Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iturup Island on 13 August, a day after he participated in the Pacific Fleet exercises, sparked diplomatic tensions in Russia-Japan relations. Iturup is one of the four major islands — alongside Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai — that make up the Southern Kuril chain (known as the Northern Territories in Japan), which is administered as part of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast. Tokyo contests Russian sovereignty over the South Kurils. Putin’s first visit to the island comes amid one of the lowest points in the Russia-Japan relationship. This sharp decline follows a period of notable promise under former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose administration actively pursued normalisation of ties and economic cooperation. However, strained Russia-West relations and Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have stalled bilateral efforts to resolve the dispute. Furthermore, the broader transformation of the East Asian security landscape has substantially narrowed the space for bilateral engagement. Against this backdrop, Putin’s visit raises questions not only about Moscow’s position on the territorial dispute but also about the future trajectory of Russia-Japan relations. While the visit does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of broader diplomatic engagement, it underscores how difficult a return to the momentum of the Abe-Putin era has become.
What is the Kuril Islands Dispute?
The Kuril Island chain lies between Kamchatka, in Russia, to the north and Hokkaido, in north-eastern Japan, to the south. Under the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda, Japan gained control of Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai, and Kunashir, while the 1875 Treaty of St Petersburg transferred the entire Kuril chain to Japan. However, the status of the islands saw a further reversal in the last days of the Second World War. Following an agreement between the USSR, the USA, and Britain at Yalta in early 1945, the USSR entered the war against Japan. The agreement called for the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the USSR and the restoration of the sovereignty and rights lost by Russia in the 1904-05 war between Japan and Russia. In 1951, Japan renounced its claims to the Kuril Islands under the Treaty of San Francisco. Tokyo, however, maintains that the four southern territories were part of Hokkaido, not the Kuril chain.
Map 1.1: The Kuril Islands
Source: Google Earth
In 1955, Moscow offered to transfer two territories, Habomai and Shikotan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty. Japan, however, continued to demand the return of all four islands. The USSR and Japan subsequently signed a joint declaration in 1956, ending the state of war and committing both sides to negotiations on a peace treaty. The declaration envisaged the transfer of the two islands following the conclusion of such a treaty. However, Japan’s close relations with the United States and divisions within Japanese politics contributed to the failure to resolve the dispute during the Cold War.
With ideological underpinnings waning and Russia’s relations with the West warming at the end of the Cold War, avenues for cooperation between Russia and Japan emerged. Tokyo’s salience grew in Moscow’s calculus as an important investor, critical to Russia’s plans to develop the Russian Far East. Tokyo also adopted a more flexible approach towards the timing of any territorial settlement.
Though the territorial issue remained in limbo, its resolution received considerable impetus under Putin. Putin announced his intent to fully resolve the dispute and to conclude a peace treaty between the two countries. However, the ground realities differed, with fundamental divergences in approaches to resolving the issue. Moreover, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir Island in 2010 further heightened tensions. Nonetheless, economic pragmatism allowed diplomatic efforts to continue. By the mid-2010s, the joint efforts of Putin and Abe had further improved bilateral ties. The approach to resolving the dispute shifted towards a greater emphasis on economic cooperation. In May 2016, Abe proposed an eight-point cooperation plan to Putin to strengthen the partnership and foster progress towards a formal peace treaty, and during Putin’s visit to Japan that December, the two sides signed 80 government and business documents under it.
Japan’s rationale for the proposal was that building trust between the two countries through stronger trade ties would expedite the resolution of the territorial issue. Both sides called for the dispute to be resolved on the basis of the 1956 declaration, yet remained divided over its interpretation. Moscow maintained that Japan had to accept the results of the Second World War, while Tokyo argued that its renunciation of the Kuril Islands under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco did not extend to the four southern islands.
Moscow also came to believe that transferring the Southern Kurils would automatically extend the American security umbrella to the islands under the 1960 US-Japan security treaty, which contains a clause on security guarantees.
