By Jon Letman
This article was originally published by Truthout
The US controls nuclear weapons in five NATO countries, but Europe may choose a new path amid strained relations.
For more than 70 years, the United States has practiced what it calls extended deterrence, which includes the so-called “nuclear umbrella” for its NATO allies in Europe. Countries under the umbrella agree not to develop their own nuclear weapons with the understanding that the U.S. could use its nuclear weapons on their behalf in certain circumstances.
In addition to some 80,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe, the U.S. deploys an estimated 100-120 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at military bases in five NATO nations (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey). Under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, the U.S. maintains operational control over these weapons but if used, they could be delivered by fighter jets flown by pilots in some host countries. Although these so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons are sometimes characterized as smaller “battlefield” bombs, they have a variable yield with a destructive power that can be adjusted from less than one kiloton (kt) to as high as 50 kt. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was around 15 kt.
The total U.S. military stockpile of 3,700 nuclear weapons, deliverable by intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, long-range bombers, and other systems, make up the nuclear umbrella. Today, with rising uncertainty about U.S. commitments to NATO’s collective defense, Europe is reassessing its own security capabilities and the role of nuclear deterrence.
As Russia’s war against Ukraine enters its fifth year, Europe faces economic, social, and political uncertainty. Growing doubts about U.S. obligations to help defend Europe are underscored by the mercurial nature of Donald Trump, who — until his recent abrupt change of tone — insisted the U.S. must own Greenland, which he called “a big piece of ice.” Trump’s conflicting statements are causing friction and fueling mistrust among NATO allies.
Europe’s reevaluation of its nuclear posture didn’t begin overnight. In a 2020 speech, French President Emmanuel Macron said, “I would like strategic dialogue to develop with our European partners … on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our collective security,” adding, “European partners which are willing to walk that road can be associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to developing a true strategic culture among Europeans.”
In 2024, Macron was criticized for comments he made about greater integration of France’s nuclear weapons in European security discussions, but new military agreements and dialogues between France, Germany, the U.K., Poland, Sweden, and others continue. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference earlier this month, Macron said, “we have to reshuffle and reorganize our architecture of security in Europe.” He is expected to deliver a major speech on France’s nuclear doctrine in the coming weeks.
According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute study, European military spending increased by 17 percent in 2024 with the U.K., France, and Germany all among the top 10 spending nations globally. German military spending, which is on an upward trend, was surpassed only by the U.S., China, and Russia. In 2025, Germany and the U.K. entered into a treaty calling for close dialogue and “deep exchanges” on nuclear issues.
NATO’s newest members Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) are also assuming a more forceful military posture. Last summer, Finland and four neighboring countries — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland — announced their withdrawal from the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Sweden has expressed a potential willingness to host U.S. nuclear weapons during wartime while Poland’s prime minister said his country “would be safer if we had our own nuclear arsenal.”
After January’s tension-filled World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke about increased nuclear cooperation among European nations, perhaps not as a replacement for the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but in addition to it.
Meanwhile, European confidence and trust in the United States is in a nosedive. A January 2026 YouGov poll of six European nations indicated a sharp rise in negative attitudes toward the U.S. over the last decade.
Europe Without the US? Keep Dreaming.
With the Trump administration’s more adversarial tone towards Europe, many are wondering if the U.S. is still fully committed to NATO’s Article 5, which says that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all. Despite this uncertainty, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently said, “if anyone thinks here, again, that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming. You can’t. In that scenario, you would lose the ultimate guarantor of our freedom, which is the U.S. nuclear umbrella.”
NATO nations may not be the only countries in Europe sharing nuclear weapons. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and his ally Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko claim that Russia has deployed non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons in Belarus. Analysts at the Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Information Project have identified one military facility that appears equipped to house nuclear weapons. Matt Korda, the project’s associate director and co-author of the Nuclear Notebook, told Truthout that, from a military and targeting perspective, whether nuclear weapons are in that facility or not is less significant than what it indicates about the political dependence of Belarus on Russia.
According to Korda, the idea of nuclear sharing in Europe had been undergoing a shift long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and escalating tensions with the United States. In recent years, Korda said, European nations have been signaling a more expansive, robust nuclear posture, emphasizing the need for maximum flexibility to move weapons and aircraft during a crisis. “That to me is a clear response to other members of NATO feeling like they still need some kind of nuclear umbrella or nuclear deterrent but not being able to rely as much on the United States anymore,” said Korda.
