Some years, such as 1945 and 1991, are remembered for historic transformations. The existing international system was abolished, resulting in the establishment of a “new world order.”
Today, the future of the current “liberal” international order has become a contentious topic. Challenges from revisionist states — and, more importantly, the decline in the United States’ capacity and willingness to enforce the post–World War II order it helped build — have fueled predictions that another historic transformation of the international system may be approaching.
The year 2026 has begun with events that have bolstered these predictions. U.S. President Donald Trump has started the second year of his second term with an escalation of an “America First” unilateralist foreign policy. In January, the U.S. conducted military operations to abduct Venezuela’s leader, Nicolas Maduro. The Trump administration has announced withdrawal from additional international organizations and UN agencies and has intensified pressure on Europe to approve its acquisition of Greenland from Denmark.
These developments have increased the dread among some analysts that this year may deal a death blow to the 80-year-old liberal international order. NATO and other U.S.-led alliances could collapse; Europe and East Asia might either fall within Russia’s and China’s spheres of geopolitical domination or pursue military — even nuclear — armament for survival. International trade could decline amid waves of reciprocal protectionism. The UN and other major international organizations could become functionally defunct (as did their predecessor, the League of Nations), as states repudiate “rules-based” multilateral cooperation in favor of explicitly nationalist, interest-driven foreign policies.
The prospects of such an adverse geopolitical transformation should not be lightly dismissed. At the same time, a key characteristic of an international order is that it can endure, even as its effectiveness declines or it faces crises. A systemic transformation may encounter countervailing inertia, as countries dissatisfied with the status quo still hedge against risking an alternative outcome.
The Trump administration has displayed this paradox — confrontational yet cautious in its drive to alter the current international system. Despite implementing or threatening a series of coercive military actions, the Trump administration has, until now, refrained from undertaking large-scale military operations or pursuing political regime change. As a result, regimes that have clashed with the Trump administration— such as Cuba, Iran and even Venezuela — remain largely in power.
Similarly, Trump’s conflict with U.S. allies has not yet crossed a red line. The Trump administration has not suspended support for Ukraine and Taiwan or attempted military action to occupy Greenland. Ongoing diplomatic and economic disputes may have weakened the credibility and effectiveness of U.S.-led alliances, but there is not yet a significant alliance breakdown comparable to the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War.
The revisionist powers have also displayed weaknesses in asserting systemic changes against the existing U.S.-led international order. Russia, even amid the West’s growing fatigue with the Russia-Ukraine War, has failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough in its war of attrition. Russia’s failure to protect allied regimes in Latin America and the Middle East from recent U.S. military operations has raised doubts about its ability to replace U.S. hegemonic influence. China, too, appears, for now, cautious about engaging in full-scale hegemonic competition with the United States.
Accordingly, this year may see a continuation of geopolitical attrition, in which no major actor achieves a significant victory or suffers a significant defeat. The United States may suffer a loss of reputation among allies, yet still retain alliances with countries that remain, strategically or ideologically, more averse to China and Russia. The Trump administration’s attempt to disengage from international conflicts and to selectively prioritize certain regions and issues may encounter obstacles from uncooperative adversaries as well as allies. Yet U.S. struggles — or even setbacks — may not translate into substantive geopolitical gains for its competitors.
Russia may still be trapped in a protracted war with Ukraine. Iran’s regime may continue to weaken as anti-regime protests persist. China, constrained by its domestic socioeconomic crises, may be unable or unwilling to risk aggressive pursuit of regional and global hegemony. Despite increases in conflicts and uncertainties worldwide, a geopolitical status quo may largely continue due to the weaknesses and restraints of key international actors. For those fearful of an adverse geopolitical transformation, geopolitical attrition may then be perceived as a less-bad outcome.
To be clear, relying on the caution and constraints of major world powers alone poses high risks for other countries. Historically, a world leader’s policy misjudgment or an unanticipated black swan event has triggered a catalyst for catastrophic events. Particularly for U.S. allies, their challenge is to persuade the Trump administration to refrain from policy overreach, while also deterring similar behaviors from revisionist powers. Deterring the crossing of an international red line may appear as a low bar, but even achieving such a bar requires diplomatic fortitude and strategy.
Skeptics may observe that attrition will eventually give way to a more definite outcome, whether positive or negative. A fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy —and a subsequent restructuring of the U.S.-backed liberal international order — may be inevitable, even after the Trump presidency. It is a relevant critique that frames geopolitical attrition as a transition period. But a transition toward what?
For Korea, geopolitical attrition is a double-edged sword; it will have to endure the current geopolitical impasse and heightened tensions in Northeast Asia. However, Korea will gain time; time to prepare and strategize how it might contribute to future geopolitical transformation. However long this transition period may last, Korea should make optimal use of the time available to partner in constructing an international order that would better safeguard its national interests.
Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer.