In Denmark, the (Danish) Competition Council is the principal authority responsible for enforcing the Danish Competition Act, whereas the (Danish) Competition and Consumer Authority handles day-to-day administrative functions and issues decisions in minor cases. Decisions adopted by either body may be appealed to the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal or directly to the Danish courts. Following the 2021 amendments implementing the ECN+ Directive, an initial appeal to the Appeals Tribunal is no longer mandatory. Instead, parties may challenge decisions directly before the civil courts – typically the (Danish) Maritime and Commercial High Court – with the possibility of further appeals. In competition law cases, private enforcement actions and most corporate criminal matters are usually brought before this Court, whereas criminal proceedings against individuals are heard before the local courts.
Danish competition law mirrors Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the EU Merger Regulation subject primarily to Denmark’s lower merger control turnover thresholds. As a result, it is generally immaterial to the substantive outcome whether a case is pursued under both EU and national competition law or solely the latter.
Several procedural avenues exist to bring an investigation or case to a conclusion, assuming it is not closed informally. In addition to ordering the cessation of infringements, the Competition and Consumer Authority may accept commitments, impose fines in uncontested cases, grant leniency –including full immunity – in return for cooperation or refer cases to the courts when corporate fines are deemed appropriate. However, only the public prosecutor may seek fines (or imprisonment) against natural persons.
Where concerns arise that do not justify the opening of formal proceedings, the Authority may issue a caution letter outlining its reservations without identifying the addressee. As regards mergers, transactions may be cleared, blocked or approved subject to commitments, broadly in line with the practice under the EU Merger Regulation.
Most of these procedural instruments were employed in 2025, resulting in several noteworthy cases discussed below. For brevity, references are made only to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which should be construed so as to encompass their national counterparts unless otherwise indicated. Finally, it should be noted that the Danish Competition Act was amended in 2024, empowering the Competition and Consumer Authority to call in mergers irrespective of turnover and increasing the level of fines. The call-in option was exercised twice in 2025.
Article 101 and horizontal agreements
In 2025, Danish case law offered, as usual, a couple of notable Article 101 cases involving horizontal agreements, including cases from previous years reaching the courts. Below, these are further detailed with links to the underlying decisions.
Murder on the Dance Floor – Round IV – Now with a judgment
In January 2025, the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court upheld the finding that ECIT Account A/S had acted as a cartel facilitator and imposed a fine of DKK 20 million (approximately EUR 2.68 million).
The case originated in 2021, when the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority fined 22 nightclubs for participating in a market-sharing arrangement. Within the framework of a legitimate cooperation agreement – focusing on joint procurement of goods and services and on staff training – the nightclubs had agreed not to establish venues in close proximity to one another. The Authority characterised this arrangement as an anti-competitive market-sharing agreement “by object”.
Initially, only brief summaries of the Authority’s findings were published, leaving several issues unclear. In October 2023, however, a formal decision was issued against the consultancy firm ECIT Account A/S. In addition to providing bookkeeping and managerial services to the 22 nightclubs, ECIT Account A/S had coordinated aspects of their cooperation, including the understanding concerning non-establishment.
Although ECIT Account A/S operated in a different market, it was found liable as a cartel facilitator – a concept that permits the inclusion of undertakings that play a decisive role in the implementation of a cartel without being direct participants. Given that ECIT Account A/S had allegedly managed core elements of the arrangement, the case may stretch the traditional contours of the facilitator concept. Nevertheless, in 2025, the Maritime and Commercial High Court affirmed the Authority’s assessment. The case has been appealed.
Procurement of reserve capacities and the formation of an electricity cartel
In November 2025, the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court issued the first judgments in the electricity cartel cases. A total of 49 undertakings, primarily active in district heating, and one trading company were accused of inflating the price of reserve capacity in Western Denmark, and six of these undertakings have now been found guilty by a court.
Reserve capacity is procured by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) to address unexpected imbalances between supply and demand in the electricity system. The 49 undertakings primarily operate district heating facilities but also produce electricity as a secondary activity.
In May 2021, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority carried out inspections at six undertakings following a tip-off from the Danish TSO regarding suspiciously uniform bids in tenders for reserve capacity. During these inspections, evidence emerged of an arrangement under which a single company, Effekthandel, coordinated the auction process on behalf of 49 district heating/electricity generators and subsequently distributed the resulting revenue.
