—Tímea Drinóczi, Research Professor at the Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania
Before and following the recent electoral victory in Hungary, the TISZA Party has reiterated its commitment to introducing constitutional limits on prime ministerial terms, as the most important change to the Hungarian constitution. The proposal is politically compelling. Yet from a comparative constitutional perspective, it raises a more complex question: what exactly such a reform can, and cannot, achieve within a parliamentary system.
This post argues that term limits for the prime minister are an innovative instrument and a necessary signal, but their effectiveness may be limited if they are not accompanied by broader structural changes to reconstruct constitutional democracy.
Prime Minister and term limits in a parliamentary governmental system
From a public law perspective, TISZA’s proposal would mean that a person could not be elected prime minister more than twice. A key issue here is whether this limitation would apply only to consecutive terms or to the individual’s entire political career. The apparent intention of the TISZA party is to introduce a lifetime limit. Such a rule would constitute a novelty in a parliamentary system. It directly limits parliament’s freedom to form a government by excluding a potential candidate, regardless of the existing parliamentary majority. As a constitutional matter, its introduction would require a constitutional amendment, which, in Hungary, in a highly formal sense, requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Politically, the proposal is best understood as a reaction to the experience of the past sixteen years of the Orbán regime, during which an accumulation of power occurred in the hands of the government and, in particular, the prime minister. The introduction of term limits thus seems to be an attempt to prevent the re-emergence of such concentration of power and to fulfill an explicit political commitment made by the leader of TISZA, Péter Magyar, before and after the 2026 election.
At the same time, comparative constitutional experience does not offer examples of such limits in democratic parliamentary systems, and not without reason. Parliamentary government is based on a specific internal logic: the relationship of confidence and responsibility between the parliamentary majority and the government. The government derives its legitimacy from the continued confidence of parliament, and political responsibility is ensured through mechanisms that allow this confidence to be withdrawn. If that confidence is lost, several constitutionally and politically available solutions exist. Parliament may adopt a constructive vote of no confidence and appoint a new prime minister. The prime minister may resign. In extreme cases, parliament may dissolve itself if it is no longer capable of ensuring democratic and effective governance, leading to new elections. These mechanisms are designed to ensure political accountability and, when functioning properly, to prevent the entrenchment of power.
Nevertheless, preventing the excessive concentration of power in any system primarily relies on a functioning system of checks and balances. These include the role of the parliamentary opposition and its constitutional instruments, the constraints of coalition governance, where applicable, and the broader institutional framework, including the head of state, the constitutional court, independent oversight bodies, and the public sphere supported by free media. This leads to a crucial question:
Does limiting the prime minister’s term address the problem it is intended to solve?
To answer this, one must first consider what caused the previous concentration of power in Hungary. A key factor was the existence of a constitutional majority in parliament, combined with a formalistic understanding of constitutional power that was treated as effectively unconstrained. This approach contributed to the dismantling of the democratic and rule-of-law framework, causing checks and balances to cease functioning as intended. Formally, all measures were adopted by parliament and, in certain periods, especially during states of emergency, by the government. However, from a constitutional law perspective, all of this was underpinned by a stable two-thirds parliamentary majority that consistently served the will of the government and the prime minister. This reflects a structural feature of parliamentary systems, in which the executive is supported by the parliamentary majority, but in the case of Hungary between 2010 and 2026, it was combined with the dismantling of checks and balances. The excessive concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister was not, therefore, caused by the repeated re-election of Viktor Orbán as such, but by these broader structural and institutional factors.
Against this background, the effect of introducing prime ministerial term limits is necessarily limited. To some extent, such limits do respond to a clear social demand. They may also form part of a broader effort to restore the rule-of-law functioning of democratic institutions, for which there appears to be political intentions and commitment. However, it must be recognized that such a rule cannot, on its own, prevent future abuse of power. A political leader excluded from formal office may still exercise significant informal influence. Any legal rule can be complied with, but it can also be circumvented, and its effectiveness depends on the surrounding institutional and political environment. For this reason, the introduction of the prime minister’s term limits can only be meaningful if it is accompanied by the restoration and effective functioning of democratic institutions and checks and balances. These include independent oversight bodies, a functioning constitutional court, a pluralistic political environment, and a public sphere capable of holding power to account.
