperation to be effective in advancing U.S. interests, it must be responsive, flexible, and tied to the realities of a fast-evolving strategic environment. Whether it is Israel or any other partner, lengthy security cooperation commitments, not linked to specific operational or strategic contexts, risk placing assistance decisions on autopilot. It is the opposite of the more deliberate approach the United States should be adopting in determining where, when, and how to engage around the world.
Weighty decisions around military aid and security cooperation should be rooted in rigorous evaluation of U.S. interests and reflect a commitment to restraint, due diligence, and conditionality. No matter the partnership, blanket arrangements pledging billions in support place constraints on the ability of policymakers and legislators to think critically about the efficacy of U.S. security assistance and ensure policies are accountable to U.S. interests and can evolve alongside the changing circumstances of an increasingly unpredictable global security environment.