The distribution was not based on successful tenders but on the capacity made available, meaning that it was immaterial whether an undertaking’s bid was ultimately accepted. In return, Effekthandel received a commission from each participant. Investigators also found that Effekthandel routinely informed the district heating/electricity generators of the purpose and effects of the arrangement, including information on how the arrangement enabled higher prices. Although the conduct did not involve explicit price coordination, the court found a restriction of competition by object, as the arrangement effectively operated as a bid-rigging cartel.
All 50 undertakings have contested this finding, but fines have now been imposed on the first six ranging from DKK 29,000 (EUR 3,887.88) to DKK 300,000 (EUR 40,219.50). Some benefited from the statutory 10% turnover ceiling, whereas others benefited from mitigating circumstances, including (incorrect) advice rendered by a competition law lawyer and a prior dialogue with the Competition and Consumer Authority, both of which may have led them to perceive the arrangement as legal.
Further hearings remain pending, and appeals are anticipated. Subsequently, criminal penalties may also be imposed on certain individuals. Damage claims may likewise be filed. Notably, some undertakings may be unable to pay the fines or any damages due to their legal structures, leaving insolvency as their only viable option. The six undertakings are expected to lodge appeals against the court’s findings.
The Hübsch case – when casual discussions on housing interiors take a twist
In April 2025, the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal upheld the finding that Hübsch A/S had infringed Article 101, including the conclusion that the evidence relied upon could lawfully be used to substantiate the infringement. Hübsch A/S had unsuccessfully sought to exclude certain items of evidence, arguing that they fell outside the scope of the inspection carried out.
Following a dawn raid in 2021, the Competition Council issued a decision in March 2024, finding that two suppliers of home interior products, Hübsch A/S and Broste Copenhagen A/S, had engaged in unlawful concerted practice.
The Council concluded that the undertakings had exchanged sensitive information via emails, text messages and telephone calls, enabling them to coordinate the introduction of a Covid-19 surcharge and subsequent price increases. Although no formal agreement was concluded, the Council relied on the concept of concerted practice, noting that the parties had communicated and then acted in a manner consistent with coordination. Hübsch A/S argued, unsuccessfully, that the discussions did not concern price sensitive matters, were unrelated to later price increases and had in any event been initiated by Broste Copenhagen A/S.
Hübsch A/S – unlike Broste Copenhagen A/S – lodged an appeal against the decision with the Appeals Tribunal. In addition to denying any anti-competitive understanding, Hübsch A/S submitted that key evidence should have been excluded. The Competition and Consumer Authority had initially opened the case and conducted the dawn raids in search of evidence of vertical price maintenance. Because the search warrant referred only to potential vertical restraints, Hübsch A/S argued that relying on evidence of a possible horizontal price cartel was improper, referring to the principle of out-of-scope.
In April 2025, the Appeals Tribunal dismissed Hübsch A/S’s arguments and upheld the Competition Council’s findings. In this respect, the Tribunal held that there was no general out-of-scope rule in Danish law.
The matter is now pending before the courts, where the Competition Council is expected to seek to impose a substantial fine, whereas Hübsch A/S, in contrast, must be assumed to deny any infringements and refer to enforcement irregularities.
Broste Copenhagen A/S, in contrast, did not contest the infringement and agreed to pay a fine of DKK 1.5 million (EUR 201,118), reflecting a significant reduction for cooperation during the investigation and for measures taken to prevent future infringements.
Fines in the Clear Channel Danmark case
In October 2025, the Copenhagen District Court imposed a fine of DKK 10 million (approximately EUR 1.34 million) on AFA JCDecaux for its participation in a price cartel. The other participant, Clear Channel Danmark, had accepted a fine of DKK 6 million (approximately EUR 804,473) in 2024, and the underlying conduct dated back to 2018.
In 2018, the Danish Competition Council found that the two outdoor advertising companies – Clear Channel Danmark and AFA JCDecaux – had engaged in unlawful price coordination. The conduct spanned two periods: i) September 2008 to December 2010 and ii) January 2011 to April 2015. A written price agreement existed only for the first period. However, according to the Council, the parties implicitly renewed their coordinated behaviour after the agreement terminated in December 2010 and thus engaged in concerted practices during the second period. The Council further held that the parties’ occasional deviations from their mutual understanding did not alter the anti-competitive nature of their conduct.
Although the parties initially succeeded in having the Council’s findings concerning the second period annulled on appeal, the High Court reversed that outcome in 2023 and reinstated the Council’s original assessment. In April 2024, Clear Channel Danmark accepted a fine of DKK 6 million, thereby concluding the case in relation to its involvement. AFA JCDecaux, by contrast, opted to have the courts review its role in the infringement.