The U.S. B61 gravity bombs in NATO countries act mostly as a symbol of U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Korda said the true backbone of deterrence lies with nuclear-armed submarines, long-range strategic bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Questions about U.S. commitment to European security and increased tension come just as the last bilateral nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Russia, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), expired on February 5. Originally intended to last 10 years, it was extended by five, but Russia and the U.S. failed to negotiate a follow up. Despite Putin’s offer to abide by the treaty and Trump saying it was a good idea, nothing happened and the treaty lapsed. Trump dismissed the treaty, signed under President Barack Obama, saying, “if it expires, it expires,” vowing to negotiate a “better deal.”
Not only did New START limit the number of warheads either side could deploy, it offered a high degree of transparency and predictability. For example, whenever a weapon changed status or a missile was moved from a factory to a deployment site, notifications were issued — more than 25,000 over the lifetime of the treaty. Now, with the end of New START, the war in Ukraine, and an unpredictable U.S. administration, it’s much more difficult for NATO countries to talk about risk reduction, arms control, or disarmament, said Korda.
Nuclear Weapons Are Not Cheap
John Erath, senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, told Truthout that the expiration of New START “is but another factor in creating a general perception that times are much worse and things are much more dangerous now. But it’s only one part of the equation.”
Speaking on the utility of the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe, Erath said that, from the perspective of an American strategist, they are “completely useless and a needless expense.” But he recognized that from NATO’s perspective they play an important political role as symbols of the American commitment to Trans-Atlantic defense. If those weapons were going to be eliminated, he said, it would require “a complicated, extensive discussion about what else will signify and will symbolize that U.S. commitment to defend the allies at any cost.” Erath said that commitment is now in doubt because Trump has quite bluntly said so.
The ongoing maintenance of U.S. B61 gravity bombs, which Erath described as “rather old-fashioned,” is costly. “Nuclear weapons are not cheap,” he said, listing the requisite extensive security precautions, reinforced storage vaults, specially trained personnel, and other systems and facilities that cannot be dedicated to other military missions, “all in order to maintain weapons you hope you will never use.”
Would removing U.S. nuclear bombs lead to a country like Germany developing its own? Erath finds that hard to imagine. Any such attempt would face multiple significant legal, political, economic, and technological hurdles. Germany is prohibited from developing its own nuclear weapons by international treaties and agreements. Speaking about nuclear sharing and deterrence in Europe recently at the Munich Security Conference, Germany’s Merz said, “to be clear, we absolutely stick to our legal obligations.”
Europe Defending Europe
Even as the war in Ukraine catalyzes the rupture in NATO, accelerating conversations, giving a sense of urgency to discussions about U.S. retrenchment from Europe and the question of nuclear sharing, Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, has confidence in Europe’s ability to defend itself. In an interview, she told Truthout that she favors scaling back the U.S. military presence in Europe. “They can continue to be security partners. I just would like to not have 80,000 U.S. military forces there and … be on the hook to defend Europe.” She said the U.S. is secure enough and doesn’t need a large military footprint.
Kavanagh said Ukraine’s struggle for outside support underscores the need for self-sufficiency and adds that last year’s bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities sent a counterintuitive signal. If the U.S. wanted to send the message that it will not tolerate nuclear proliferation, in bombing Iran, the message was “if you don’t have a nuclear weapon, you’re not safe.” The very different treatment North Korea has received from Iran matters, said Kavanagh. “I do think that these trends are affecting European thinking, both about conventional security and whether or not Europe needs its own nuclear capability.”
At some point, she said, the U.S. nuclear umbrella loses credibility, adding that if the U.S. were to pull its conventional forces out of Europe, she expects Europe to pursue its own nuclear capability which could come in several forms. This could include extending French and U.K. arsenals to cover Europe, other countries pursuing their own nuclear weapons, or developing a unified European nuclear command. This would require a long, complex multilateral discussion of the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Kavanagh said, “There are some who are trying to shut the door on nuclear proliferation really hard. I think the cat’s out of the bag.”
There are also questions of sustainability. How long can countries continue to prioritize military spending over other needs? Kavanagh said it’s not sustainable for the U.S. to maintain global primacy as it has in the past. She said it makes sense to hand off the burden of defending Europe. She doesn’t think endlessly increasing military spending is the answer for the U.S. “We already spend more than half — discretionary spending is $1.8 trillion and we spend $1 trillion on the military.”
