The Kremlin unilaterally declared a short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 10 ordering Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to cease combat operations “in all directions” as part of a declared ceasefire from 1600 Moscow time on April 11, 2026, until the end of the day on April 12, 2026, for Orthodox Easter.[1] Putin’s decree states that Russia “assume[s]” that Ukraine will “follow [Russia’s] example.”[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded “no” on April 9 to a question about whether the Kremlin had discussed the proposed truce with the United States or Ukraine, or whether the truce meant that negotiations would resume.[3]
Zelensky stated on April 10 in response to Putin’s decree that Ukraine had proposed a ceasefire during the Easter holidays and “will act accordingly.”[4] Zelensky also stated that Russia could choose to extend the ceasefire. Peskov acknowledged that the Kremlin has seen Zelensky’s acceptance of the ceasefire.[5]
Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction over defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction but are not making significant advances west of Hulyaipole despite this prioritization. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 10 that the Russian military command appears to be prioritizing conducting offensive operations in the area of operations of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), which comprises the area west of Hulyaipole, over stabilizing the situation in the areas of operations (AORs) of the 29th and 36th CAAs (both EMD), which include the Oleksandrivka direction.[6] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has assessed that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction, which threaten the operational rear of the 5th CAA attempting to advance west of Hulyaipole toward Orikhiv, do not pose a sufficient threat for the Russian military command to reprioritize the defensive effort to the east over the offensive effort to the west. Russian forces have made only limited advances near Hulyaipole in recent days despite this reported prioritization; rather, ISW has observed multiple instances of Ukrainian forces continuing to advance in this area in recent days.[7] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command directed more reinforcements to the AOR of the 5th CAA, including elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], EMD), and 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), while the command only redeployed elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) and 69th Separate Covering Brigade (35th CAA) to the AORs of the 36th and 29th CAAs.[8] Mashovets noted that elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Regiment lead counterattacks toward Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve (both east of Oleksandrivka) and defensive efforts near Voskresnka (east of Sichneve) and Sichneve, but that this effort has not yielded gains for Russian forces, as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking in the Pryluly-Varvarivka-Oleksandrivka area (north to northwest of Hulyaipole).
Russian forces are reportedly pulling from their strategic reserves to reinforce their efforts in Ukraine, but do not appear to be using these reserves to reinforce their identified priority effort in Donetsk Oblast. Mashovets reported that Russian forces appear to be deploying strategic reserves to the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions, as the 5th CAA operating in the Hulyaipole direction and 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) fighting west of Orikhiv are in dire need of reinforcements.[9] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command intends to both increase the 5th CAA’s tempo of offensive operations in order to reach the Verkhnya Tersa-Hulyaipilske line (northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole) while defending against Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also reported that Russian forces have likely begun committing strategic reserves, as Ukrainian forces continue to inflict similar casualty rates on Russian forces, but the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine continues to increase.[10] Zelensky noted that Russian forces set a deadline to seize Druzhkivka, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk — the first two of which are part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt line in Donetsk Oblast — by the end of April 2026.[11] Russian forces have largely taken Pokrovsk but will not meet this deadline for Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka, however. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions are disrupting Russian efforts elsewhere in the frontline, including in the Pokrovsk area and the Fortress Belt, especially as Russian forces continue efforts to gain momentum in the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[12] These counterattacks have presented the Russian military command with dilemmas that have overstretched Russian forces, including forcing the Russian military command to redeploy forces away from instead of toward their priority effort against the Fortress Belt, and the Russian military command appears to be trying to alleviate some of these dilemmas by pulling from strategic reserves.[13] Pulling from these reserves so far has not resulted in tactically-significant gains for Russia, however, and Ukraine appears to have forced Russia to field these reserves in an area far from its main operational objective for the spring-summer offensive.