The Copenhagen District Court delivered its judgment in October 2025, thereby bringing the proceedings to a close, as no appeal has been lodged by AFA JCDecaux.
Children are wonderful, but can be very expensive – the Ønskebørn case
In September 2025, the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court imposed a fine of DKK 9 million (approximately EUR 1.21 million) on the bankruptcy estate of Ønskebørn. The undertaking had originally contested the allegation of an infringement of Article 101. However, before the case could be argued before the Court, the retail chain filed for bankruptcy.
Ønskebørn is a voluntary retail chain comprising 26 independent shops and 20 owners, specialising in toddler accessories. On the basis of evidence obtained during an inspection in November 2020, the Danish Competition Council concluded in March 2023 that the members had coordinated prices and the marketing of those prices for certain brands – specifically, brands owned by the chain or in which it held exclusive distribution rights.
The coordination took place through a closed mailing list and through direct communication between the CEO and the members, contrary to the chain’s internal policy. In its defence, the chain argued, unsuccessfully, that its shops were not competitors because each served a distinct geographical area, that the contested decisions concerned marketing rather than pricing, and that the evidence suggesting otherwise had been taken out of context.
The Competition Council rejected all of these arguments. It first noted that Article 101 TFEU does not require all participants in an infringement to be direct competitors; it suffices that some are competitors while others facilitate the conduct. The Council also dismissed the claim that the discussions did not concern problematic pricing matters. In this respect, it referred to a series of incriminating emails in which members complained about others “dropping” their prices and urged the CEO to intervene, as described above.
As Ønskebørn contested the infringement, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority referred the case to the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court seeking the imposition of a fine. Before the proceedings could take place, however, the Ønskebørn chain filed for bankruptcy. A fine of DKK 9 million (approximately EUR 1.21 million) was subsequently imposed on the bankruptcy estate.
Botex II – A voluntary retail chain cannot assign territories – Or, can it?
The Competition Appeals Tribunal has overturned the decision in the Botex II case, involving a voluntary retail chain and its assignment of exclusive territories.
The case goes back to a decision issued in June 2022, in which the Danish Competition Council found that an agreement adopted by the voluntary retail chain (Botex) concerning its participation in advertising outside designated geographical areas infringed Article 101. The agreement prohibited such advertising, relying on a model that assigned exclusive territories to members and barred them from actively soliciting customers beyond those territories. In contrast, there were no restrictions on passive sales.
While the Competition Council characterised the arrangement as a horizontal market-sharing agreement, the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal took a different view. In October 2023, it overturned the decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. In March 2025, the Competition Council re-adopted its decision, addressing some of the shortcomings identified by the Competition Appeals Tribunal, but ultimately reaching the same conclusion as in 2022. However, this time, following more substantial (but undisclosed) discussions with the EU Commission on the correct reading of the horizontal guidelines.
The Competition Appeals Tribunal’s reasoning is particularly noteworthy in both the original 2023 and the subsequent 2025 decision. The Tribunal refused to classify the arrangement as a restriction by object (i.e. a cartel) in circumstances where a legitimate horizontal joint purchasing agreement merely had indirect effects resembling market allocation. Although authorities may be inclined to rely on the object category in such cases, case law – most notably the judgment in Case C-28/18, Budapest Bank, which emphasises the need for a holistic assessment – precludes automatic recourse to a by-object designation. Applying this holistic approach and relying on the “centre of gravity” principle set out in paragraphs 7-8 of EU’s Horizontal Guidelines, the Tribunal concluded that, despite the combined features of joint purchasing and joint marketing, the agreement remained, in substance, a joint purchasing arrangement. As market partitioning is not identified as a concern for voluntary retail chains in paragraph 278 of the Horizontal Guidelines, the Tribunal remitted the case.
Several possible interpretations of the case may be advanced. It is clear that the Competition Appeals Tribunal adopted a holistic approach to the assessment of horizontal agreements, looking beyond the agreement’s indirect market-allocation effects. What remains uncertain, however, is whether the Tribunal implicitly accepted the assignment of exclusive territories within voluntary retail chains. This reading is plausible: Such territorial allocations would generally be permissible under the Vertical Guidelines, provided that passive sales remain unrestricted.
The Tribunal’s reliance on paragraph 285 of the Horizontal Guidelines is particularly significant. In that passage, the EU Commission extends the more flexible treatment of joint purchasing arrangements to other markets in which the participants may also be competitors. Although the Tribunal did not explicitly state this, the extension should logically encompass the downstream retail market, thereby supporting the interpretation proposed here. Moreover, under a holistic approach, vertical and horizontal restrictions cannot be examined out of context, but must be assessed in accordance with the relevant guidelines. In this case, the vertical guidelines would provide guidance, unless a reservation is made in the horizontal guidelines.
