The review of the U.S. military presence in Europe should not be interpreted as a spontaneous decision following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, but rather as the consequence of a previous strategic trend: the progressive reassignment of Washington’s resources towards scenarios it considers priorities for its national security. It is not merely a budgetary issue or a situational reaction against its European allies, but a structural readjustment. For years, the United States has been reconsidering the strategic value of its permanent deployments on European soil in an international scenario increasingly conditioned by competition in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. presence in Europe
The U.S. military presence in Europe primarily responds to two major interests. The first is the ability to project force into various theaters of operations: the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Arctic, or even the Asia-Pacific. Bases, logistics centers, military hospitals, regional commands, and communication systems allow the United States to operate quickly beyond the European continent. The second interest is early warning and protection of North American territory against missiles, aerial threats, cyberattacks, space operations, or hybrid actions that may directly or indirectly affect its national security.
From this perspective, a clear logic can be anticipated: the United States will maintain in Europe those assets that contribute to its global security, but will reduce, relocate, or condition all those forces and installations that are not essential to its strategic priorities. The question, therefore, is not whether Washington will abruptly leave Europe, but which part of its European presence will continue to be useful for its national interests.
The recent decision to cut approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel from the 36,436 deployed in Germany should be interpreted in this context. Although the White House has linked this measure to the lack of European support for the United States in the war with Iran, that explanation should be understood within a broader strategic framework. The immediate political argument does not exhaust the underlying reasons: the decision fits with a previous trend from Washington aimed at reducing the cost of European defense, incentivizing greater responsibility from allies, and freeing up capabilities for scenarios considered more priority.
Change of strategy
The United States’ National Security Strategy of 2025 reinforces this reading. In it, Russia no longer occupies the central place it had during the Cold War and much of the period following the aggression against Ukraine. Moscow remains a relevant threat, especially for the eastern European flank, but it no longer constitutes the absolute axis of U.S. strategic planning. For Washington, the determining challenge of the 21st century lies in competition with China, protection of the Western Hemisphere, technological security, control of maritime routes, industrial resilience, and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
This change has direct consequences for NATO. If Russia is no longer perceived by the United States as an immediate existential threat to North American territory itself, it becomes less justifiable to maintain tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel in Europe prepared for a high-intensity land war. From the U.S. perspective, that type of contingency should increasingly be assumed by the Europeans themselves. The United States will continue to provide critical capacities—nuclear deterrence, intelligence, satellites, strategic transport, command and control, missile defense, and naval capabilities—but will be less inclined to sustain the bulk of conventional defense of the continent.
Here lies NATO’s great paradox. The North Atlantic Treaty was born in 1949 to curb the expansion of the former Soviet Union and ensure the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic space. Its founding principle responded to a specific, identifiable, and territorial threat: the possibility of Soviet expansion over Western Europe. However, the world that gave rise to the Alliance no longer exists. The Soviet Union disappeared, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and international security has fragmented into multiple dimensions: competition between great powers, hybrid warfare, cyber threats, instrumentalized migratory pressure, energy insecurity, disinformation, control of critical infrastructures, and technological rivalry.
The reason for NATO’s existence
This does not mean that NATO has lost all reason for existence. On the contrary, the war in Ukraine demonstrated that territorial defense and deterrence remain relevant. But it does mean that the Alliance needs to redefine its purpose. An organization created to contain the Soviet Union cannot simply reproduce its original logic indefinitely in an international system dominated by competition between the United States and China.
The question, therefore, is inevitable: will the United States leave NATO?
From a legal standpoint, a formal exit during Trump’s term does not seem simple. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows a member state to leave the Alliance after notifying its renunciation, but in the U.S. case, there are internal constraints, especially Congress’s resistance to a unilateral withdrawal. That is, de jure, the U.S. exit would require a complex, politically costly, and legally disputable procedure.
However, the real risk is not a formal exit, but a functional exit. The United States can remain within NATO and, at the same time, partially empty its commitment. It can reduce forces, decrease financial contributions, condition operations, demand greater European contributions, limit the availability of certain capabilities, or turn its security guarantee into an instrument of political negotiation. In other words, Washington does not need to leave NATO to profoundly transform it.
