Tsikhanouski published an article in the West about the “Finlandization” model for Belarus. He was answered from Finland: This is Manilovism and wishful thinking

Siarhei Tsikhanouski. Photo: Marek Antoni Iwanczuk NurPhoto via Getty Images

I didn’t think I would have to speak again about the possibility, and even more so the desirability, for Eastern European countries to adopt the model of so-called “Finlandization”.

I have repeatedly had to discuss this issue as it applies to Ukraine. For a long time, it was pushed in this direction by European “benefactors” who did not wish to escalate relations with Russia.

Unfortunately, partly as a result of these “good advices,” Ukraine was too long unable to determine its place in the modern geopolitical structure of the world and Europe, unable to make a choice.

But all attempts to maneuver did not save it from war with Russia. It seemed to me that if one were to draw lessons, it would be hard to imagine a more illustrative example than the Ukrainian one.

It was all the more surprising for me to see Siarhei Tsikhanouski’s article, in which he calls for “Finlandization” for Belarus.

Unfortunately, this article demonstrates a basic misunderstanding that any model is unique and applicable — and therefore should be considered — only in the specific historical circumstances in which it arose.

In Finland’s case, these circumstances are as follows. First of all, “Finlandization” was not a free choice of the Finnish people, and this term is still perceived by Finns with a sense of resentment and bitterness, as it is largely unfair.

The model was imposed on Finland by the Soviet Union — a victorious country upon a defeated country. The alternative would have been occupation, as happened with the Baltic states and Eastern Europe.

Perhaps Siarhei Tsikhanouski perceives today’s choice for Belarus precisely in this way, as a choice between abandoning foreign policy independence and Russian occupation, but here, I think, many of his compatriots who have tied their personal fate to Europe and see their country’s future in integration with Europe will be ready to argue with him.

I repeat, for Finland, “Finlandization” was not a victory, but not a complete defeat either. For this, it had to endure two wars, in 1939-40 and 1941-44.

During the first, the so-called “Winter War,” a modern Finnish nation was born from a society split into Reds and Whites. The second, known as the “Continuation War,” ended on difficult but honorable terms. Even Joseph Stalin understood that taking Finland out of the war by securing its agreement to declare war on Germany and pay reparations was much more desirable for the USSR than continuing the war.

It was September 1944, and the move should have been towards Berlin, not Helsinki, losing thousands upon thousands of soldiers. With whom, in Tsikhanouski’s imagination, should Belarus fight its “Winter War” to achieve similar respect from the Kremlin?

Already in the interwar years, Finland was a parliamentary democracy and cherished this. Therefore, limiting foreign policy sovereignty in exchange for preserving the internal political order was a painful but acceptable choice for Finns. Democratic institutions became the basis that allowed Finns to remain integrated into the West. Primarily economically, of course, but to some extent politically as well.

Therefore, as soon as the opportunity to become an EU member opened up to the country after the collapse of the USSR, it took advantage of this opportunity. And even before that, in the 1970s, it joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Not Comecon, we note.

No transitional periods or market reforms were needed. And most importantly — there was no need to explain to anyone within the country where and with whom it was natural and organic for Finland to be, and where it was not.

Try asking where and with whom Lukashenka’s Belarus will be comfortable, and you will immediately understand the difference and the inapplicability of Finland’s experience to Belarus. And what will be natural for Belarus after Lukashenka is pointless to guess now.

If we set history aside, then I would like to ask all those analysts, and Tsikhanouski is far from the first here, who like to ponder the topics of Belarus’s neutrality — did Moscow ever offer such an option?

It seems to me that everything developed in the opposite direction — from the status of a country that declared its desire to become neutral at least in the future, to the status of not just a formal member of military alliances led by Russia, but the only post-Soviet state that became a co-aggressor of Russia in Ukraine.

To think that Moscow will give up control over Belarus, its territory and airspace, its training grounds and military industries, its human resources, finally, in exchange for a promise not to join NATO, is called “Manilovism” in Russian, good wishes, “wishful thinking”. All this — unlike “Finlandization” in its time — will have no relation to practical politics.