This is a domestic case, but as the Council had coordinated its findings with the EU Commission, the findings should be applicable throughout the EU.
No cartel is too small or insignificant to infringe Article 101
In July 2025, fines were imposed in connection with a market-sharing agreement between two kiosks located on Himmelbjerget.
Himmelbjerget, rising to 147 metres above sea level, is considered Denmark’s highest point. For more than 25 years, the two kiosks had operated under an arrangement in which one kiosk (Bjergkiosken) sold foods and beverages exclusively to visitors, whereas the other (Ugleboden) sold souvenirs to tourists.
For these serious infringements of Article 101 TFEU, Bjergkiosken was fined DKK 250,000 (approximately EUR 33,471), whereas Ugleboden escaped sanctions under the leniency regime.
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority was fully aware of the relatively modest scale of the case, acknowledging this in the press release. Nevertheless, in an accompanying press release, it justified the imposition of sanctions by pointing to the duration and seriousness of the infringements, confirming that no infringement is too small or insignificant.
Article 101 and vertical agreements
In 2025, there were no new cases concerning vertical arrangements infringing Article 101 TFEU, which is somewhat unusual.
Abusive behaviour
2025 saw two new cases on abusive behaviour under Article 102 and two judgments confirming earlier ones.
The Coloplast margin squeeze – dominance in the market for your own product
In January, Coloplast was held in defiance of Article 102 by the Competition Council for engaging in a margin squeeze between 2020 and 2022.
Firstly some details on the background to the case. Coloplast manufactures and sells, e.g., ostomy products to people with ostomies, however, not directly, as the customers are a) municipalities procuring products from wholesalers, including Coloplast, and b) other wholesalers selling to the municipalities in competition with Coloplast. Moreover, two groups of municipalities are involved. The regional municipalities, first to introduce new users to an ostomy solution, and the local municipalities, procuring ostomy products for these end users. In principle, the latter group has options, but users tend to prefer the ostomy solution they are first introduced to, creating a lock-in effect. Manufacturers even try to capitalise on this by supplying ostomy products to the Regions for free.
In terms of market definitions, the Competition Council defines a separate wholesale product market for Coloplast ostomy products and an accompanying retail market for these, as the local municipalities procure a portfolio of complementary ostomy products. Brand-specific markets are unusual, but the Competition Council refers to consumer demand for Coloplast solutions due to the lock-in effect, making them akin to what in EU case law has been referred to as “experience goods” (see, e.g., Case AT.39.812 – Servier, recitals 2405, 2434-2435). Unsurprisingly, Coloplast is dominant in the market for Coloplast ostomy products, only subject to (limited) competition from parallel importers of Coloplast ostomy products. Yet, the market shares had fluctuated between 30-40% and 60-70% in 2022-2022. Moreover, the Competition Council includes group-internal sales (captive sales) in Coloplast market shares but, usually, this is not accepted.
A margin squeeze emerges when the margin between the wholesale and retail prices does not allow coverage for the downstream costs. Usually, this is assessed across a portfolio of products but, in certain yet unusual situations, on a product-by-product basis. As the wholesale prices levied by Coloplast when selling to the competitors exceeded the retail price offered to the municipalities by Coloplast, the abuse was apparent, dispensing the need for advanced AEC calculations.
The case is now pending before the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court, and, as indicated above, it is unique in several aspects, providing a case to look for.
Wrestling with Apple is possible
Before its Christmas recess, the Competition Council closed an Article 102 case against Apple by accepting commitments requiring Apple to grant third parties effective access to the servicing of iPhones. Until 2018, Apple did not permit this, but then it gradually changed its position, providing the necessary technical information. Nevertheless, unless original Apple spare parts were used, repaired devices displayed a warning message suggesting that the phone was not functioning correctly.
Following a complaint, an investigation was opened, indicating that Apple held a dominant position in the market for key inputs (technical information and specialised tools) necessary for the repair and servicing of iPhones within the European Economic Area. This dominance allegedly enabled Apple to leverage market power into adjacent markets. Apple disagreed, but offered to remove any perceived barriers.
The decision is a commitment decision, which is why many elements are underdeveloped. Regardless, it warrants comment. Confronting large technology firms is inherently demanding, but the decision is also well-drafted and offers many notable mentions.
