The Middle East has a way of clarifying who shares interests when the missiles start flying.
Israel and Saudi Arabia have held US-mediated talks aimed at helping Riyadh defend itself against the Iran-backed Houthis. According to diplomatic sources, the talks were mediated by US Central Command and focused on possible Israeli intelligence assistance.
Israel should help.
The Saudi request is believed to center on intelligence about Houthi military deployments and preparations for future operations. Israel has considerable capabilities to offer. As The Jerusalem Post reported, the IDF has demonstrated its intelligence and operational abilities around the Strait of Hormuz, helping the United States build intelligence on Iranian forces.
Sharing those capabilities with Saudi Arabia makes sense. That does not mean sending Israeli forces into Yemen or assuming responsibility for Saudi Arabia’s security. Nor should Jerusalem mistake quiet security cooperation for an imminent diplomatic breakthrough. But Israel has a clear strategic interest in helping contain a threat that affects Israelis, Saudis, and much of the world.
Followers of Yemen’s Houthi participate in a rally to celebrate the group’s takeover of the strategic port city of Mocha and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait on September 11, 2026 in Sana’a, Yemen. (credit: Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images)
The Houthis are no longer merely a Yemeni problem. They have expanded their control along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and seized territory around Bab al-Mandab, one of the world’s critical maritime choke points. According to diplomatic sources cited in the Post report, Houthi forces have also barred Saudi vessels from passing through the strait, imposing what the sources described as an economic and diplomatic blockade.
Houthi attacks on Bab al-Mandab have global repercussions
Meanwhile, attacks on Saudi Arabia have intensified. Recent Houthi attacks have targeted Saudi oil pipelines and pumping facilities as well as civilians near the Saudi-Yemeni border.
The consequences extend far beyond Riyadh.
Bab al-Mandab connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Gulf of Eilat. Its security matters to international shipping, global energy markets, Egypt’s economy, and Israel’s access to the Red Sea.
Israel understands this threat better than most. Houthi attacks have severely damaged activity at the Port of Eilat, while missiles and drones launched from Yemen have repeatedly targeted Israel since October 7, 2023.
Iran’s strategy is straightforward: Turn geography into leverage. Tehran pressures shipping through the Strait of Hormuz while its Houthi allies threaten Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis attack Saudi oil infrastructure, shipping becomes more expensive, energy prices rise, and governments far beyond the Middle East feel the consequences.
The answer cannot be to allow each threatened country to confront this network alone.
There should be limits, however, and Saudi Arabia is looking elsewhere for assistance. Riyadh has asked Britain for help in repelling the Houthis from Bab al-Mandab and defending its oil infrastructure, the Post reported. Britain has agreed to send military advisers but has not committed additional assistance.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also sought direct American military action, but US President Donald Trump has declined to launch strikes against the Houthis.
Israel should likewise avoid rushing into another country’s war. Intelligence cooperation is different. Helping Riyadh defend its cities, energy infrastructure, and maritime routes against Iranian-backed attacks is prudent and serves Israel’s interests.
A diplomatic opportunity also exists, but Israel should approach it with realistic expectations.
Israel-Saudi normalization may be built on shared interests
Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia has long been treated as the great unfinished project of the Abraham Accords era. The Israel-Hamas War and disagreements over the Palestinian issue have complicated that possibility. Security cooperation against the Houthis will not erase those disagreements or automatically produce embassies in Riyadh and Jerusalem.
But diplomacy is often built on shared interests before it is formalized in ceremonies.
Israel and Saudi Arabia do not need to agree on every regional question to recognize that neither benefits from an Iranian proxy controlling a strategic waterway, threatening oil infrastructure, and holding international commerce hostage.
CENTCOM provides an architecture for Israel and Arab states to coordinate against common threats without requiring every relationship to become public or political. That framework should be strengthened.
Iran has constructed a regional network designed to exploit divisions among its adversaries. Its answer to pressure has been to threaten the arteries through which the region trades with the world.
Israel should answer the Saudi request positively, carefully, and without triumphalism.
Iran has spent decades trying to divide and intimidate its adversaries. The best response is to make its aggression bring them closer together.