Can Spain be expelled from NATO?
Something similar occurs with the possibility of expelling a member state, as could hypothetically be proposed in the case of Spain or another ally that did not meet certain political or budgetary commitments. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contemplate a mechanism for expulsion. Its fourteen articles regulate collective defense, cooperation, the accession of new members, treaty review, and voluntary withdrawal, but do not foresee the expulsion of an ally. Therefore, from a legal standpoint, there is no clear path to expel a member state. What could occur is sustained political pressure: diplomatic isolation, loss of influence in the allied structure, reduced access to responsibility posts, decreased bilateral cooperation, or informal exclusion from certain decision-making circles.
The NATO of the future will likely be an alliance of variable geometry. The United States will continue within it but will reduce its role as an automatic and unlimited guarantor of European security. Europe, for its part, will have to assume a much larger burden. This does not simply mean spending more on defense but spending better: air defense, artillery, ammunition, drones, electronic warfare, force projection, defense industry, intelligence, protection of critical infrastructures, and real capacity to sustain high-intensity operations.
Evolution of NATO
In this scenario, the Alliance could evolve into three complementary dimensions.
The first will be a legal NATO, based on the permanence of the Washington Treaty and the continuity of Article 5 as a collective defense clause. This dimension will retain enormous political and symbolic value, but its effectiveness will depend on the real will of member states, especially the United States.
The second will be a European NATO, where continental allies must assume the conventional defense of Europe with much more autonomy. The time when Europe could delegate its strategic security to Washington is running out. The war in Ukraine has shown that the continent still lacks industrial depth, sufficient reserves, technological autonomy, and fully integrated command and control capability. Correcting these shortcomings will be an indispensable condition for the political survival of the Alliance.
The third will be a NATO connected to the Indo-Pacific. It is unlikely that countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand will formally join NATO under the current framework, as the Treaty is conceived for the Euro-Atlantic space. However, these countries—known as IP4 partners—will increasingly play a significant role in the allied strategic architecture. Cooperation with them can intensify in areas such as cybersecurity, intelligence, military industry, technological innovation, space, maritime security, supply chains, and deterrence against China.
In this context, AUKUS can play a relevant role. The alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia does not replace NATO, but it can function as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic space and the Indo-Pacific. Its focus on nuclear-powered submarines, advanced technologies, artificial intelligence, submarine warfare, and long-range capabilities aligns with the U.S. strategic priority: containing China’s rise and ensuring freedom of action in the Pacific.
Hybrid organization
The war with Iran has also highlighted the limits of any U.S. attempt to significantly reduce its involvement in the Middle East. Although Washington aspires to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific, the persistence of regional conflicts, Israel’s centrality in the strategic balance, the security of energy routes, and the fragility of several alliances compel the United States to maintain significant attention on the region. Consequently, the Middle East continues to act as a strategic distraction factor for a power that wants to look towards Asia but still cannot disengage from its traditional regional sphere of influence.
Therefore, NATO’s future should not be considered in terms of immediate disappearance but rather profound transformation. The Alliance will survive but will be less traditionally Atlantic, less dependent on the massive presence of U.S. troops in Europe, and more connected to a global competition that will largely be decided in the Asia-Pacific.
The United States will not necessarily leave NATO de jure, but it can reduce its commitment de facto. Europe will not be expelled from North American protection, but it will have to pay a much higher price for it. And the Alliance, born to contain the Soviet Union, will have to adapt to a world where Washington’s main strategic concern is no longer in the center of Europe but in Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade routes, rare earths, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and the struggle for technological supremacy.
In short, the NATO of the future will be a hybrid organization: Atlantic by its treaty, European by its defensive burden, and Indo-Pacific by its strategic horizon. Its great challenge will be to maintain the credibility of collective defense at a time when the United States redefines its priorities, Europe discovers the urgency of its military autonomy, and the center of gravity of world power shifts towards Asia.