Tokyo’s ties with Washington remain a core concern for Moscow in any resolution of the dispute. As military ties between Japan and the United States strengthened and Russia’s relations with the West deteriorated following the annexation of Crimea, Moscow criticised Tokyo’s decision in 2017 to approve the deployment of two Aegis Ashore missile defence systems (Tokyo scrapped the plan in 2020 over cost and technical concerns). Moscow also came to believe that transferring the Southern Kurils would automatically extend the American security umbrella to the islands under the 1960 US-Japan security treaty, which contains a clause on security guarantees. The islands’ geostrategic location heightens these concerns. They lie between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean and include important chokepoints such as the Shpanberg Strait, between Shikotan and the Habomai islands. Russia perceives that even a limited transfer could allow Japan to develop anti-access/area-denial capabilities against Russia’s Pacific Fleet. These developments, in turn, have raised the significance of the islands in Russian strategic discourse, with senior Russian officials increasingly visiting them to reinforce Moscow’s sovereignty claims.
The Optics of Putin’s Visit
In response to Putin’s visit, Tokyo issued a strong protest, condemning the visit as “utterly unacceptable” and reiterating that the Northern Territories are “Japan’s inherent territory”. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, summoned the Japanese ambassador. A day before the visit, Putin expressed concern over Japan’s military doctrine and its sanctions against Russia. He also reaffirmed Moscow’s position that sovereignty over the South Kurils is “enshrined in international documents as a reality that arose following the outcome of World War II”. The president added that Moscow was interested in seeking solutions towards the conclusion of a peace treaty. The juxtaposition is significant. Russia appears willing to keep open the possibility of a broader political settlement with Japan, but without reopening the question of sovereignty over the islands. Nevertheless, the visit and the live-fire missile drills conducted by Russia’s Pacific Fleet near the Southern Kuril Islands underscored the narrowing space for diplomatic engagement between the two countries.
Russia appears willing to keep open the possibility of a broader political settlement with Japan, but without reopening the question of sovereignty over the islands.
Russian experts have argued that Putin’s participation in the drills and the subsequent visit to the island reflect Moscow’s concern over shifts in Japan’s defence policy, including its growing cooperation with NATO countries, and signal that Russia’s military presence in the Asia-Pacific will be maintained and possibly expanded. However, the timing of the visit, two days before the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War, suggests that it also served as an important form of strategic signalling towards Japan.
Russia-Japan Relations Since 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to a further deterioration in Moscow’s relations with Japan. Tokyo condemned the war and joined the sanctions against Russia. Japan provided non-lethal support, including vehicles and protective gear, and pledged more than US$15 billion in humanitarian and economic assistance to Ukraine. Within a month of the invasion, Russia designated Japan an unfriendly country, halted negotiations on a peace treaty and talks on joint economic activities on the islands, and suspended visa-free exchanges (which had already been suspended since the COVID-19 pandemic).
The deterioration in ties was further reflected in Japan’s designation of the South Kurils as “illegally occupied” for the first time since 2003. Though energy trade continued, Russia’s trade with Japan decreased from US$20 billion in 2022 to US$8.1 billion in 2025. Furthermore, the security landscape in East Asia has shifted rapidly, as reflected in the deepening alignment between Russia, China, and North Korea. Russia-China joint naval and air patrols around Japan have grown in frequency and scope since 2022, including joint drills in the Sea of Japan. Moscow and Beijing’s positions in East Asia now reflect a stronger alignment: both countries have raised concerns over Japan’s perceived aggressive militarisation and its alleged attempts to erase the memory of the Second World War. Similarly, Russia-North Korea relations have improved considerably, as evidenced by Putin’s landmark visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 and North Korea’s provision of munitions and manpower in the Ukraine conflict. The war acted as a catalyst for the further consolidation of Russia-North Korea relations.
Putin’s visit to the islands, his first after more than two decades in power, indicates that a resolution of the territorial dispute remains a distant prospect. With economic ties, particularly in energy, now limited, relations are likely to settle into a prolonged freeze.
Sanae Takaichi’s arrival as prime minister last year raised hopes of a partial thaw in relations, given her political affinity to Shinzo Abe, and her expressed intent to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. However, Putin’s visit to the islands, his first after more than two decades in power, indicates that a resolution of the territorial dispute remains a distant prospect. With economic ties, particularly in energy, now limited, relations are likely to settle into a prolonged freeze. Although scope for talks on normalisation of ties persists, a return to the pre-2022 level of engagement appears unlikely.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.