This is an automated translation of the original column published in Spanish.
By Luciano Codeseira, CEO and founder of Gas Transition Consultantand co-director of the Energy Institute at Universidad Austral. Codeseira is also an academic at Universidad Austral and at Universidad Nacional de San Martín, and co-founder of Puelche Energy.
With the election result now consolidated, the debate definitively leaves the realm of hypotheses and enters that of concrete decisions. The new Chilean political map accelerates processes that the market had already begun to factor in and forces public and private actors to move faster. As Pablo Neruda wrote when looking at the mountain range from both sides, “before being a border, the mountain range is a stone bond that unites the peoples who inhabit it”.
In other words, José Antonio Kast’s victory consolidates a change in direction that introduces predictability for capital-intensive, long-term sectors such as energy and industry. In an international context marked by productive reshoring, pressure on energy costs, and competition between jurisdictions to attract investment, Chile is once again appearing on the regional radar not only because of its resources, but also because of faster decision-making, streamlined permits, and reduced administrative timeframes. At this stage, capital does not reward lengthy diagnostics but rather speed and certainty: first play, first win is beginning to operate as an organizing principle.
In this post-election scenario, the permitting process becomes the central axis of economic policy. The incoming government is moving forward with the implementation of the Sectoral Permits Reform, approved by a broad majority in Congress (93 votes), which reduces processing times for energy, mining, and industrial projects by between 30% and 70%. The one-stop shop, parallel processing, and clarification of technical criteria are not minor adjustments: they represent a structural change in the relationship between the State and productive investment, introducing predictability into a system that for years accumulated delays and overlaps.
This new framework does not imply a lowering of environmental standards, but rather a reorganization of processes that, in some cases, have delayed strategic projects for more than eight years. Added to this is the reform of the Environmental Impact Assessment System (SEIA), still in the legislative process but key to unlocking large-scale investments in energy, ports, and infrastructure. The coordination between both instruments will be crucial for Chile to capture the next wave of investments in an increasingly competitive regional environment.
This regulatory reshuffle also takes place within a new regional political climate. The alignment between the Kast government and Javier Milei’s administration —reinforced by the technical role of José Luis Daza as a bridge between both agendas— reduces historical frictions and enables smoother binational coordination.
The closure of Huachipato serves as a symbolic milestone marking the exhaustion of an industrial phase. More relevant than the event itself is the void it leaves, particularly in the Biobío Region, and the need to redefine its productive matrix. There, strong interest in data centers is emerging, attracted by the availability of industrial land, connectivity, and the possibility of accessing firm, competitive energy. Within this same framework, other complementary alternatives are being revalued: the development of an FLNG as a flexible industrial anchor, leveraging the value of existing thermoelectric assets in the Charrúa node, capable of providing firmness to the system, and the conversion of local industries to gas, which would make it possible to accelerate demand without major new works.
In parallel, Argentina is going through the most significant gas expansion cycle in its history. Vaca Muerta has left behind the exploratory phase and today produces volumes that exceed the available evacuation capacity. This surplus forces us to think about regional markets in a structural way. Chile, within this framework, ceases to be a marginal client and becomes an energy corridor to the Pacific, with the capacity to absorb gas, transform it, and project it into new industrial and energy uses.
This movement is gaining strength in the south. Within the framework of the open season of the Gasoducto del Pacífico, the Biobío Region is emerging as a node with its own potential. After acquiring ExxonMobil’s assets in 2024, Pluspetrol began streamlining its portfolio and put up for sale secondary blocks near the Gas Pacífico route, with direct access to existing infrastructure and competitive development costs. In that same corridor appears Sierra Chata, operated by Pampa Energía and YPF, as a benchmark case: a block with proven capacity and a feasible connection to supply Biobío, marking the beginning of a broader process. Added to this is the upcoming tender of seven blocks covering some 914 km² in the dry gas window, also close to the system, with low exploration risk and short development times.
The Argentine regulatory framework completes the equation. The extension of the RIGI to upstream activities improves the economic viability of projects aimed at regional exports, combining fiscal stability, exchange rate predictability, and access to external markets. In this context, an early-mover advantage dynamic prevails, in which securing demand in advance enables investment and allows the value generated to be captured.
That logic is already being expressed in concrete decisions on the Argentine side. In recent hours, Pluspetrol submitted the best offer to secure access for 50 years to transportation capacity in the GasAndes gas pipeline, enabling the export of up to 4.1 million m³ of gas per day to Chile’s Metropolitan Region and adjacent areas. There are no recent precedents of contracts of this duration in the sector, and the initiative clearly illustrates the longevity and scale of commitment promised by this new chapter of binational gas integration.
In the same vein, the contract between ENAP and a consortium of Argentine operators for approximately USD 12 billion (bn) was recently made public, securing crude supply until mid-2033. These are decisions that have been made, contracts that have been signed, and flows that are beginning to materialize.
This is how every discussion converges in this new energy map: Chile has the infrastructure and the regulatory framework in transition; Argentina has the resource and the incentives to develop it. The new political context reduced frictions that for years blocked decisions. This drive toward integration is no longer just an idea and is beginning to translate into concrete actions; the creation of Puelche Energy last July stands out as a strategic success: an early decision, aligned with the logic of anticipation and execution that the market is only now beginning to validate.
The stage is set; it is no longer about imagining major projects from scratch, but about making early decisions, activating existing assets, closing long-term contracts, and coordinating permits quickly. The market has already begun to allocate capital based on timing. At this stage, optimism is reasonable but selective: only those who act first will be in a position to achieve their goals and sustain them over time.
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