The review of the U.S. military presence in Europe should not be interpreted as a spontaneous decision following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, but rather as the consequence of a previous strategic trend: the progressive reassignment of Washington’s resources towards scenarios it considers priorities for its national security. It is not merely a budgetary issue or a situational reaction against its European allies, but a structural readjustment. For years, the United States has been reconsidering the strategic value of its permanent deployments on European soil in an international scenario increasingly conditioned by competition in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. presence in Europe
The U.S. military presence in Europe primarily responds to two major interests. The first is the ability to project force into various theaters of operations: the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Arctic, or even the Asia-Pacific. Bases, logistics centers, military hospitals, regional commands, and communication systems allow the United States to operate quickly beyond the European continent. The second interest is early warning and protection of North American territory against missiles, aerial threats, cyberattacks, space operations, or hybrid actions that may directly or indirectly affect its national security.
From this perspective, a clear logic can be anticipated: the United States will maintain in Europe those assets that contribute to its global security, but will reduce, relocate, or condition all those forces and installations that are not essential to its strategic priorities. The question, therefore, is not whether Washington will abruptly leave Europe, but which part of its European presence will continue to be useful for its national interests.
The recent decision to cut approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel from the 36,436 deployed in Germany should be interpreted in this context. Although the White House has linked this measure to the lack of European support for the United States in the war with Iran, that explanation should be understood within a broader strategic framework. The immediate political argument does not exhaust the underlying reasons: the decision fits with a previous trend from Washington aimed at reducing the cost of European defense, incentivizing greater responsibility from allies, and freeing up capabilities for scenarios considered more priority.
Change of strategy
The United States’ National Security Strategy of 2025 reinforces this reading. In it, Russia no longer occupies the central place it had during the Cold War and much of the period following the aggression against Ukraine. Moscow remains a relevant threat, especially for the eastern European flank, but it no longer constitutes the absolute axis of U.S. strategic planning. For Washington, the determining challenge of the 21st century lies in competition with China, protection of the Western Hemisphere, technological security, control of maritime routes, industrial resilience, and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
This change has direct consequences for NATO. If Russia is no longer perceived by the United States as an immediate existential threat to North American territory itself, it becomes less justifiable to maintain tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel in Europe prepared for a high-intensity land war. From the U.S. perspective, that type of contingency should increasingly be assumed by the Europeans themselves. The United States will continue to provide critical capacities—nuclear deterrence, intelligence, satellites, strategic transport, command and control, missile defense, and naval capabilities—but will be less inclined to sustain the bulk of conventional defense of the continent.
Here lies NATO’s great paradox. The North Atlantic Treaty was born in 1949 to curb the expansion of the former Soviet Union and ensure the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic space. Its founding principle responded to a specific, identifiable, and territorial threat: the possibility of Soviet expansion over Western Europe. However, the world that gave rise to the Alliance no longer exists. The Soviet Union disappeared, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and international security has fragmented into multiple dimensions: competition between great powers, hybrid warfare, cyber threats, instrumentalized migratory pressure, energy insecurity, disinformation, control of critical infrastructures, and technological rivalry.
The reason for NATO’s existence
This does not mean that NATO has lost all reason for existence. On the contrary, the war in Ukraine demonstrated that territorial defense and deterrence remain relevant. But it does mean that the Alliance needs to redefine its purpose. An organization created to contain the Soviet Union cannot simply reproduce its original logic indefinitely in an international system dominated by competition between the United States and China.
The question, therefore, is inevitable: will the United States leave NATO?
From a legal standpoint, a formal exit during Trump’s term does not seem simple. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows a member state to leave the Alliance after notifying its renunciation, but in the U.S. case, there are internal constraints, especially Congress’s resistance to a unilateral withdrawal. That is, de jure, the U.S. exit would require a complex, politically costly, and legally disputable procedure.
However, the real risk is not a formal exit, but a functional exit. The United States can remain within NATO and, at the same time, partially empty its commitment. It can reduce forces, decrease financial contributions, condition operations, demand greater European contributions, limit the availability of certain capabilities, or turn its security guarantee into an instrument of political negotiation. In other words, Washington does not need to leave NATO to profoundly transform it.