The Kremlin continues to intensify the throttling of Telegram. Russian opposition outlet Agenstvo, citing data from the global observation network Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), reported that the anomaly rate for Telegram logins reached 95 percent on the morning of April 10.[14] Agenstvo reported that this is the highest anomaly rate since Russia began throttling access to Telegram on March 20 and noted that the figures indicate that Russia is blocking Telegram more severely than WhatsApp and Signal, both of which Russia has banned, and have anomaly rates of about 89 percent. Agenstvo noted that Russian authorities tend to tighten access progressively and that authorities have previously conducted new waves of blocking at the end of the week. Agenstvo noted that the anomaly rate was 79 percent on April 9, which is typical of the anomaly rate on recent days. Agenstvo noted that Downdetector data also indicated a sharp increase in complaints about Telegram access in Russia on the night of April 9 to 10. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor previously reportedly struggled to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities attempted to throttle access to Telegram.[15] Russian officials have recently faced backlash from the Russian people, including the prominent ultranationalist information space, about the Kremlin’s ongoing censorship efforts, and Kremlin officials will likely continue to face such backlash.[16]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin unilaterally declared a short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday.
- Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction over defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction but are not making significant advances west of Hulyaipole despite this prioritization.
- Russian forces are reportedly pulling from their strategic reserves to reinforce their efforts in Ukraine, but do not appear to be using these reserves to reinforce their identified priority effort in Donetsk Oblast.
- The Kremlin continues to intensify the throttling of Telegram.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kupyansk, Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole directions.
- Russian forces launched 128 long-range strike drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Russian energy infrastructure on April 8 to 9 and 9 to 10, likely impacting Russian production capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two drilling platforms, an LSP-2 ice-resistant fixed platform at the Valery Grayfer oil field and an LSP-1 ice-resistant fixed platform at the Yuri Korchagin oil field in the northern Caspian Sea, on the night of April 9 to 10.[17] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed on April 10 that Ukrainian drones struck an oil tank in Svetloyarskiy Raion, Volgograd Oblast, overnight.[18] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tinguta main oil pumping station in the Svetloyarskiy Raion, causing a fire.[19] Astra reported that Tinguta belongs to JSC “Transneft – Pryvolga” and pumps up to three million tons of diesel fuel per year and can access the Novorossiysk loading port for exports and the domestic Russian market.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Krymskaya oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 8 to 9, causing a fire.[20] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Schemes project published satellite imagery on April 9 showing possible scorch marks near the oil tanks at the Krymskaya pumping station, indicating possible damage to the infrastructure.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on April 10 that Ukrainian forces on April 4 to April 5 damaged the AVT-2 primary oil refining technological unit and the LCh-24-7 diesel fuel hydrotreatment unit at the Russian Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[22]
Russia has reportedly partially resumed oil and fuel loadings at the port of Novorossiysk following recent Ukrainian drone strikes. Two sources familiar with the port’s operations told Reuters on April 10 that Russia resumed oil and fuel loadings from its Sheskharis oil terminal at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk late on April 9 after a week-long suspension following a Ukrainian drone strike.[23] Reuters reported that the Sheskharis oil terminal, which has a loading capacity of roughly 700,000 barrels per day of crude oil, suspended oil loadings on April 6 after a drone strike started fires at a fuel terminal and some berths. ISW observed reports of Ukrainian drone strikes on Novorossiysk on the night of April 5 to 6.[24]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly targeting Russian air defense personnel in Belgorod Oblast border areas. Reporting from a Belgorod Oblast Telegram channel indicates that Ukrainian strikes against Belgorod Oblast border areas since April 1 and 9 have killed at least one and injured at least 13 members of the Russian Orlan volunteer air defense unit.[25]
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 10, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.
Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows a Russian position in Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) in what ISW assesses is a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[26]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on April 10 that Russian forces seized Myropilske (east of Sumy City along the international border).[27] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of the Myropilske.[28] Russia has claimed the seizures of several small settlements along the international border with northern Ukraine as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at furthering the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[29]
A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces attacked east of Sumy City toward Velykyi Prykyl and southeast of Sumy Oblast near Novodmytrivka on April 10.[30]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[31] Fiber-optic drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in the Kursk Oblast border area.[32] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy and Belgorod directions.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Krasnooktyabrskoye (roughly 16 kilometers from the international border) on the night of April 9 to 10.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Starytsya, Verkhnya Pysarivka, Zybyne, and Prylipka and toward Okhrimivka and Volokhivka on April 9 and 10.[35]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[36]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on April 10 but did not advance.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: The geolocated footage published on April 10 also indicates that Ukrainian and Russian positions in the fields east of Petropavlivka are likely intermixed.[39]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka, and toward Novoosynove and Kivsharivka; and south of Kupyansk toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on April 9 and 10.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[41]
Order of Battle: Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone operators are reportedly targeting Ukrainian logistics in the Kupyansk direction.[42] Drone operators of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Pishchane.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Olhivka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on April 9 and 10.[44]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on April 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot and a manpower concentration near occupied Perevalsk (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline), an ammunition depot near Trudove (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline), and a fuel and lubricants warehouse near Rovenky (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[45] Ukrainian Telegram sources published footage on April 9 showing fires reportedly at a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline) following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates Ukrainian forces advanced in central Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[47]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Additional geolocated footage published on April 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Yampil, likely as part of an infiltration mission.[48] These Russian forces likely infiltrated prior to recent Ukrainian advances in Yampil, and therefore, this event does not indicate a change in control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Dibrova (southeast of Slovyansk).[49] A Russian milblogger refuted the Russian MoD’s claims, instead claiming that the village has been a contested “gray zone” for a long time and that Russian forces cannot even consolidate positions on the outskirts of Dibrova.[50]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky and toward Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Slovyansk near Yampil and Fedorivka Druha and toward Nykyforivka; and east of Slovyansk near Ozerne, Kryva Luka, Zakitne, and Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 9 and 10.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dibrova and Lypivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[52]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb strike against Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[53]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Yampil.[54] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Rai-Oleksandrivka tactical direction.[55] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka, south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar, and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Novopavlivka on April 9 and 10.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Kostyantynivka itself and near Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka).[58]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near Novopavlivka and Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on April 9 and 10.[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[61]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[62]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: The geolocated footage published on April 9 also indicates that Russian positions in western Hryshyne are not contiguous.[63]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself, northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Vasylivka, and Myrne, north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske, east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on April 9 and 10.[64]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 10 that Russian forces continue small group infiltrations in the Pokrovsk direction in an attempt to survey the land and determine new paths for infiltration missions.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Muravka, and Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 9 and 10, but did not advance.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and Myrne; southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Vorone, Kalynivske, Zlahoda, and Verbove; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Boikove and Rizdvyanka on April 9 and 10.[67]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces that reached Ternove and Novomykolaivka areas (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) repelled Russian attacks from Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizke (southeast of Berezove) over the past two weeks (since about March 27).[68] Mashovets implied that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infantry groups from Berezove. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces do not appear to have made additional advances from Novomykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) toward Termyrivka (southeast of Novomykolaivka) or from Ternove toward Zaporizke recently.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Oleksandrivka.[69]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on April 8 to 9 and April 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian materiel and technical warehouse near Mykilske (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone warehouse near Orlynske (roughly 28 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 8 to 9.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics hub near Novoazovsk (roughly 148 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone control point near Novohryhorivka (roughly 106 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 9 to 10.[71]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole).[72]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Varvarivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; southwest of Hulyaipole near Charivne and toward Hulyaipilske; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Staroukrainka on April 9 and 10.