Maleski is the first-ever Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of North Macedonia
When Croatia, Albania and Kosovo signed a declaration on defence cooperation in Tirana in March 2025, it was presented not as a military alliance but as a trilateral framework in security and defence. Yet the very creation of such a format inevitably activated the classic “security dilemma” in Serbia, raising a familiar question: what are our neighbours preparing? In such situations, what matters is not how the signatories interpret the agreement, but how it is perceived in Belgrade. If Serbia sees it as a threat, the predictable response is to arm itself “just in case.” This is how the security dilemma operates: a cycle of mistrust and countermeasures that can escalate into open conflict.
As NATO members, Croatia and Albania already benefit from Article 5 guarantees, meaning their security is formally ensured without the need for additional defence arrangements. Bringing Kosovo into cooperation with them effectively extends not only their security umbrella but also, indirectly, NATO’s protective reach over the former Serbian province, now an independent state contested by Belgrade. Brussels was likely aware that such a step would strengthen Pristina’s position in negotiations with Serbia. Regardless of the rationale, the outcome is clear: a new arms dynamic is taking shape in the Balkans. Serbia, as President Aleksandar Vučić explains, is acquiring Russian and Chinese missile systems to counter potential threats. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, he warned that the “biggest threat to Serbia” is the military alignment between Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina, hinting that external backing exists without naming it.
This narrative is echoed by Vladimir Đukanović from the leadership of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, who wrote in the Belgrade daily Politika that the intentions of the “alliance” are “clear as day.” He argues that once a broader conflict between Russia and the European Union erupts, Serbia would inevitably be targeted. He further suggests that Bulgaria could eventually join such a framework, citing alleged ambitions toward North Macedonia and southeastern Serbia, depending on the political leadership in Sofia. His remarks imply that North Macedonia could be drawn into any future confrontation, at least as a geopolitical arena of competing influences.
The broader context adds further uncertainty. The erosion of the unipolar global order, shifts in Washington’s foreign policy and the US war against Iran raise questions about NATO’s future. If the United States were to distance itself and the Alliance failed to transform into a primarily European security structure, the region’s stability could be further tested. In this light, North Macedonia once again appears as a point of contention among larger neighbours, suggesting that historical patterns could repeat. Both Skopje and Sofia face strategic choices: advancing EU integration and reducing bilateral tensions would limit the space for narratives about territorial ambitions and regional rivalry. | BGNES
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Prof. Denko Maleski, the first-ever Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of North Macedonia