Image: Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tarik shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi.The meeting underscores Oman’s strategic role as a stable gateway linking India, the Gulf, and the Mediterranean — a key pillar in the planned IMEC trade corridor connecting Asia and Europe.Credit: X / @MEAIndia
India–Turkey Tensions Are Shaping the Western Corridor via Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Greece (IMEC).
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week visited India and Jordan — the southern and northern edges of the Middle East — along the route of the planned western trade corridor, IMEC.
This week, Israel hosted a meeting of Mediterranean states — Israel, Greece, and Cyprus — focused on building the infrastructure that will position the Port of Haifa as the western gateway to Europe, the Port of Piraeus as Europe’s entry point, and the Port of Limassol in Cyprus as a transit hub for oil and gas pipelines on their way to Europe.
During his visit, Modi signed significant economic and security agreements in Jordan and Oman, and finalized a free trade agreement between India and Oman — India’s second such agreement in the Gulf after the existing FTA with the United Arab Emirates. In parallel, India is also completing a similar trade agreement with Israel, following the visit of India’s Minister of Commerce to Israel last month.
It is therefore not surprising that shortly after Modi’s visit to Muscat, Oman announced it would allow the export of marble blocks to India, ending a decade-long ban on marble exports. India will be the first beneficiary of Omani marble, after facing growing difficulties since May in importing marble blocks from Turkey.
Tensions between India and Turkey have intensified following reports that drones supplied by Turkey to Pakistan were used in attacks on cities in northern India last May. This comes on top of growing ethnic and ideological frictions, as Turkey has drawn closer to radical Islamist groups, while India continues to face extremist Islamist terrorism which, according to Indian authorities, benefits from a permissive environment in Pakistan.
More recently, Turkey signed an agreement to purchase 52 training aircraft for its air force from Pakistan. The two countries are also cooperating on the development and production of an advanced indigenous fighter-bomber aircraft, further tightening their defense ties.
In May, after several days of fighting between India and Pakistan, a ceasefire was reached under US mediation. However, the agreement remains fragile, and relations between New Delhi and Islamabad are still tense. The latest conflict — involving exchanges of fire and pinpoint strikes along the Line of Control in Kashmir — underscored for India’s leadership just how fragile its security environment remains, and how dependent it is on broader regional stability.
Although a ceasefire was achieved with American mediation, Indian policymakers view recurring confrontations with Pakistan as a persistent threat — especially in light of growing military cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey. In this context, India’s choice of a western trade route through Jordan and Israel as part of IMEC is seen not only as an economic decision, but also as a deliberate strategic distancing from regional axes associated with security instability.
Turkey has openly expressed support for Pakistan, a stance that has been met with a cold response from India amid a prolonged cooling of relations between the two countries. At the same time, while Turkey seeks to expand its influence in Syria and leverage Syrian ports to connect Gulf states to Europe, India has opted for the Jordanian–Israeli route.
Last week, Jordanian aircraft joined US forces in strikes against ISIS strongholds in Syria, following attacks on American forces that resulted in the deaths of three Americans — two soldiers and a translator. Jordan’s participation underscored its commitment to the pro-Western axis in the Middle East.
Interestingly, both Turkey and India are democratic states that for decades operated under significant Russian economic influence. In the 1990s, as both economies began turning westward, Russian Tupolev and Ilyushin passenger aircraft were still flying domestic routes, alongside widespread use of Soviet-made industrial equipment and agricultural machinery. Both countries underwent similar processes of modernization and Western integration.
In recent years, however, Turkey’s growing alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood and its distancing from Israel have widened the gap between the two regional middle powers. Israeli defense exports have gradually shifted from Turkey to India, which today accounts for a substantial share of Israel’s defense market.
Both countries have sought to maintain ties with Russia, but while Turkey purchased Russian air defense systems, India continues to import Russian oil and fuel — a policy that has caused unease in Washington. The United States has restricted Turkey’s access to the F-35 program and has made trade negotiations with India more complex.
Oman is one of the Gulf states with which Israel maintained trade relations as early as the mid-1990s, following the Oslo Accords. I personally visited Muscat, Oman’s capital, in 1996 as a guest of the Omani Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Abraham Accords did not begin in 2016, but rather in 1994, when Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Oman and Israel opened trade offices in Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman — ties that were severed in 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
Three new political-economic axes have been converging in recent weeks — none of which include Turkey:
A renewed Qatar–Saudi axis, including the announcement of the Doha–Riyadh high-speed rail line and economic agreements between Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The Oman–India–Jordan axis, forming the eastern and western anchors of IMEC trade routes.
The Israel–Cyprus–Greece axis, connecting IMEC from the Middle East to Europe via the Mediterranean.
By early 2026, with the signing of political agreements related to Gaza’s reconstruction, the establishment of a multinational force in Gaza, and the announcement of President Trump’s proposed Peace Council, it may also be possible to formally announce the launch of detailed planning and preparatory works for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Rafi Glick is a writer, lecturer, farmer, and business executive with decades of experience at the intersection of academia, technology, agriculture, and international trade.
• He has served as a Senior Teaching Associate at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Ono Academic College, Ariel University, Ruppin Academic Center, and as a guest lecturer at Sofia University’s Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (FEBA). At Ben-Gurion University he also advised the BGU–NHSA Accelerator in the Faculty of Science.
• In business, Rafi was CEO of Bidsnet Ltd., a pioneer in deploying fiber-optic cables through unconventional infrastructure (in partnership with CableRunner), delivering high-speed connectivity to homes, enterprises, institutions, and cellular networks. Earlier he held senior roles at ECI Telecom and served on the board of RLF Venture Capital, working with partners such as Intel, Teva, and the Jerusalem Development Authority.
• He contributed extensively to Israel’s trade and investment ecosystem: he directed industrial and agricultural technology divisions at the Israel Export Institute, founded Israel’s AGRITECH as international exhibition, and served on the board of the Israeli Investment Center at the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
• In his early career, Rafi established and served as the first director of the Cargo and Aircraft Supply Security Department in the Security Division at Ben-Gurion Airport (1972–1976). He lived in Kibbutz Parod until 1974.
• Rafi has also been recognized for his writing: in 2008 he was named Best Economic Blogger by TheMarker, Israel’s leading business daily.
• Today he continues to publish essays and commentary—with a special passion for astrophysics, space exploration, technology, economics, and social issues.
From Kibbutz Parod to the global stage, Rafi Glick’s career reflects a lifelong commitment to building connections—between people, industries, and ideas.
Email: rafi.glick@gmail.com