[73]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[74] Drone operators of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th CAA) are intercepting Ukrainian drones northeast of Ivana Franka (southwest of Hulyaipole).[75] Drone operators of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are intercepting Ukrainian drones east of Varvarivka.[76] Elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Ternuvate, south of Kosivtseve, and in Dobropillya (all northwest of Hulyaipole).[77]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Hulyaipole overnight on April 9 to 10.[78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Orikhiv itself and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on April 10.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[80]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[81] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[82]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near Okhrimivka (roughly 117 kilometers from the frontline) and an unmanned aerial vehicles control point near Novopetrivka (roughly 98 kilometers from the frontline).[83] Ukrainian National Guard Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko stated on April 10 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Palatin electronic warfare (EW) system, a 9A83 missile launcher, and a 9S32 multi-channel missile guidance station of an S-300V air defense missile system in unspecified areas of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[84] Geolocated footage published on April 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian diesel locomotives near Mala Bilozerka and Dniprorudne (southwest of Orikhiv).[85]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction on April 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on April 9 and 10.[86]
Kherson Occupation Governor Vladimir Saldo published footage on April 10 showing Russian forces conducting a FAB-3000 strike against Kherson City.[87]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[88]
Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to impact Russian energy assets and logistics in occupied Crimea. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data continues to record heat anomalies at the JSC Sea Oil Terminal in Feodosia (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline) for the third day after the Ukrainian strike on the terminal on April 8.[89] Executive Director of the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” Oksana Ishchuk stated on April 10 that the strike destroyed Russian capacity to store petroleum products, fuels, and lubricants at one of the three main logistics hubs in occupied Crimea along with Sevastopol and the Kerch Bridge.[90] Ishchuk added that the damage to the terminal tank will force Russian logistics to deliver fuel via the Kerch bridge and lead to a two to six-week short-term fuel shortage in occupied Crimea.
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 9 to 10, damaging energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 128 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones — of which about 85 were Shaheds – from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[91] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 113 drones, that 14 drones struck six locations, and that debris from downed drones fell on seven locations. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Odesa, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts on the morning of April 10.[92]
Russian forces are conducting daytime Shahed drone strikes to maximize their effectiveness against civilian targets and business activity. BBC’s Russian Service reported on April 10 that Russian forces engaged in 24-hour Shahed drone strike campaigns on March 23 to 24 and March 31 to April 1, a deviation from Russia’s previous strategy of conducting 10-to-12-hour attacks between dusk and dawn.[93] BBC’s Russian Service reported that these longer strike windows allowed Russian drones to target almost every Ukrainian oblast, alongside areas deep in western Ukraine, including Lviv, Lutsk, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk cities. The BBC noted that Russian forces tend to target frontline areas during more traditional overnight strikes series, however. The BBC assessed that increased visibility during the day also allows Russian drone operators to control Shahed drone flight paths using mesh networks to find unprotected targets, compared to having to rely on pre-prepared coordinates for stationary targets at night. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated in an interview with RBK Ukraine on April 8 that Russia is combining nighttime and daytime strikes to inflict greater casualties on civilian targets, disrupt businesses, and avoid Ukrainian air defenses after exhausting them in the evening.[94] Palisa warned that Russian forces may temporarily suspend strikes before conducting more intense strikes that target energy generation and distribution, water supply, and transportation infrastructure.
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus is collaborating with Russia on a joint remote-sensing satellite. The Belarusian National Academy of Sciences Aerospace Activities Department Chief Specialist Irina Kazachok claimed on April 10 that Belarus is developing target equipment for a joint Russian-Belarusian satellite, which will conduct remote sensing, and that Belarus and Russia plan to launch the satellite in 2028.[95] Kazachok added that Belarus is responsible for the specialized payload equipment, while Russia is providing the platform for the target equipment.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
Endnotes
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79517; https://t.me/mod_russia/62537; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4806;
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79517; https://t.me/mod_russia/62537; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4806;
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/27061443
[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2042349718186180839?s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18585
[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/27066727
[6] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3342
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/;
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3341
[9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3340
[10] https://suspilne dot media/1285851-rosia-pocala-zastosovuvati-strategicnij-rezerv-u-vijni-z-ukrainou-zelenskij/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2042490848059830393?s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18586
[11] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1285747-hocut-zahopiti-do-kinca-kvitna-ale-sil-nemae-zelenskij-pro-situaciu-u-boah-za-pokrovsk-kostantinivku-druzkivku/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/
[14] https://t.me/agentstvonews/14737
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37134
[18] https://t.me/rgn_34/11205
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/109414
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37100
[21] https://t.me/cxemu/4752
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[23] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/black-sea-port-novorossiysk-partially-resumes-oil-fuel-loadings-after-drone-2026-04-10/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/
[25] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2042323084527415390; https://t.me/belpepel/19549; https://t.me/belpepel/19593; https://t.me/belpepel/19608; https://t.me/belpepel/19740; https://t.me/belpepel/19754;