Firstly, the Competition Council explicitly articulates a theory of harm that explains why Apple’s conduct raises competition concerns. Although not legally required, this facilitates the identification of the appropriate legal test and enhances the coherence of the assessment. Secondly, in defining the relevant spare parts market, the Competition Council draws on approaches developed for motor vehicles. It distinguishes between original and non-original Apple spare parts, the latter encompassing both parts of equivalent quality and those of inferior quality. Subsequently, it further differentiates between repairs carried out under/out-of-warranty, again drawing inspiration from motor vehicle case law. From this, it must be inferred that Apple retains the right to guide how repairs covered by the warranty are conducted.
Thirdly, the Competition Council considers, but ultimately rejects, including out-of-warranty services in the initial sales market. In antitrust terminology, inclusion would constitute a “system market” (see the Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market, recitals 99–101), an approach typically accepted where consumers calculate total life cycle costs rather than viewing primary and secondary products separately. This was not relevant here, but it is most positive that the Council entertained the idea rather than just rejecting it.
Fourthly, the decision’s analysis of dominance and abuse is relatively underdeveloped. This, however, may largely be attributed to the use of commitments rather than a prohibition decision. References are made to EU cases such as Apple Mobile Payments (AT.40452), recital 34, which identifies Apple as dominant in the supply of certain inputs, as well as to Google Shopping (C-48/22), Servizio Elettrico Nazionale (C-377/20) and Google Automotive Services (C-233/23), all of which establish that leveraging market power is abusive where competitors are unable to counteract such conduct.
Fifthly, notwithstanding the relatively underdeveloped treatment of abuse in this area, the case clearly demonstrates that the retention of technical information is unlikely to qualify as competition on the merits where it has the effect of foreclosing competition. This finding has broader policy implications for owners of ecosystems – whether digital or otherwise – who must remain attentive to the constraints imposed by Article 102 when interacting with third parties seeking access to such information or relying on it to provide after-sales services. Beyond smartphone manufacturers such as Apple, this reasoning is likely to be of particular relevance to the automotive sector, especially in relation to car manufacturers and non-authorised repair workshops.
Cash management and when to consider a price to be predatory
In November 2025, the Danish Supreme Court upheld the predatory abuse in the Loomis Cash management case, regardless of pricing exceeding AVC and the lack of predatory intent.
In 2017, the Competition Council closed an investigation into the cash management company Loomis concerning alleged anti-competitive foreclosure. Although the investigation identified certain concerns, the Council discontinued the case against commitments to terminate any exclusivity. However, a competitor (Nokas), claiming to have been foreclosed, filed a civil claim against Loomis, seeking damages.
In an interim ruling issued in August 2021, the Maritime and Commercial High Court held that the exclusivity agreements infringed both Articles 101 and 102. Four of the five judges also held that Loomis violated Article 102 by offering eight strategically important customers prices below its Average Total Cost (ATC), which is notable as the Court did not identify any predatory (elimination) intent, which the Court of Justice in AKZO considers necessary for finding abuse in cases of pricing below ATC. Under the AKZO doctrine, only pricing below AVC is abusive per se. The four-judge majority did not provide any detailed justification for departing from AKZO. Instead, they referred broadly to Post Danmark I and II and to the special responsibility of a dominant undertaking. By contrast, the dissenting judge explicitly relied on the AKZO doctrine, rejecting a finding of abuse unless pricing fell below AVC.
The finding of predatory conduct in the interim ruling was appealed and subsequently upheld by the Danish Supreme Court in November 2025. Once again, one judge dissented, maintaining that a strict application of the AKZO criteria did not support a finding of abuse, and that no additional factors justified characterising the pricing as anti-competitive. The remaining four judges endorsed the reasoning of the Maritime and Commercial High Court, concluding that Loomis had engaged in abusive conduct, albeit without providing substantial independent justification. It must therefore be inferred that the Supreme Court either implicitly accepted that predatory pricing may be established outside the narrow circumstances delineated in AKZO where the conduct appears anti-competitive, or, more broadly, that it expanded the concept of abuse under competition law.
Having confirmed that the conduct was abusive and infringed Article 102, the underlying damages claim will proceed before the Maritime and Commercial High Court in 2026.
One of the authors of this overview is an associate of Nokas’s legal advisers.
The FK Distribution tying case
In May 2025, the Maritime and Commercial High Court upheld the FK Distribution tying case.
In 2020, the Competition Council found that FK Distribution had infringed Article 102 by tying physical and non-physical (digital) advertising, thereby leveraging its dominant position in the former market into the latter. The Council identified an abuse on the ground that the conduct created an artificial advantage in the emerging online advertising market, applying a traditional and restrictive legal standard derived from Tetra Pak and Hilti.
More recently, however, the EU – see, for example, the Draft Article 102 Papers, recital 95, and Google Android, paragraph 537 – has moved toward a framework that places greater emphasis on: a) the extent to which competitors are able to counteract any artificial advantages, and b) the actual developments observed in the market. FK Distribution argued that the Competition Council had not adhered to these principles, prompting it to appeal the decision.
In May 2025, the Maritime and Commercial High Court upheld the Council’s decision, although two judges dissented. The dissenting judges considered that the Competition Council had failed to: a) substantiate the alleged anti-competitive potential of the conduct, b) assess the material submitted to rebut that finding, and c) take account of actual market developments.
FK Distribution has lodged an appeal against the judgment with the High Court, and the case is expected to be heard in 2026.
One of the authors of this overview is an associate of FK Distribution’s legal advisers.
Merger control
During 2025, a total of 70 merger cases were concluded, all of which were approved. Of these, three casesproceeded to phase II investigations, and one casewas concluded with commitments.
The gap between national markets and local assessments in retail
The Salling/Coop case from 26 March 2025 concerned Salling Group’s acquisition of 33 retail outlets from Coop Danmark in the Danish grocery retail market, with both parties being among the largest players in the market.
Salling initially notified the acquisition of 35 retail outlets, but two outlets were ultimately carved out following the Competition Council’s investigations of competitive conditions in the relevant local markets. In its assessment, the Council initially applied a screening methodology to determine which local areas warranted closer scrutiny. Specifically, it considered it unlikely that the transaction would significantly impede effective competition in local catchment areas defined by either a 5 or 10 minute drive from the parties’ stores where one or more of the following filters were met:
1) Filter 1: The parties’ combined market share was below 25% in the area.
2) Filter 2: The parties’ combined market share was below 40%, and the merger increased Salling’s market share by less than 5%.
3) Filter 3: The parties’ combined market share was below 40%, the merger increased Salling’s market share by more than 5%, but at least three grocery chains and two close competitors were present in the area.
These screening filters were inspired by prior approaches used by competition authorities in the retail sector, including the Competition Council’s decision of 29 November 2023 concerning Salling Group’s acquisition of parts of ALDI Danmark, and by the Commission’s guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. Based on the screening, the Council identified 20 local areas where, on the basis of the applied filters, it could not be excluded that the transaction might significantly impede effective competition. It then assessed these 20 areas and found no concerns in 13 areas, since the post-merger concentration levels, as reflected in the HHI calculations, fell below the Commission’s thresholds for cases unlikely to raise competition concerns, including six areas showing a negative change in HHI. The Council then carried out a more detailed assessment of the remaining areas and conducted a market investigation in five areas, which led to preliminary concerns in two areas. In response, the parties adjusted the perimeter of the transaction to exclude the two problematic outlets, enabling a smoother process without the need for a long and tedious consultation phase and negotiations on commitments. The Council subsequently cleared the acquisition of the remaining 33 outlets.
When examining the Salling/Coop case, it is particularly noteworthy to highlight that the Competition Council applied a narrow geographic market definition. While this approach is in line with the Commission’s practice in ITM/Mestdagh (M.10631) and the practice of the Danish Competition Council in, inter alia, the Rema 1000/Aldi case from 30 August 2023, in light of Aldi’s exit from the Danish market, it is worth noting that retail chains generally operate on a national level – with decisions relating to prices, assortment, quality of products, advertising campaigns and opening hours being made at national level. Additionally, with respect to other retail outlets, the Commission has considered the market to be national in scope, making the overall approach appear inconsistent. For example, in the restaurant sector, the Commission considered the narrowest plausible geographic market to be national – see TCCC/Costa (M.9122).
