The world’s biggest arms manufacturers have descended on Egypt’s El Alamein air show this week to show off their latest and greatest equipment to prospective buyers.
Russia is bringing its crown jewel. The Su-57 fighter jet, known to NATO as the “Felon,” is Moscow’s answer to America’s F-35 and F-22 Raptor. But it’s not really about the jet—it’s the slogan attached to it and every other piece of hardware Vladimir Putin is trying to promote.
Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms dealer, announced on the eve of the show that more than 90 percent of the weapons systems it has contracted for export this year are battle-tested against modern Western-made equipment.
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This “Made In Russia, Tested against NATO” pitch seems to be working. Rosoboronexport claims it closed more than $13 billion in new contracts in the first half of 2026, roughly as much as in all of 2025.
Moscow badly needs the comeback. Years of Western sanctions and wartime demand have crippled the sector; Russia’s market share of global major-arms exports collapsed from 21 percent in 2016-2020 to just 6.8 percent in 2021-2025.
Putin may have found the perfect way to advertise his way out of the hole; now, he has to prove Russia can actually deliver.
It’s Not All Marketing
Rosoboronexport CEO Alexander Mikheev made the company’s strategy explicit before the Su-57 takes to the skies over Egypt this week. More than $13 billion in arms export contracts had been signed in six months, he said, with aircraft and air-defense equipment bringing in the bulk of the cash.
“The performance demonstrated in real-world conditions significantly influenced the final contracting decisions of the customers,” he declared.
Moscow had been putting this marketing tool to work for months before Mikheev’s announcement.
At the World Defense Show in Riyadh in February, Rosoboronexport staged world premieres for a batch of weapons developed from “experience gained in battle.” They included the new Sarma multiple-launch rocket system and BTR-22 armored personnel carrier, both presented as products shaped by lessons from real combat in Ukraine.
Two months later at the Defence Services Asia expo in Malaysia, Rosoboronexport advertised the Su-57E not simply as a fifth-generation fighter, but as one with experience firing long-range missiles while operating amid heavy air-defense fire and electronic countermeasures.
Putin and arms export chief Mikheev have good reason to believe battlefield experience can translate into big business.
After years of war in Gaza and the success of the “Iron Dome” air defense system in thwarting the bulk of Iranian missile and drone strikes, Israel’s Defense Ministry announced a record $19.2 billion of defense export agreements in 2025, nearly 30 percent more than the previous year. The ministry explicitly credited the combat-proven performance of Israeli systems with generating international demand.
Last week, Greece staked a €3 billion (about $4 billion) bet on Israel’s argument, inking a landmark agreement for a new multilayered air-defense shield built around Israeli David’s Sling, SPYDER and Barak MX interceptors.
Meanwhile, the nation of Ukraine has effectively become a live-fire showroom for Russian arms.
Moscow’s jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles have confounded U.S. Patriot interceptors. Ukraine’s Air Force admitted its interception rate against jet-powered UAVs has fallen to roughly 60 percent, compared with more than 90 percent against conventional, propeller-driven models. As if to prove the point, Russia launched more than 100 drones and dozens of missiles on Kyiv and Odesa early this morning, killing several people and starting large fires just hours after U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner left Ukraine.
Despite the damage suffered by Russian oil refineries and logistics warehouses of late, Russian authorities claim more than 43,300 Ukrainian drones were intercepted over Russia and occupied Crimea in June, July and August—nearly six times as many as during the same period last year.
The Russian factories producing these weapons systems have also proved more difficult to stop than expected.
A study published in July by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that Russian defense firms had expanded production despite sanctions, labor shortages and dependence on imported components. Its researchers concluded that Russia could sustain a high production tempo in selected weapons categories and identified an export portfolio shifting toward newer, combat-tested systems, especially drones.
In other words, Moscow is selling more than just propaganda.
Stopping The Rot?
Putin’s arms exporters can’t afford to pat themselves on the back just yet.
The $13 billion in new orders adds to Rosoboronexport’s healthy $60 billion-plus order book. But that’s not money secured safely in the Kremlin’s coffers—it’s the value of outstanding contracts waiting to be fulfilled.
SIPRI, the world’s leading research institute on military expenditure and arms trading, measures something different: the volume of major weapons exports that actually reach customers.
Russian export volumes dropped 64 percent between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, leaving Moscow with just 6.8 percent of the global market—its lowest five-year share in the Russian or Soviet record stretching back to 1950. Those figures are enough to make even Putin’s Botox-reinforced forehead crease.
The war in Ukraine might make for excellent marketing material, but it’s also the obstacle preventing Russia’s arms exporters from satisfying foreign demand. Every fighter jet, air-defense missile or precision weapon sent overseas is one less piece of hardware available for Russian forces waging war across the border.
Mikheev acknowledged the tension this week, saying Rosoboronexport “first and foremost” takes the Russian Defense Ministry’s needs into account when planning export deliveries.
So when Moscow and an overseas customer both want the same bit of equipment, who is left waiting?
The Iranians can tell you. Tehran announced in 2023 that arrangements had been finalized to acquire a squadron of Russia’s highly capable Su-35 fighter jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters and Yak-130 jet trainers from Russia.
The trainers arrived mostly on schedule. The Su-35s, however, were still nowhere to be seen in February—a fact that will have no doubt comforted American and Israeli pilots as they were free to batter Iranian targets largely unchallenged.
What’s more, the showpiece of Russian air superiority has a credibility problem of its own.
In 2019, Russia’s Defense Ministry signed a contract for 76 serial Su-57s by the end of 2027. Public estimates vary because Moscow no longer discloses the size and scope of most arms deliveries, but the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance report listed “more than 21” Su-57s in service at the start of 2026.
If that figure is accurate, Moscow might need to produce something like 50 more aircraft in the next 15 months to reach its contracted target for its domestic fleet—never mind jets for export.
Rosoboronexport’s $13 billion in new contracts tells us demand for Russian arms may be on the rise. It does not inspire confidence that its customers will ever receive their orders.
Putin’s Next Test
Some Russian officials have accused Moscow of getting in its own way.
Sergei Shvetsov, chairman of the Moscow Exchange supervisory board, complained at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June that the state-led export system has created “a monopoly” that prevents the growth of Russian defense companies.
“A military-industrial company can’t raise money on the stock exchange because the Ministry of Defense can be the only buyer. If it wants to export, it would have to hand over virtually all its profits” to Rosoboronexport, he said.
Global transfers of major arms rose 9.2 percent between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, even as Russia’s exports fell 64 percent over exactly the same period. Putin’s slice of the pie was therefore not shrinking with a stagnant market—he was losing ground while the market expanded.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that Russia needs to rebuild the export empire it once had by churning out expensive, big-ticket items. An export machine concentrated around the hardware war in Ukraine has shown to be the most valuable—drones, air defense systems, electronic warfare and selected combat aircraft—could still drum up funds for the Kremlin, bind foreign militaries to Moscow and earn Russia influence well beyond the battlefield.
Foreign buyers already appear convinced that Russian weapons can survive, compete with and in some cases outperform their Western counterparts.
But weapons exports create decades of demand for ammunition, spare parts, maintenance, and upgrades, binding foreign militaries and often their governments to the supplier long after the initial sale.
Putin’s challenge, then, is making sure his defense industry can actually put enough of those arms in buyers’ hands as agreed, without leaving his own armed forces wanting in Ukraine.
That will determine not only whether Russia’s defense industry can enjoy a genuine renaissance, but whether Moscow can restore something arguably more valuable than lost market share: its reputation as a dependable military partner.