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11664; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1B3Qf1bB7m/
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/62546
[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206428; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41735;
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/33427; https://t.me/severnnyi/7501
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/7507
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41720
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206477
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20424; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50423
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133
[38] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042403361648230767; https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/7343; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/577
[39] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042403361648230767; https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/7343; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/577
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20424 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41741 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18275
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/91038
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/09/roblyat-use-shhob-logistyka-ne-mogla-doyihaty-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-adaptuyutsya-do-vorozhoyi-taktyky/
[43] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042403361648230767; https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/7343; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/577
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[46] https://t.me/supernova_plus/50395 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18628
[47] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14169; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11659
[48] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042362141760766104; https://t.me/brigade_53/1541
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/62546
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50414
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20424 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50404 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50400 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50423 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427 ; https://t.me/rybar/79392
[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/91038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41730
[54] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14169; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11659
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50401 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50418
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206477
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/91038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15230; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/112840
[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/33427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50401 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50418
[62] https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/2763; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2042285782627467490
[63] https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/2763; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2042285782627467490
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101; https://t.me/dva_majors/91038; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/10/hochut-proshhupaty-terytoriyu-stezhky-podyvytysya-poblyzu-pokrovska-narazi-nemaye-navit-natyakiv-na-velykodnye-peremyrya/
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13679 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3341
[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/19227
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37100
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[72] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042325740537201106; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042333134612807819; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042337899761582087; https://t.me/rotabplaofficial5/333
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13679 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101; https://t.me/dva_majors/91038; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427; https://t.me/voin_dv/19225
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/19226; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2042572242349855166
[75] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042300492882329998; https://t.me/voin_dv/19220
[76] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042307017453551901; https://t.me/zov_kam/22831
[77] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042325740537201106; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042333134612807819; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042337899761582087; https://t.me/rotabplaofficial5/333
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33427 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91038
[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50404
[81] https://t.me/wargonzo/33443; https://t.me/voin_dv/19228
[82] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41720
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37135
[84] https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/3916 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/10/bagatosharova-speczoperacziya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-pozbavyla-voroga-ppo-ta-punktu-upravlinnya-bpla/; https://t.me/lasars_group/118 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-zaporizhzhi-drony-urazyly-dvi-systemy-kompleksu-s-300-okupantiv/
[85] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2042250258076320161?s=20; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2042251876121411630?s=20; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/868; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/866; https://t.me/andriyshTime/55738
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37133 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37103 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13679 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37101
[87] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/14716; https://t.me/tass_agency/370524
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41720
[89] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@34.7,45.2,8.9z; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1286075-pozeza-na-naftobazi-u-feodosii-trivae-tretij-den-pisla-ataki-zsu-suputnikovi-znimki/
[90] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1286423-bude-deficit-na-2-6-tizniv-oksana-isuk-pro-naslidki-urazenna-naftovogo-terminala-v-okupovanomu-krimu-8-kvitna/
[91] https://t.me/kpszsu/59785
[92] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4857 ; https://suspilne dot media/1286039-u-pati-oblastah-ukraini-e-castkovo-znestrumleni-spozivaci-cerez-ataki-rf-ukrenergo/ ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4856 ; https://suspilne dot media/1285769-u-vsih-regionah-ukraini-diatimut-grafiki-vidklucen-svitla/
[93] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c7059g65554o ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/93700
[94] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/okupovaniy-kilometr-donechchini-voroga-316-1775564047.html
[95] https://belta dot by/tech/view/belarus-razrabatyvaet-tselevuju-apparaturu-dlja-sovmestnogo-s-rossiej-sputnika-774696-2026/