Horizontal competition concerns despite lack of same-level operations
The Norlys/EWII case from 27 August 2025 concerned the acquisition of Ewii Fibernet A/S by Norlys Fibernet A/S. Both companies were major operators in the provision of broadband and TV services to households via high-capacity infrastructure. Remarkably, the Competition Council relied on a complex theory of harm, finding that the merger raised horizontal competition concerns even though the parties did not operate at the same level of trade, as the market structure allowed both parties to significantly influence key competitive parameters when ultimately competing for the same end customers. The Council found that Norlys’s acquisition of EWII’s fibre network would eliminate competition between EWII’s fibre network, which provides access to retail broadband and TV providers, and the coax network of seven antenna associations for whom Norlys acted as the exclusive supplier. Since the merger would eliminate competition between these infrastructure networks, the Council found that there was a risk of price increases at both the wholesale and retail levels, as Norlys could effectively recapture customers who might switch from one network to the other in response to a price increase. Due to these competition concerns, the Council required commitments from Norlys as a condition for approving the merger. Specifically, Norlys had to accept that the merger could be implemented only once Norlys had either entered into agreements with one or more new suppliers for the seven antenna associations or agreed with the associations that the existing cooperation agreements would terminate, and once those agreements had been approved by the Competition Council. Norlys thereby committed either to divest the activities relating to the antenna association agreements or to conclude mutual agreements with the antenna associations on early termination of those activities.
Sub-threshold mergers scrutinised under new call-in regime
On 25 and 26 August 2025, the Competition and Consumer Authority exercised its new call-in powers for the first time, requiring notification of the Uber/Dantaxi and OneMed/Hardam mergers even though the turnover thresholds were not exceeded in the respective cases.
The Uber/Dantaxi case concerned two related markets: The market for taxi services and a potential market for the intermediation of taxi services. Uber had acquired Dantaxi while also having a cooperation agreement with Drivr, a competing taxi operator that had been growing and putting increasing competitive pressure on Dantaxi. The Competition and Consumer Authority’s main concern was that, after the deal, bookings for both Dantaxi and Drivr would run through Uber’s app, which could weaken Drivr’s ability and incentive to compete aggressively against Dantaxi. This reduced competitive pressure was the key reason for intervention. The Competition and Consumer Authority also noted that routing both through one platform could make pricing more aligned and increase the risk of coordination. In a related intermediation market, the Authority also saw a risk that the merger could enable unilateral fee increases.
The OneMed/Hardam case concerned OneMed’s acquisition of Hardam in the market for the supply of ostomy products and related services to Danish municipalities, where competition largely takes place through tenders. The Competition and Consumer Authority emphasised that, in tender markets, the decisive issue is often whether the parties are close competitors in bidding rather than concentration metrics alone. It found that OneMed and Hardam frequently competed in the same tenders and often ranked close to each other. The preliminary concern by the Competition and Consumer Authority was that the merger risked removing important competitive constraints between the parties and could lead to horizontal unilateral effects, meaning weaker tender competition and poorer outcomes for municipal buyers.
The cases share certain characteristics, which provide valuable insight into how the Authority intends to use the call-in powers going forward. Notably, both cases are based on observations of high combined market shares and HHI levels well above the thresholds set out in the Commission’s guidelines, without the need for a well-developed theory of harm. This indicates that only a relatively low level of scrutiny is required to establish a risk of significantly impeding effective competition as required to bring the call-in powers into play. Furthermore, both cases concern traditional transactions rather than so-called killer acquisitions, despite the fact that the legislative documents specifically highlighted such acquisitions as examples the rule was intended to address.
It is worth noting that companies required to notify a merger under the call-in regime must submit a full notification and, as a result, pay a significant fee of up to DKK 1.5 million, which may be disproportionate to the value of the transaction – possibly discouraging the parties from completing the merger.
Furthermore, the Danish call-in regime operates with a multi-track structure of time limits. As a general rule, the Competition and Consumer Authority may only require notification of a below the threshold merger within three months after a merger agreement has been concluded, a takeover bid has been published or a controlling interest has been acquired. This time limit may be extended to six months after closing in special circumstances, e.g., concealment of the transaction, failure to answer the Authority’s request for information within the set deadline or late submission to the Authority just before the three-month deadline, preventing timely assessment. However, if the parties inform the Authority of the transaction, the Authority must decide within 15 working days whether a notification will be required. This framework places merging parties in a difficult position. The quickest path to legal certainty is to engage the Authority early, but doing so may also increase the risk of closer scrutiny by effectively flagging the transaction as potentially warranting further review. In practice, this may lead parties to impose a de facto standstill period of at least three months before implementing the merger to mitigate the call-in risk. At the same time, there may be cases in which it is commercially preferable to notify the Authority voluntarily in order to trigger the 15-working-day time limit, rather than merely publish the transaction and wait out the three-month call-in window. For example, an earlier decision may help preserve business momentum, including by supporting employee retention.
Public enforcement, including punishment for infringements
As for 2025, several cases concerning public enforcement merit comments, jointly with the Competition and Consumer Authority’s new policy on commenting on the conduct of inspections (dawn raids). Moreover, new guidelines had been issued on a) information exchange in industrial organisations, b) inspections, and c) how cases are advanced before the Competition and Consumer Authority.