To be fair, TISZA’s proposal has several advantages. First, it fulfills a clear political commitment, which may help increase trust in politics and, potentially, in the institutional system as a whole. That said, much will depend on how the constitutional amendment is adopted, as the procedure itself will influence whether the reform strengthens or undermines trust among Hungarians. At this stage, even before the constituent session of the new parliament on 9 May 2026, it is difficult to predict whether the new constitutional majority will pursue a minimalist approach, seeking to demonstrate swift action by submitting a draft to parliament and adopting it rapidly, or instead open up the drafting and deliberation process. The latter would require more time but would better align with the TISZA Party’s political communication, emphasizing participation. Second, it sends an important signal that all power, including power derived from parliament and thus ultimately based on direct popular authorization and democratic political confidence, is limited. This is significant from the perspective of the separation of powers. Third, if, for whatever reason, informal power cannot be maintained or re-established after the introduction of such a limit, the rule can have some important structural effects on political practice. It can incentivize the development of political leadership more broadly, rather than relying on a single individual as the central and defining figure of a party or political movement. It can also encourage the emergence of competition within political party’s, which is essential for democratic functioning. In this way, it may reduce the likelihood of highly personalized party structures that marginalize internal democratic processes.
Let us also consider some disadvantages, however. First, the proposal may signal a lack of confidence in existing accountability mechanisms, such as votes of confidence. Second, term limits may reconfigure power. A dominant political actor may continue to exercise influence through informal channels, through control of the party, or through loyal successors. It risks producing a dual structure of formal officeholders and an informal center of power, which can reduce transparency and accountability because informal influence is harder to monitor and contest than formal authority. Third, term limits may restrict democratic choice by limiting voters’ and parliament’s ability to retain a leader they still support. Finally, they may encourage shorter-term political strategies, especially toward the end of a prime minister’s permissible tenure.
Nevertheless, given how democracy and constitutionalism were captured in Hungary, contextual considerations may outweigh these concerns. Even so, all advantages and disadvantages should be openly debated. This brings me to the final point.
How should this constitutional amendment be introduced?
Even where there is political and social support, the legitimacy of constitutional change depends not only on what is adopted, but on how it is adopted. From a procedural-legitimacy perspective, a two-thirds majority is essential, but not enough. It provides an exceptional form of democratic authorization, but it does not by itself determine how that change should be carried out. Without additional constraints, it risks reproducing the very patterns of concentrated and exclusionary lawmaking that characterized the previous period.
What is required instead is an inclusive process grounded in social consultation, public justification, transparency, and meaningful parliamentary participation, including a genuine opportunity for opposition engagement. This implies avoiding accelerated procedures and instead allowing for real deliberation. Whether the opposition makes use of this opportunity, and how, is a separate question, but the possibility itself must be ensured.
The constitutional text itself must be drafted in a way that avoids ambiguity and interpretative uncertainty. A clear formulation could be: “No person shall be elected Prime Minister more than twice during their lifetime”. Given the text, the context of its adoption, i.e., regime-change and constitutional reconstruction, and its preferred adoption process, this rule should not raise concerns about retroactive application. Even if it is argued that Viktor Orbán has already served multiple terms prior to the amendment, the rule does not impose a sanction for past conduct. It does not penalize his earlier decisions to accept the position, nor, most probably, could those decisions have been made differently in anticipation of such a rule. Accordingly, as opposed to some opinions, it does not raise issues of personalized legislation, legal certainty, or retroactive legislation in the sense relevant to the rule of law.
Term limits for the prime minister may send a necessary signal that power is limited. They are not, in themselves, a solution to the problems that enabled the concentration of power in Hungary. What matters, ultimately, is how constitutional democracy is reconstructed, both in substance and in the way change is carried out.
Suggested citation: Tímea Drinóczi, Term Limits for the Prime Minister: Reform Capacity and the Importance of Process in Hungary, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 16, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/term-limits-for-the-prime-minister-reform-capacity-and-the-importance-of-process-in-hungary/