For years, the idea of Moldova rejoining Romania hovered in the
realm of sentiment, whispered at commemorations, debated in cafés,
and carefully avoided in official speeches. Then President Maia
Sandu said the quiet part out loud. By framing her hypothetical
vote for reunification not as a romantic return to history but as a
matter of security, Sandu signaled that Moldova’s most sensitive
question has entered a new phase. In a region reshaped by war,
identity alone no longer explains political choices; survival
does.
Moldova’s predicament is emblematic of small states caught
between geography and geopolitics. Culturally intertwined with
Romania yet shaped by centuries of Russian and Soviet rule, the
country embodies a dual legacy: shared history on one bank of the
Prut, enforced separation on the other. What has changed is not the
past, but the present. Russia’s war against Ukraine has reframed
neutrality as vulnerability and turned once-theoretical debates
into strategic calculations.
Experts speaking to AzerNews caution that
symbolism should not be confused with imminence. Cultural affinity
may provide the emotional logic for reunification, but law,
security guarantees, frozen conflicts, and great-power reactions
impose far stricter limits. The renewed debate, they argue, is less
about whether Moldova “belongs” with Romania, and more about how a
fragile state navigates an increasingly unforgiving security
environment without losing its sovereignty in the process.
How likely is it that Moldova rejoins
Romania?
From an institutional and political standpoint,
Sebastian Schaeffer, Director at the Institute for
the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), argues that unification
remains unlikely in the short to medium term. While cultural,
linguistic, and historical arguments for reunification are deeply
rooted, political consent is not. Support fluctuates on both sides
of the Prut River and remains below the level required to make a
binding referendum politically viable, particularly in Moldova.
What has shifted, however, is not the probability of unification
but the legitimacy of openly discussing it. Russia’s war against
Ukraine has transformed unification from a taboo subject into a
contingency scenario. President Maia Sandu’s statement that she
would personally vote for unification—explicitly framing it as a
response to mounting geopolitical pressures and the difficulty of
sustaining democracy as a small state—marks a significant change in
official discourse. Unification is now increasingly framed not as
romantic nationalism, but as a security insurance option of last
resort. Even so, Moldova’s strategic trajectory remains focused on
EU integration as a sovereign state rather than an imminent merger
with Romania.
Andrew Korybko, Moscow-based political analyst,
by contrast, contends that the unification question is already
largely moot in practical terms. In his view, Moldova has become a
de facto member of NATO despite its constitutional neutrality,
while those Moldovan citizens who genuinely wish to (re)join
Romania already hold Romanian citizenship. This dual citizenship
grants them access to EU residency, employment, and political
participation, effectively delivering many of the benefits
unification would otherwise provide. As a result, Korybko sees
Sandu’s stated preference for unification as unlikely to translate
into concrete action, particularly given contested electoral
processes and the political risks of attempting to engineer a
referendum whose outcome could not be easily controlled.
NATO’s Article 5, EU Article 42(7), and the Transnistria
dilemma
Schaeffer underscores that, in principle, NATO’s Article 5 would
apply only to Romania’s internationally recognized territory at the
moment of unification. In practice, Transnistria becomes decisive.
NATO has consistently avoided importing unresolved territorial
conflicts, meaning that any unification would almost certainly
require a prior legal clarification excluding Transnistria from the
transferred territory. Otherwise, the Alliance would inherit a
frozen conflict involving Russian troops—something it has
systematically avoided. As a result, Transnistria would either
remain outside Article 5 coverage or block the process
entirely.
More importantly, Schaeffer argues that the debate is overly
focused on NATO. He points instead to Article 42(7) of the Treaty
on European Union as increasingly consequential. NATO’s political
cohesion can no longer be treated as immutable, as demonstrated by
recent burden-sharing disputes and the political shock triggered by
US President Donald Trump’s January 2026 push to acquire Greenland.
While Article 5 remains the cornerstone of European defence, its
credibility ultimately depends on political will, particularly in
Washington. By contrast, Article 42(7) obliges EU member states to
provide “aid and assistance by all means in their power” if a
member state suffers armed aggression. Its legal language is
explicit, embedded in EU primary law, and politically difficult to
ignore once invoked. Crucially, it extends collective security
obligations to EU states outside NATO, such as Austria, Ireland,
and Cyprus. A Moldova–Romania unification would therefore place
Moldova immediately under the EU’s mutual assistance framework,
creating a European security backstop that is often underestimated
in NATO-centric debates.
Korybko approaches the same issue from a strategic and
perceptual angle rather than a legal one. He argues that Moldova is
already part of Romania’s broader security space and lacks only the
psychological comfort associated with popular interpretations of
Article 5. In his reading, the legal distinctions between NATO and
EU clauses matter less than how Moscow interprets intent. Any move
toward formal unification would likely be viewed in Russia as a
signal of hostile designs toward Transnistria. From this
perspective, unification is dangerous not because of what treaty
articles technically apply, but because it could be perceived as
paving the way for NATO involvement in a territory where Russian
peacekeepers are present.
The feasibility of ceding Transnistria
Schaeffer describes the idea of ceding Transnistria in exchange
for faster integration with Romania or Western institutions as
legally and politically fraught. While not entirely impossible in
theory, it would require constitutional amendments, a referendum,
and international recognition. Politically, transferring territory
to Russia is implausible and deeply toxic. Ukraine, meanwhile, has
no interest in annexing Transnistria while fighting to preserve its
own territorial integrity. President Volodymyr Zelensky has
repeatedly emphasized that territorial concessions are Ukraine’s
most difficult challenge and that legitimizing occupied territories
would undermine international law and set a dangerous
precedent.
Beyond legal constraints, Schaeffer highlights economic
realities. Transnistria is not driven by ideology but by the
incentives of its ruling oligarchy. Official Moldovan data shows
that roughly three quarters to over four fifths of Transnistrian
exports go to the EU, with Romania, Italy, Poland, and Germany
among the main destinations. Imports from the EU account for nearly
half of total imports. This makes the EU—not Russia—Transnistria’s
most important economic partner. The local elite benefits from
ambiguity, with smuggling networks, preferential EU market access
via Moldova, and regulatory grey zones forming the backbone of
their revenue streams. Formal annexation by Russia would disrupt
this business model and expose the region to sanctions, sharply
reducing incentives for radical status changes.
Korybko largely sidesteps the legal feasibility question,
arguing instead that territorial cession is strategically
irrelevant. In his view, Transnistria’s value lies precisely in its
unresolved status. Any attempt to formalize its fate—whether
through cession, annexation, or reintegration—would upset the
delicate balance that allows it to function as a geopolitical
buffer. For Moscow, ambiguity is preferable to resolution,
especially when unresolved territories can be used to shape
narratives and constrain opponents’ strategic choices.
Casus belli or political defeat?
Schaeffer assesses that Russia would most likely interpret a
Moldova–Romania unification as a political defeat rather than a
casus belli. Moscow lacks both the geographic access and military
capacity to wage a conventional war against Romania, a NATO member.
Any direct confrontation would carry unacceptable escalation risks
and likely trigger a broader clash with the Alliance. Instead,
Russia would frame unification as a hostile act and exploit it
politically through propaganda, disinformation, economic pressure,
and political destabilization. More broadly, Moscow could
instrumentalize unification as part of a revisionist narrative,
pointing to it as a precedent to justify its own claims over
Ukraine’s occupied territories by arguing that border changes
driven by security concerns or historical narratives are
selectively legitimized by the West.
Korybko agrees that outright war is unlikely but places greater
emphasis on escalation risks linked to Transnistria. He argues that
while unification itself may not trigger conflict, it could be
interpreted as a precursor to dismantling the existing status quo
around the breakaway region. In that sense, the danger lies less in
unification as a legal act and more in its potential to catalyze a
broader NATO–Russia crisis under conditions of heightened
mistrust.
The risk of escalation in Transnistria
Schaeffer concludes that Russia’s ability to preemptively
escalate in Transnistria is more limited than often assumed. The
region is geographically isolated, dependent on Moldova and Ukraine
for access, and hosts a relatively small Russian military presence
with constrained logistics. A serious escalation would be difficult
to sustain and would directly threaten the economic interests of
the Transnistrian elite, whose revenues depend on uninterrupted
trade with the EU. Consequently, Moscow is more likely to exploit
Transnistria politically rather than militarily, using it as a tool
for freezing options and sustaining ambiguity rather than as a
launchpad for war. This contrasts with Gagauzia, where identity
politics and pro-Russian narratives resonate more strongly and
where political obstruction may pose a greater challenge to
unification scenarios.
Korybko similarly views escalation as unlikely but frames
Transnistria as a strategic deterrent rather than a liability. He
argues that the region functions as a warning mechanism, signaling
that certain red lines—particularly those involving NATO’s
proximity to Russian peacekeepers—should not be crossed. While
Moscow may avoid military escalation, it could still leverage
Transnistria diplomatically and rhetorically to constrain Moldova’s
choices and deter any moves perceived as deliberately
provocative.