a. Freedom of the Press
The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and authorities generally respected this right. The influence by oligarchs and Russia over certain media outlets, a challenging advertising market that limited outlets’ commercial sustainability, and the lack of an independent judiciary created difficulties for independent media. Harassment and intimidation against journalists occurred in some instances, but there were no reports of national government involvement.
Hate speech was regulated by the Law on Freedom of Speech and the Audiovisual Code.
Several symbols representing Russia’s military operations remained banned, including the “Z” and “V” symbols used by Russia during its invasion of Ukraine and the black and orange St. George’s ribbon. The General Police Inspectorate reported 189 violations concerning banned symbols on May 9, Russian Victory Day.
In Transnistria, “authorities” used the 2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism to silence dissent and repress freedom of expression, complementing the existing “anti-extremism law.” Several individuals faced charges pursuant to the “anti-extremism law” for publicly criticizing “authorities” during the year or for expressing opposing viewpoints, including with regard to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Public insults of the region’s “leader” could be punished by a fine or up to five years in prison.
Physical Attacks, Imprisonment, and Pressure
Some journalists were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and lawsuits.
During the year, harassment and intimidation of journalists was most prominent in the autonomous region of Gagauzia. In January, Mihail Vlah, media advisor for Governor of Gagauzia Evghenia Gutul, declared it was time to “muzzle” journalists from independent media outlet Nokta.md for their criticism of Gutul’s government. Vlah said in a social media video in January that Nokta.md used grant money to insult the Gagauzia governor and deputies in Gagauzia’s People’s Assembly. Vlah also threated Nokta.md and Sirkeli at rallies in May and August.
Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups
In its 2024 Press Freedom Index report, the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Reporters Without Borders characterized the country’s media environment as “divided into pro-Russian and pro-Western camps” with oligarchs and political leaders strongly influencing editorial stances. The report noted the influence of fugitive, pro-Kremlin oligarch Ilan Shor on the media landscape, as well as the rapid and nontransparent changes to national legislation at the end of 2023, with the aim of blocking channels whose licenses were suspended during the state of emergency.
On January 16, several NGOs raised concerns about a December 2023 law, which went into effect in January, aimed at ensuring the integrity and functionality of the electricity market that granted the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance the authority to temporarily suspend television station licenses outside of a state of emergency and without a court order. The NGOs issued a statement criticizing the lack of transparency in the drafting, voting, and implementation processes.
A December 2023 law gave the Public Services Agency (PSA) authority to screen legal entities of interest to the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance, inclusive of media outlets, for illegal financing and affiliation with sanctioned or criminal individuals. During the year, based on the results of PSA screening, the council voted to cancel the broadcast licenses of 12 media entities. On June 18, the Council for Promoting Investment Projects of National Importance revoked the television broadcasting licenses of Orhei TV and TV6 based on their link to Media Resources Ltd., a company affiliated with U.S.-sanctioned fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. In addition, the council suspended the licenses of four media outlets for failing to provide requested documents during the screening process.
In some cases, journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid conflicts with the sponsors or owners of their media outlets, many of whom were politicians or oligarchs connected to political parties. Despite passage of a January 8 law on governing timely release of information of public interest, obstacles for accessing information persisted.
In Transnistria, “authorities” censored media outlets, including through controlling licensing and accreditation. Journalists regularly practiced self-censorship and avoided criticizing “authorities,” the separatists’ goal of independence and their “foreign policy,” or anything that would be deemed “extremist” under the 2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism.
Efforts to Preserve the Independence of the Media
A law expanding access to information of public interest came into effect on January 8. NGOs reported multiple media outlets successfully applied the law to access information. The 2024 Promo-LEX CSO Meter Moldova Country Report, released on December 2, showed improvements in civic space in the country, from 5.3 to 5.4 points, due in part to the new law, which allowed for more active participation by civil society actors in decision making.
b. Worker Rights
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining
The law provided workers the right to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The government generally respected these rights, but with limitations. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination but did not provide for the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law prohibited strikes when the government declared an emergency, such as during natural disasters, epidemics, and pandemics. Authorities could impose compulsory arbitration at the request of one party to a dispute.
The State Labor Inspectorate and the Prosecutor General’s Office were responsible for overseeing labor laws, but they failed to monitor or enforce effectively the rights to collective bargaining and labor union organization. The law did not provide effective sanctions for abuses of freedom of association nor antiunion discrimination, nor stipulate penalties for violating trade union rights.
Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike were less than those for analogous violations such as civil rights violations, or of other laws related to civil rights, and penalties were rarely applied against violators.
The government and employers generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Worker organizations were generally independent of the government, political parties, employers, and employers’ associations.
There were no reports that the government, political parties, or employers interfered in the functioning of workers’ organizations. Prosecutors could reject appeals by trade unions alleging antiunion behavior, and authorities did not punish alleged violations of the trade union law, which was under the jurisdiction of the trade unions and not the national courts.
Forced or Compulsory Labor
See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Acceptable Work Conditions
Wage and Hour Laws
The law provided for a national minimum wage that was less than the poverty level.
The law set the maximum workweek at 40 hours with overtime compensation, provided for at least one day off per week, and mandated paid annual leave of at least 28 calendar days (government holidays excluded). Different paid leave plans could be used in some sectors, such as education, health care, and public service. The law prohibited excessive compulsory overtime. Foreign, migrant, and domestic workers had the same wage and hour protections as other workers.
Occupational Safety and Health
The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate for the main industries in the country. Inspectors proactively identified unsafe conditions during announced and unannounced inspections. According to labor law, workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.
Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement
The State Labor Inspectorate was responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor relations and OSH laws. Government efforts to enforce occupational health and safety standards were limited. The number of inspectors was insufficient to effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. The law required the government to establish and monitor safety standards in the workplace, but inspections could only occur when a complaint was received, and not all complaints met the criteria for a workplace inspection. Penalties for violations were less than those for analogous crimes and were sometimes applied.
The government took additional steps to enforce labor laws in the informal sector during the year. The labor code required work contracts for employment, but the government did not have an effective mechanism to monitor compliance. According to data issued by the National Bureau of Statistics for the third quarter of the year, 14.7 percent of employed persons worked in the informal sector. The service, construction, transportation, and agricultural sectors had high levels of informality. The International Labor Organization and other outside sources estimated the share of employment in the informal sector at 20-56 percent. Workers in the informal economy did not have the same legal protections under wage, hour, and OSH provisions as employees in the formal sector.
c. Disappearance and Abduction
Disappearance
There were no reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.
There were no reports of enforced disappearances in the Transnistria region.
Prolonged Detention without Charges
The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements. In Transnistria, there were frequent reports that Transnistrian “authorities” engaged with impunity in arbitrary arrest and detention.
In Transnistria, arbitrary arrests, particularly of those who criticized de facto Transnistrian authorities, remained a significant problem. The Bureau for Reintegration confirmed that on November 3, Moldovan national Stanislav Derebcinschi was arrested by “law enforcement” at the administrative line in Grigoropol for defaming de facto Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky on social media – a “crime” punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment. As of December, Derebcinschi was being held in Slobozia prison and a trial date had not been announced.
In Transnistria, lengthy pretrial detention resulting from a lack of respect for rule of law remained a problem.