Corridors matter more than contracts. Perhaps, for Moldova,
energy security has long been a vulnerability rather than a policy
choice. Landlocked, politically exposed, and historically dependent
on Russian gas, the country is now positioning itself as a transit
node rather than a hostage.
Moldova and the United States are advancing plans to bolster the
Vertical Gas Corridor, a strategic gas transit route designed to
channel Azerbaijani pipeline gas and U.S.-supplied liquefied
natural gas (LNG) northward through Eastern Europe. The project is
gaining fresh momentum as Chisinau and Washington align more
closely on energy diversification and geopolitical resilience.
Originally conceived in 2016 to link Greece, Bulgaria, Romania
and Hungary, the corridor was expanded in 2024 to include Moldova
and Ukraine, turning a regional pipeline network into a potential
lifeline for countries previously reliant on Russian gas. It builds
on the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline, enabling flows from Greek LNG
import terminals such as Revithus and Alexandroupolis northward
into Central and Eastern Europe.
Moldova’s Energy Minister, Doreen Yunghieu, and U.S. Energy
Secretary Chris Wright have discussed accelerating the corridor’s
development, underscoring a joint interest in reducing Moscow’s
historical leverage over European gas markets. Such cooperation
reflects broader U.S. policy that views Southeastern Europe as a
key arena for energy security and diversification, tapping both
Azerbaijani pipeline supplies and LNG imports from global
markets.
The Vertical Gas Corridor stands out not just for its
geographical reach but for its strategic ambition. It aspires to
link a network of existing and emerging infrastructure, from the
TANAP and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) routes that bring
Azerbaijani gas to Greece, through the Greece-Bulgaria
Interconnector (IGB), and onward through Bulgaria, Romania and
Moldova to Ukraine and beyond.
Moldova revoked the gas supply license of Moldovagaz, in which
Gazprom holds a controlling stake, and has handed over all supply
functions to the state-owned Energocom from September 1. According
to Moldovan Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu, the state-owned
company Energocom has a clear strategy focused on source
diversification. “We would be glad to see Azerbaijani companies
among the suppliers. However, our recommendation is to carefully
monitor the tender procedures organized by Energocom, or submit
applications, or start direct negotiations,” the minister
stated.
Recent developments underscore this shift from concept to
implementation. Gas transmission operators from Greece, Bulgaria,
Romania, Moldova and Ukraine have jointly proposed new capacity
routes labelled “Route 2” and “Route 3” to regulators for approval,
aiming to expand cross-border transmission from reek LNG terminals
and Azerbaijani sources through the corridor to Ukraine. This kind
of infrastructure cooperation reflects a pragmatic response to
Russian gas transit reduction and European Union goals to diversify
supply as Russian pipeline contracts wind down.
Moldova, for its part, has been proactive. Its National Energy
Regulatory Agency has approved new transmission routes that are
expected to operate through winter months, strengthening linkages
with neighboring systems and boosting regional energy security. And
as winters grow more demanding and interconnected markets more
competitive, the corridor offers both security and flexibility, by
routing gas from multiple sources including LNG as well as
traditional pipeline flows.
Why it matters for Chisinau and beyond?
For Moldova, integration into the Vertical Gas Corridor is
transformative. Historically dependent on Russian gas, the country
has since diversified supplies and modernized infrastructure,
securing over 90 percent of its own gas needs heading into the
2025/2026 winter. Participation in the corridor now gives Chisinau
direct access to Azerbaijani gas and regasified LNG from Greek
terminals, reducing its vulnerability and embedding it more firmly
in the European energy market.
The corridor also has broader geopolitical implications. The
United States has signaled its support for Greece as a gateway for
LNG into Europe, encouraging investment and serving as a hub for
diversified flows that circumvent Russia. U.S. diplomats and
officials have articulated a clear strategic interest in developing
these connections, emphasising that Greece’s position as an LNG
receiving and transmission point can bolster regional energy
independence.
For the European Union, too, the corridor offers a way to align
energy markets across the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Expanded
capacity, potentially up to 10 billion cubic meters per year in
future phases, would link LNG supply points in Greece with transit
networks reaching Moldova, Ukraine and even Slovakia, reinforcing
EU objectives for cross-border energy connectivity and
competition.
Yet the project’s momentum is not without hurdles. Past attempts
to move gas along the corridor northward have seen mixed results;
in some seasons, buyers have opted not to import gas through
certain routes when competing options proved cheaper or more
convenient. Overcoming such market inertia requires not only
infrastructure but market mechanisms, regulatory alignment, and
competitive pricing, conditions that the participating countries
and their partners are now actively trying to establish.
By late 2026, key infrastructure components in Bulgaria and
beyond are expected to come online, boosting transmission capacity
and facilitating more robust use of the corridor. The involvement
of the United States, both as a policy partner and LNG supplier,
adds a geopolitical dimension that transcends regional concerns: it
frames Moldova’s role in the corridor as part of a transatlantic
strategy for energy security and diversification.