The possibility of Ukraine joining the European Union through an accelerated process has in recent weeks shifted from a political hypothesis to an openly discussed scenario in Brussels. Internal European Commission documents and debates held at the latest European Council point to a ‘fast-track’ accession process, potentially concluding as early as 2027, closely tied to Ukraine’s post-war economic reconstruction plans.
This strategic shift comes as Ukraine remains engaged in an active armed conflict, continues to face deep-seated structural corruption problems, and maintains an open political confrontation with an EU member state, Hungary, without Brussels having set clear limits on this dynamic.
Recent reporting and diplomatic briefings confirm that Brussels is actively discussing a ‘fast-track’ accession model for Ukraine, closely tied to the country’s post-war reconstruction. An internal document circulated ahead of the latest European Council summit outlines an €800 billion “Ukraine Prosperity Plan,” jointly pitched by the EU and the United States, which explicitly links reconstruction funding to accelerated EU membership.
This coupling has alarmed several capitals. Not just because of the financial scale—large sums are already being committed—but because accession is being used as a policy instrument rather than the result of a completed reform process. EU sources acknowledged that concerns were raised over abandoning the principle of merit-based enlargement, a cornerstone of EU credibility since the eastern enlargements of the 2000s.
The Commission, however, appears determined. Ukraine’s accession is increasingly framed not as a legal process governed by the Copenhagen criteria but as a strategic reward and security guarantee. In practice, this risks transforming EU membership from a rules-based outcome into a geopolitical concession.
Ukraine’s leadership insists the country will be “technically ready” for EU membership by 2027. That claim sits uneasily with reality. Ukraine remains in a full-scale war, its territory partially occupied, its economy sustained by external aid, and its institutions under extreme strain.
Corruption remains a systemic problem, acknowledged even by Kyiv’s Western backers. While reforms have been initiated, enforcement remains uneven and judicial independence fragile. In previous enlargement rounds, candidate countries were required to demonstrate not only legislative alignment but also sustained institutional stability—often over a decade or more. That standard now appears negotiable.
Supporters of fast-tracking argue that war justifies exceptional treatment. Critics counter that the EU risks setting a precedent it will not be able to reverse, weakening conditionality not only for Ukraine but for future candidates in the Western Balkans and beyond.
Targeting a member state: The Hungary question
The most politically sensitive element is Ukraine’s ongoing confrontation with Hungary. Kyiv has repeatedly accused Budapest of undermining European unity and has openly supported international pressure campaigns against the Hungarian government. Hungarian officials, in turn, argue that Ukraine interferes in domestic politics and disregards the rights of ethnic Hungarians in western Ukraine.
That a candidate country is allowed to wage diplomatic and political pressure against an EU member state—while being actively promoted for accession—is unprecedented. Yet, Brussels has largely looked the other way. The Commission’s silence contrasts sharply with its willingness to sanction member states over rule-of-law disputes, raising questions about double standards.
For Budapest, dissent on enlargement or Ukraine policy comes at a cost. For the EU as a whole, the episode exposes a deeper problem—the erosion of internal cohesion in the name of external strategy.
By promoting Ukraine’s accession while downplaying unresolved legal, political, and institutional obstacles, the European Commission risks hollowing out the very idea of the Union as a community of law. Enlargement has always been one of the EU’s most powerful tools precisely because it was conditional, demanding, and slow.
Linking membership to reconstruction funding and geopolitical loyalty may deliver short-term political wins, but it weakens the Union’s long-term legitimacy. If accession becomes a political shortcut rather than a legal destination, public trust—already strained—will erode further.