Can Spain be expelled from NATO?
Something similar occurs with the possibility of expelling a member state, as could hypothetically be proposed in the case of Spain or another ally that did not meet certain political or budgetary commitments. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contemplate a mechanism for expulsion. Its fourteen articles regulate collective defense, cooperation, the accession of new members, treaty review, and voluntary withdrawal, but do not foresee the expulsion of an ally. Therefore, from a legal standpoint, there is no clear path to expel a member state. What could occur is sustained political pressure: diplomatic isolation, loss of influence in the allied structure, reduced access to responsibility posts, decreased bilateral cooperation, or informal exclusion from certain decision-making circles.
The NATO of the future will likely be an alliance of variable geometry. The United States will continue within it but will reduce its role as an automatic and unlimited guarantor of European security. Europe, for its part, will have to assume a much larger burden. This does not simply mean spending more on defense but spending better: air defense, artillery, ammunition, drones, electronic warfare, force projection, defense industry, intelligence, protection of critical infrastructures, and real capacity to sustain high-intensity operations.
Evolution of NATO
In this scenario, the Alliance could evolve into three complementary dimensions.
The first will be a legal NATO, based on the permanence of the Washington Treaty and the continuity of Article 5 as a collective defense clause. This dimension will retain enormous political and symbolic value, but its effectiveness will depend on the real will of member states, especially the United States.
The second will be a European NATO, where continental allies must assume the conventional defense of Europe with much more autonomy. The time when Europe could delegate its strategic security to Washington is running out. The war in Ukraine has shown that the continent still lacks industrial depth, sufficient reserves, technological autonomy, and fully integrated command and control capability. Correcting these shortcomings will be an indispensable condition for the political survival of the Alliance.
The third will be a NATO connected to the Indo-Pacific. It is unlikely that countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand will formally join NATO under the current framework, as the Treaty is conceived for the Euro-Atlantic space. However, these countries—known as IP4 partners—will increasingly play a significant role in the allied strategic architecture. Cooperation with them can intensify in areas such as cybersecurity, intelligence, military industry, technological innovation, space, maritime security, supply chains, and deterrence against China.
In this context, AUKUS can play a relevant role. The alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia does not replace NATO, but it can function as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic space and the Indo-Pacific. Its focus on nuclear-powered submarines, advanced technologies, artificial intelligence, submarine warfare, and long-range capabilities aligns with the U.S. strategic priority: containing China’s rise and ensuring freedom of action in the Pacific.
Hybrid organization
The war with Iran has also highlighted the limits of any U.S. attempt to significantly reduce its involvement in the Middle East. Although Washington aspires to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific, the persistence of regional conflicts, Israel’s centrality in the strategic balance, the security of energy routes, and the fragility of several alliances compel the United States to maintain significant attention on the region. Consequently, the Middle East continues to act as a strategic distraction factor for a power that wants to look towards Asia but still cannot disengage from its traditional regional sphere of influence.
Therefore, NATO’s future should not be considered in terms of immediate disappearance but rather profound transformation. The Alliance will survive but will be less traditionally Atlantic, less dependent on the massive presence of U.S. troops in Europe, and more connected to a global competition that will largely be decided in the Asia-Pacific.
The United States will not necessarily leave NATO de jure, but it can reduce its commitment de facto. Europe will not be expelled from North American protection, but it will have to pay a much higher price for it. And the Alliance, born to contain the Soviet Union, will have to adapt to a world where Washington’s main strategic concern is no longer in the center of Europe but in Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade routes, rare earths, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and the struggle for technological supremacy.
In short, the NATO of the future will be a hybrid organization: Atlantic by its treaty, European by its defensive burden, and Indo-Pacific by its strategic horizon. Its great challenge will be to maintain the credibility of collective defense at a time when the United States redefines its priorities, Europe discovers the urgency of its military autonomy, and the center of gravity of world power shifts towards Asia.
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