There is also a security dimension to burgeoning relations between the two countries. Defence collaboration has advanced rapidly since 2021, when several agreements were signed. Two years later, a comprehensive bilateral military cooperation agreement covering joint drills, information sharing, counter-piracy activities, and defence industry partnership was approved[vii] by the Turkish parliament. Ankara is a major drone producer, and Ethiopia has long acquired drones to fight Tigrayan groups in the north of the country. This is especially important given the tenuous situation[viii] on the ground following the 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the warring sides. Ethiopia is also facing another conflict in the Amhara region. Here too, Turkish weaponry would be of major help. For Turkey, defence cooperation with Ethiopia serves multiple purposes. It expands Ankara’s defence export market in Africa, reinforces its reputation as a reliable security partner, and provides leverage in a region where military balance directly shapes political outcomes.
The durability of the alignment depends on Ethiopia’s internal trajectory. Ethiopia remains a state undergoing profound internal transformation, with unresolved tensions along ethnic, regional, and federal lines. A stable, centralised Ethiopia enhances the value of long-term strategic partnership; while a fragmented Ethiopia could entangle Ankara in complex internal dynamics and pose risks to its investments. Despite such uncertainties, the strategic logic underpinning alignment between the two remains strong. Ankara’s engagement with Ethiopia is therefore part of Turkey’s overall push to elevate its position in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.
This process is also animated by shifting geopolitics in Eastern Africa, which has grown increasingly intertwined with the Middle East. The space has become more geopolitically congested than ever, and Israel and the wealthy Gulf states’ engagement has heightened the stakes for Ankara. With their partnership, Turkey gains access to one of Africa’s most important political centres, a growing defence market, and influence over Red Sea dynamics without direct territorial commitments. Ethiopia gains a powerful external partner capable of supporting its security needs, amplifying its diplomatic voice, and facilitating its long-term quest for maritime access. As neither side is bound by ideological affinities the relationship will continue to be based on the principles of pragmaticism, interests, and adaptability.