37Russia’s pressure on Poland is no longer confined to cyber operations, propaganda or incidents that can easily be dismissed as peripheral. Warsaw is confronting military risk on its border, sabotage threats, disruption to critical infrastructure and an information campaign designed to exploit uncertainty. At the same time, confrontation within Poland’s own political leadership risks creating exactly the fractures that hybrid warfare seeks to exploit.

    Poland is no longer dealing with Russian hybrid activity as a largely theoretical security problem.

    The country has entered a period in which military alerts, threats to infrastructure and increasingly explicit warnings from Moscow are overlapping with a bitter domestic political confrontation.

    Prime Minister Donald Tusk put the issue in unusually direct terms when he addressed parliament on 17 September. According to the official transcript of his statement to the Sejm, Polish and allied intelligence assessments indicate that Russia could conduct hybrid drone and missile strikes against countries supporting Ukraine — specifically including Poland.

    Tusk outlined a particularly difficult scenario: Russian weapons entering NATO territory and causing damage while Moscow describes the incidents as accidental, creating uncertainty over whether the threshold for an allied response has been crossed.

    That possibility goes to the heart of modern hybrid warfare.

    The objective does not necessarily have to be a conventional military attack on Poland. Repeated incursions, border incidents and disruption can instead force Warsaw to operate permanently at an elevated state of readiness while testing how much ambiguity NATO governments will tolerate.

    The military pressure is becoming harder to ignore

    Russia’s intensified attacks on western Ukraine have brought the war progressively closer to Polish territory.

    On 13 September, a Russian attack struck targets only a few kilometres from the Polish border. Following an emergency security meeting, Tusk warned that the escalation of Russian operations was becoming a reality and said Warsaw could no longer exclude the possibility that future escalation would affect Polish territory.

    The Polish government subsequently said that recent attacks close to the frontier had involved faster jet-powered drones, complicating existing air-defence calculations.

    This comes after Poland had already experienced a far more serious warning. During the mass Russian attack of 9–10 September 2025, multiple Russian drones entered Polish airspace, NATO aircraft were scrambled and several drones were intercepted. As EU Today reported following subsequent attacks on Polish infrastructure, the incident fundamentally altered Warsaw’s assessment of how easily Russia’s war could spill across NATO’s eastern border.

    Poland’s response is therefore increasingly visible in everyday security arrangements.

    The government has extended the third-level CHARLIE alert for important railway infrastructure until 30 November, while BRAVO and BRAVO-CRP alerts remain in force more broadly. The Interior Ministry explicitly states that these measures are connected to hybrid operations conducted by Russia and Belarus against Poland and other EU states.

    Railways are especially sensitive because Poland is the principal logistical corridor linking much of Europe with Ukraine.

    That vulnerability has already moved beyond contingency planning. Following sabotage on the Warsaw–Lublin line last year, Warsaw attributed responsibility to individuals allegedly working on behalf of Russian intelligence. Poland subsequently moved to close Russia’s remaining consular presence in the country.

    Hybrid warfare also depends on fear

    Military pressure is accompanied by rhetoric intended to magnify it.

    Russian Security Council figure Nikolai Patrushev has threatened that Polish statehood could disappear within days in the event of war with Russia.

    Such statements should not be confused with serious military assessments. Their immediate function is political and psychological: introduce the prospect of national destruction into every Polish discussion about Ukraine, Russia and NATO.

    That matters because hybrid operations achieve disproportionate effects when physical incidents and information warfare reinforce each other.

    An airport closure becomes evidence that war is approaching. A drone crossing becomes proof that NATO cannot protect its borders. Sabotage becomes a reason to distrust public transport. A political argument becomes evidence that the state itself is divided.

    The cumulative effect is a continuing atmosphere of insecurity: repeated military alerts, cyber incidents, sabotage investigations and threatening rhetoric reinforce one another, making each new incident appear part of a broader pattern of pressure.

    Poland’s political confrontation creates another vulnerability

    The difficult part of Warsaw’s security problem is that Russia does not have to manufacture every division it seeks to exploit.

    Poland already has a serious institutional confrontation between Tusk’s government and President Karol Nawrocki.

    Their disputes extend across foreign policy, European integration, defence spending, Ukraine and the limits of presidential and governmental authority. EU Today has previously examined how Poland’s constitutional confrontation has become part of the country’s wider political struggle and how disputes involving Ukraine have repeatedly become entangled with domestic politics.

    The relationship with Kyiv is particularly vulnerable.

    Historical disputes surrounding Volhynia, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and wartime memory are legitimate political and historical questions. But they also provide exceptionally fertile material for an information operation intended to drive Poland and Ukraine apart.

    The issue has already caused repeated diplomatic confrontations, including the controversy surrounding President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Order of the White Eagle. As EU Today reported in June, historical memory has increasingly moved from bilateral disagreement into questions affecting wartime strategic cooperation.

    That distinction is important.

    There is no need to allege that Polish politicians taking critical positions towards Ukraine are acting on Moscow’s instructions. Such a claim would require evidence.

    The security problem is different: Russian information operations can take authentic Polish disagreements, remove their context and amplify them until domestic political arguments become instruments of external pressure.

    Nawrocki’s remarks show the communications danger

    President Nawrocki provided an example of the risks surrounding political language during his 17 September speech marking the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.

    His full remarks published by the Polish presidency were historical. Nawrocki argued that Poland could lose territory for decades while preserving its national identity and ultimately recovering its statehood.

    Taken in context, he was discussing the partitions and occupations of Poland, not proposing that contemporary Poland surrender territory.

    Yet fragments of political statements are precisely the raw material from which information warfare is constructed.

    The episode also demonstrated the intensity of Poland’s internal politics at a time when its government is explicitly calling for national cohesion on security.

    In his 17 September address, Tusk warned that Russia’s objective was to weaken NATO cohesion and confidence in Article 5. The Polish government’s official account of the speech specifically appealed to political leaders not to reproduce narratives useful to Russian propaganda.

    The real hybrid test

    Poland possesses one of NATO’s largest armed forces, is spending heavily on defence and occupies a central position in the Alliance’s eastern-flank planning.

    But hybrid warfare is designed partly to bypass those strengths.

    Russia does not have to defeat the Polish Army to impose costs on Poland.

    It can force combat aircraft into the air repeatedly. It can oblige airports and transport infrastructure to adopt emergency procedures. It can probe air defences. It can conduct or sponsor sabotage. It can launch cyber operations. And it can simultaneously inject threats and manipulated narratives into an already polarised political environment.

    The resulting pressure is cumulative.

    Poland’s response therefore cannot be confined to buying more tanks, aircraft or air-defence missiles. Protecting critical infrastructure, countering intelligence operations and maintaining credible NATO deterrence are essential, but so is preventing ordinary democratic disagreement from becoming raw material for hostile information operations.

    That may prove the more difficult test.

    A drone can be detected by radar. Sabotage can be investigated by the security services. A missile can potentially be intercepted.

    A political system that begins amplifying the narratives directed against it is considerably harder to defend.

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