“We’re entering a dangerous world in which you have runaway proliferation by countries that already had nuclear weapons,” Kavanagh added, “and then you have encouragement for proliferation to other countries and that could include friendly countries like Poland and Germany and South Korea and Japan, but it could also include unfriendly countries.” Once the door is opened, she says it’s hard to close.
85 Seconds to Midnight
In January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announced its symbolic Doomsday Clock had been reset by four seconds to 85 seconds to midnight, the closest it’s ever been to global catastrophe in its nearly 80-year history. Steve Fetter, a member of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, said the setting reflects nuclear and climate risks, growing authoritarian rule, erosion of trust, and disruptive technologies that super-charge disinformation. “We don’t have a shared reality and without a shared reality I don’t know how you confront problems that are as big as nuclear annihilation or climate change,” said Fetter.
This erosion of trust extends from the United States to Europe. When Trump says the U.S. can’t defend Greenland unless it owns it, what message does that send to treaty allies? “At some point, those other NATO leaders are going to have to make a decision about whether their trust has so eroded in the United States that they have to go another way,” said Fetter. Recent polling by the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests we may be at that point.
Europe is watching how the U.S. demonstrates its commitment to treaty allies in Asia (South Korea, for example) and what happens in Ukraine, as it considers its own defense. Fetter said that he doesn’t think an increase in nuclear deployments or new weapons in Europe matters as much as whether they can trust their allies. Fetter told Truthout, “they look at the character on the other side — in the United States, in Russia, and they make their calculation about whether they can rely on us … if I was in their shoes today, I’d have a hard time relying on the United States.”
Ban the Bomb or Build a New One?
While European leaders and governments contemplate the future of the continent’s nuclear posture, many European citizens have another idea: no nukes.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also called the nuclear ban treaty, entered into force five years ago. Currently, nearly 100 countries have signed or acceded to the treaty, which forbids all aspects of developing, possessing, using, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. Four European states are party to the treaty: Austria, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino, as well as the Holy See, but NATO nations oppose the treaty, even as they insist they are committed to disarmament.
European public and parliamentary support for the nuclear ban treaty, however, is strong. According to a 2025 survey in Norway, eight in ten participants support the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Late last year, 70 percent of Swiss respondents expressed support for the treaty. A 2025 YouGov survey shows clear majorities of respondents in Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark oppose their countries developing nuclear weapons or hosting U.S. bombs. Today, more than 900 European cities and more than 560 current parliamentarians have joined campaigns and signed pledges supporting the ban treaty.
Bill Kidd, a member of the Scottish Parliament and co-president of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, told Truthout in an email that the U.K.’s entire nuclear arsenal is based “just 30 miles from half the population of Scotland … against the wishes of the Scottish people, the large majority of whom look for a nuclear weapons-free Scotland as a step towards a nuclear weapons-free world.” Kidd said that Scotland wishes for strong links with its neighbors in a “nuclear weapons-free Europe” and a “strong non-nuclear friendship with the USA.” The United Kingdom and France are the only European countries with their own nuclear weapons.
Speaking from her home in the Netherlands, Susi Snyder, director of programs with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, told Truthout that Europeans are looking for quick military solutions to long-term problems. She pointed to France, which has been pushing for a way to distribute the costs of its nuclear arsenal well before the Ukraine war.
“We’re seeing a lot more cavalier and casual talk about extending the nuclear umbrella,” Snyder said. “There’s no discussion about the impact it would have on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which is a huge outstanding legal question. The 1985 Review Conference of the NPT was very clear that nuclear sharing contravenes … the spirit of the treaty because you’re preparing to violate the prohibition on transferring or accepting the transfer of nuclear weapons. But nobody’s really talking about it in the political space. Instead, they’re talking about defense, but they’re not talking about law.”
In contrast, Snyder pointed to a report based on a public poll on perception of international law, which shows, she said, “overwhelmingly people want the law, not the military solution.”
Meanwhile, as the legality and risks of nuclear sharing are debated, real world pressures from Washington to Greenland, and Ukraine to the Middle East feed Europe’s debate over its nuclear future. Even as the discussion of a new European nuclear deterrent or another nuclear armed country continue and the line between conventional and nuclear arms is blurred, Snyder doesn’t believe the public has an appetite for developing nuclear weapons.
“Right now, lots of ideas are being floated,” she said. “It’s very risky and seems to have completely forgotten questions of what nuclear weapons do and where they would be used.”
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