Failing to adhere to earlier commitments
In June 2025, the Competition Council decided to impose sanctions for breach of a set of 2010 commitments. The latter was used to close a potential Article 102 case, but the infringement is not evident. Admittedly, commitment decisions are, by nature, devoid of any formal finding of infringement. However, this particular case raises more complex issues.
The underlying case dates back to 2010, when the Competition Council moved against a ferry operator – providing services between Denmark and Sweden – and a policy that had prevented the resale of ferry tickets. By reselling tickets, small freight customers could aggregate their purchases and offset the disadvantage compared to large ones, as the latter received greater discounts due to higher volumes. The Authority argued that this (potentially) amounted to a violation of Article 102 by disadvantaging small freight customers relative to large ones.
The alleged abuse falls under what has been called “vertical discrimination” (or “real discrimination”), in which case the dominant firm is not active in the downstream market but offers preferential terms to some customers, thereby distorting competition among them.
Vertical discrimination is a rare phenomenon, as dominant firms generally have little incentive to engage in such conduct. Nevertheless, until around 2014, the Competition Council aggressively pursued cases of vertical discrimination, particularly where small customers were penalised relative to large ones. Following the landmark Post Danmark I judgment, however, the Authority appears to have reconsidered its stance, shifting towards a more cautious approach that requires a demonstrable, material effect on downstream competition before proceeding with such cases.
In the authors’ view, the 2010 decision is predicated on the same flawed interpretation of Article 102 that underpinned Post Danmark I. However, as the original case was not advanced to conclusions, but closed against commitments, this is immaterial.
No general out-of-scope rule in Danish competition law
In April 2025, the Competition Appeals Tribunal dismissed the existence of a general out-of-scope rule in Danish competition law.
In the Hübsch A/S case (cf. above), the Competition and Consumer Authority had initially opened the case and conducted dawn raids in search of evidence of vertical price maintenance. Because the search warrant referred only to potential vertical restraints, Hübsch A/S argued that relying on evidence of a possible horizontal price cartel was improper, referring to the principle of out-of-scope.
In April 2025, the Competition Appeals Tribunal dismissed Hübsch A/S’s arguments and upheld the Competition Council’s findings. In this respect, the Tribunal held that there was no general out-of-scope rule in Danish law.
The case is now pending before the Maritime and Commercial High Court, but it is understood that only the matter of how to calculate the fine is being challenged.
Incorrect legal advice does not preclude fines
In the reserve capacity case (cf. above), several undertakings benefited from mitigating circumstances in the determination of their fines. These circumstances included reliance on erroneous advice from a competition law attorney and prior consultations with the Competition and Consumer Authority, which may have led the undertakings to believe that the arrangement was lawful. Nevertheless, because the undertakings had entered into illegal agreements, these mistakes of law did not exempt them from the imposition of fines. Only a discount was warranted.
New openness about inspection (dawn raids)
In 2025, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority introduced a new policy on the publication of information about inspections undertaken. Whereas the Authority had previously refrained from making any public comments, this approach was revised in 2025. In explaining the rationale for the change, the Authority referred to the established practices of the European Commission and other Nordic competition authorities.
New guidelines
In 2025, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority issued new guidelines on a) information exchange within industry organisations, b) inspections, and c) processes in competition cases. All sets of guidelines reflect recent developments in case law as well as changes in the underlying regulatory framework.
Private enforcement, including compensation
In 2025, one case concerning private enforcement reached a preliminary conclusion. The Loomis Cash management case (discussed above) involves private enforcement of Article 102 TFEU.
In November 2025, the Danish Supreme Court held that the prices charged by Loomis were abusive. Having confirmed that the conduct constituted abuse and infringed Article 102, the Court allowed the underlying damages action to proceed before the Maritime and Commercial High Court in 2026.
Market studies in 2025
In 2023, new powers enabling the initiation of market studies were introduced. Under these provisions, the Competition and Consumer Authority, with the approval of the Competition Council, may open investigations not for the purpose of identifying infringements of Articles 101 or 102, as is normally the case, but rather to identify structural or behavioural impediments to competition that may subsequently be subject to remedial orders. In April 2025, this power was exercised to launch an investigation into the private damage insurance market.
In parallel with the market study, the Competition and Consumer Authority also initiated two more traditional sector inquiries in 2025, focusing respectively on a) the food value chain and b) broadband prices.
Legislative reforms in 2025
No legislative reforms were undertaken in 2025.