The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” — TRIPP — continues to attract the attention of international actors both from far abroad and from neighbouring countries.
In particular, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently stated that Kazakhstan could become one of the partners in TRIPP, noting that since August, Astana has not concealed its interest in the project.
“A new route of international connectivity is opening up, and as you know, Kazakhstan is one of the major players in the international transport industry, particularly in the context of freight flows from China and to China. Kazakh partners, and we also discussed this during my visit, are trying to understand in more concrete terms what transport opportunities are opening up and what opportunities are emerging for them,” said the Armenian prime minister.
In addition, there remains ongoing intrigue regarding Kazakhstan’s potential acquisition of the Russian concession for Armenian railways, which Pashinyan has also mentioned. This information has caused significant concern in Moscow. For example, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated that “the Russian side learned about the possible transfer of the concession for the Armenian Railways from colleagues from other countries; no such discussion was held directly with Moscow.”
So, what kind of cooperation within TRIPP involving Kazakhstan is being discussed? What might it look like in practice, and is it connected to the possible acquisition of the Armenian railways concession by Astana? Kazakh political analysts answer these questions for Caliber.Az.
Thus, Professor at Turan University, PhD in International Relations Nurbolat Nyshanbayev believes that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement about potential rapprochement with Kazakhstan within TRIPP should be viewed in a broader context of the transformation of Eurasian transport geoeconomics.
“It is not just about a new route, but about the formation of an alternative connectivity architecture aimed at diversifying transit flows and reducing dependence on traditional—primarily Russian—logistics routes. In this regard, TRIPP acts as part of a broader strategy by external actors to redefine transport corridors in the South Caucasus.
Within this configuration, I believe Kazakhstan is objectively not interested in direct control over infrastructure, including such sensitive assets as South Caucasus Railway. Its strategy is more in line with the logic of ‘functional multi-vectorism’, where the priority is not control but maximising transit potential. By integrating TRIPP into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Astana can strengthen its role as a key Eurasian hub, ensuring connectivity along the China–Caspian–South Caucasus–Europe axis.
At the same time, the situation surrounding the South Caucasus Railway remains an indicator of Russia’s enduring influence in Armenia. In my view, the position of Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk reflects Moscow’s determination to retain control over Armenia’s strategic infrastructure: no negotiations are underway regarding the transfer of the concession, and there are no grounds for such discussions. Consequently, the discourse around this issue should most likely be interpreted as an element of Yerevan’s political manoeuvring aimed at expanding its room for negotiation with various external partners.
Thus, the current dynamics surrounding TRIPP and the South Caucasus Railway, in my opinion, reflect not so much concrete infrastructure decisions as a deeper competition over shaping the rules of the game in Eurasian logistics. Within this system, Kazakhstan positions itself as a pragmatic ‘middle power,’ extracting economic benefits from intersecting transport initiatives while avoiding direct involvement in geopolitical control over infrastructure,” said Nyshanbayev.
Meanwhile, political analyst and economist Ruslan Salikhov believes that Armenia is open to cooperation in the process of unblocking communications across a wide range of areas, including potential investment. In his view, this is reflected in a recent statement by Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.
“As Armenia’s foreign minister noted, third countries may be involved in implementing the ‘Trump Route’ through Armenian territory, both during the construction phase and in its subsequent operation. He also emphasised that the agreement itself will be bilateral—between Armenia and the United States—but that partners will most likely be needed at the construction stage.
Of course, for now we can only speculate about the contours of such cooperation, as much regarding the launch of the route remains at the level of political understandings rather than formalised contracts with foreign contractors. At the same time, it is clear that the partnership environment for launching the corridor is taking shape right now. Undoubtedly, the United States is currently focused on the Middle East, and we are seeing a decline in Washington’s attention to this issue, but these challenges will be resolved sooner or later.
As for Kazakhstan’s strategy, Astana appears to have already decided to engage in the launch of TRIPP due to clear objective factors. The Kazakh side is highly interested in diversifying routes through the South Caucasus to Europe, as it has long depended on transporting its energy resources and cargo via Russian logistics and through Russian territory. However, this direction is facing an increasing number of challenges.
Thus, the transit of energy resources and cargo across the Caspian and further through the South Caucasus is, in essence, a strategy of survival for Kazakhstan’s future. For this reason, Astana’s participation in the launch of TRIPP may be multi-layered and diverse, potentially including cooperation in areas such as a concession for Armenia’s railway infrastructure.
At the same time, however—and Kazakhstan emphasises this—such agreements are only possible with full consensus with Russia, taking into account the entire context of such arrangements, rather than in defiance of them,” concluded Salikhov.