Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized the European Union for not using its ‘diplomatic clout’ sufficiently to help bring the war in Ukraine to an end. Speaking to public broadcaster WDR on Monday, Merkel welcomed the military support the EU has provided to Ukraine while arguing that ‘Europe is not making sufficient use of its diplomatic potential.’
‘It is not enough for Trump to maintain contact with Russia,’ the former chancellor argued.
Merkel’s comments came at a time of growing pressure on the European Union to appoint a special envoy for peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv. According to POLITICO Brussels, as Washington’s focus increasingly shifts towards the Middle East and negotiations with Iran, both Ukraine and Russia have signalled openness to such a mediator role. The question now is who could realistically take on the position—and who would be willing to do so.
In its Monday newsletter, POLITICO Brussels listed several potential figures who could fill the role, although the realistic chances of most candidates remain relatively low.
Who Could Speak to Putin for Europe?
By virtue of her office, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas would appear to be an ‘obvious candidate’, as the outlet put it. However, the former Estonian prime minister is widely regarded as one of the bloc’s most hawkish anti-Russian politicians and has repeatedly rejected direct talks with Moscow in the past. Although she recently signalled a willingness to reconsider that approach, EU officials already reportedly acknowledge that her appointment as envoy would ‘elicit a swift nyet’ from Vladimir Putin.
Among incumbent EU leaders, Finnish President Alexander Stubb has also emerged as a possible mediator. POLITICO noted that Stubb has mediation experience in Finland and has previously expressed interest in such a role, although he would ‘need broad EU backing and Finland’s NATO membership may reduce his appeal in Moscow.’ Stubb recently stated that he believes ‘we are approaching the moment when the channels for political dialogue with Russia will need to be opened,’ adding that such dialogue should take place on behalf of the entire EU rather than through an individual member state.
Some observers have also argued that a potential envoy should not necessarily come from within the European Union itself. From that perspective, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide and Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar have both been mentioned as possible candidates.
For such a role, being an incumbent politician is not always an advantage. In fact, it could prove more logical and practical for both sides if the EU’s special envoy were no longer directly connected to any current government and instead came from a political era in which EU–Russian relations were less confrontational than they are today.
Angela Merkel’s name therefore immediately surfaced as a potential nominee, given that the former German chancellor maintained working relations with both Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy during her time in office. Merkel also played a major role in brokering the Minsk agreements, which helped prevent a full-scale war after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, although they ultimately failed to stop the 2022 invasion.
Speaking to WDR, Merkel further revealed that she had proposed establishing a diplomatic format between the EU and Russia during her final European Council meeting in 2021, only months before the full-scale invasion began. ‘You have to keep working on it until you reach a common position,’ she said, adding that ‘diplomacy has always been the other side of the coin, also during the Cold War.’
Another name that has emerged is former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi. According to POLITICO, Draghi is ‘widely respected in Europe’ and is viewed as ‘neither overly hawkish nor sympathetic to the Kremlin.’
Putin himself suggested former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder for the role, although the idea was immediately rejected. After leaving office in 2005, Schröder accepted senior positions at Russian state-linked energy companies including Gazprom, Rosneft, and Nord Stream AG, becoming closely associated with the Nord Stream gas pipeline projects that significantly increased Germany’s dependence on Russian energy. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, critics across Europe accused him of helping enable Moscow’s geopolitical leverage over the EU through energy policy, while his refusal for years to fully distance himself from the Kremlin further damaged his reputation across Europe.
The Orbán Scenario
While he did not appear on POLITICO’s list of potential EU special envoys—for obvious reasons—it is also worth mentioning former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán in the broader discussion. During his final four years in office, Orbán launched two so-called ‘peace missions’ with the declared aim of informing EU leaders about the positions of all parties involved in the war and helping bring them closer to a possible ceasefire or settlement agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
Under Orbán, Hungary maintained a more pragmatic approach to the conflict than most EU member states, rejected military support for Kyiv, and consistently advocated peace talks. Budapest was even announced as a potential venue for a peace summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin back in 2025; however, the meeting ultimately never materialized.
Following the electoral defeat of Fidesz–KDNP on 12 April, Orbán announced that he would not take up his parliamentary mandate and would instead focus on reorganizing his political camp. Media reports have also speculated about the possibility of his complete withdrawal from domestic politics, with Orbán himself allegedly arguing that Fidesz cannot renew while he remains at the centre of Hungarian politics. At first glance, the role of EU special envoy could appear to be a fitting position for Orbán following a potential retirement from domestic political life.
Alongside his more ambiguous stance towards the war in Ukraine, Orbán also arguably maintained the closest ties with Moscow within the bloc, becoming one of the few EU leaders to meet Putin personally after 2022. These close ties, combined with Orbán’s increasingly strained relations with EU leaders and the European Commission, would likely represent the main obstacle to any potential envoy role.
‘The breakdown of trust between Orbán, EU institutions, and the Ukrainian leadership would likely remove his name from serious consideration’
Over the past four years, Orbán was frequently accused of acting in Moscow’s interests during EU decision-making and of functioning as ‘Putin’s puppet’ inside the bloc. Meanwhile, relations between the Orbán government and Kyiv deteriorated significantly during the last two years of his premiership, particularly during the 2026 election campaign, when Orbán accused Ukraine of supporting the Tisza Party and Péter Magyar in an attempt to remove his government from power.
While it remains unclear how these dynamics have evolved since he left office, the breakdown of trust between Orbán, EU institutions, and the Ukrainian leadership would likely remove his name from serious consideration.
This, therefore, represents the current field of potential candidates for a future EU special envoy tasked with negotiating and mediating peace between Russia and Ukraine. Although no official nominee has yet emerged, it is nevertheless notable that the bloc appears to be moving away from its earlier strategy of avoiding direct dialogue with Moscow and increasingly acknowledging that diplomacy remains the only realistic path towards resolving the conflict.
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