Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz Group and Hungary’s MOL have signed a memorandum to develop petroleum-product storage facilities on Hungarian territory near the Ukrainian border, creating a potential strategic fuel reserve for the Ukrainian market as Russian attacks increasingly target the country’s fuel infrastructure.
The agreement covers the joint development and potential implementation of the project. Naftogaz said the facilities would serve Ukrainian demand, while acting chief executive Sergii Fedorenko argued that diversifying supply routes and creating storage capacity ‘beyond the reach of attacks’ had become vital to market stability and could strengthen cross-border energy infrastructure between Hungary and Ukraine.
The project remains at an early stage; neither its planned capacity nor the types of petroleum products to be stored have been disclosed, and no construction timetable has been announced so far.
The announcement came as Russia increased its pressure on Ukrainian fuel infrastructure in recent months. Reuters reported earlier in September that Moscow had struck around 300 Ukrainian petrol stations, mostly in or near frontline regions, while attacks have also expanded to fuel facilities in Kyiv.
Russian forces had already almost completely destroyed Ukraine’s large oil depots and fuel-storage facilities early in the full-scale war, forcing Kyiv to restructure supply logistics. Ukraine has simultaneously intensified attacks on Russian refineries and energy infrastructure, with a months-long deep-strike campaign hitting facilities inside the Russian hinterland.
The Carpathian Eight and the Uneasy Détente between Hungary and Ukraine
The MOL–Naftogaz memorandum is also one of the first tangible Hungarian projects associated with the Carpathian Eight, or C8, launched by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 18 September. The format brings together Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Czechia, Austria and Serbia, alongside EU institutions, and is intended to deepen cooperation on security, energy, logistics, investment and cross-border development. More than 50 agreements worth over €1 billion were signed around the summit, according to Reuters, more than half of them energy-related.
Interestingly, no senior Hungarian politicians attended the opening plenary of the C8, revealing a still-cautious relationship between Budapest and Kyiv. Five months ago, such cooperation would have sat uneasily with Hungary’s foreign policy under Viktor Orbán. The former prime minister’s government maintained a neutral position after Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, refused weapons deliveries to Ukraine, repeatedly blocked or delayed EU sanctions on Russia and financial assistance to Kyiv, and vetoed its EU accession bid.
‘Interestingly, no senior Hungarian politicians attended the opening plenary of the C8’
Orbán was also the only EU leader who maintained or even deepened cooperation with Moscow after the outbreak of the war, especially on energy. The former prime minister described his position as ‘pro-peace’, advocating a ceasefire and negotiations between the US, Russia and Ukraine. Budapest also made the restoration of language and educational rights for ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia a central condition for improving relations with Kyiv.
Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party won a landslide in April, framing the election particularly as a referendum on Hungary’s future trajectory between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Hungary’s foreign policy became much more aligned with the EU mainstream, without eliminating every element of Orbán’s distinctive policy.
In June, Budapest and Kyiv reached a political agreement under which Ukraine committed to restore and expand Hungarian-language educational, linguistic, cultural and political rights. Hungary then supported progress on the first cluster of accession negotiations, while Magyar maintained his opposition to fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU membership.
The implementation of the agreement, however, is disputed. On 19 September, the Federal Union of European Nationalities, acting on a proposal by the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia, unanimously called for the full restoration of the community’s previously acquired rights, including Hungarian-language education from kindergarten through higher education.
Speaking on 11 September, Magyar said that the concrete measures agreed in June had not yet been implemented, and Hungary has again blocked further accession clusters pending action by Kyiv.
Ukraine, however, rejected that characterization, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi stating on 16 September that Ukraine had adopted the legislation and documents agreed with Hungary and now expected Budapest to reciprocate, while Ukrainian officials say additional legislation remains under preparation and should not be used to block unrelated accession chapters.
Breaking Up with Russia
Meanwhile, Budapest’s shift towards Kyiv has been accompanied by a markedly harder official position on Moscow. At the end of August, the government’s instructions to the country’s delegation to the UN General Assembly stated that ‘Russia’s behaviour poses a threat to Hungary, Europe and the global order’, while reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to self-defence. The document nevertheless continues to support negotiations aimed at sustainable peace and long-term security guarantees.
The Kremlin did not formally respond to the designation, but Russian lawmakers reacted sharply. Andrei Kolesnik, a member of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, told Gazeta.ru that Russian oil and energy supplies to Hungary could now be put ‘in question’, accusing Budapest of yielding to pressure from Brussels.
Behind the diplomatic signalling of the new directive lies Hungary’s deeper and substantial dependence on Russian energy supplies. European Commission data show that more than 90 per cent of Hungary’s imported oil and 74 per cent of its imported gas came from Russia in 2025. MVM’s 2026 prospectus says its long-term agreements with Gazprom provide for 4.5 billion cubic metres of gas annually, while the Russian-built Paks II nuclear project also remains alive, although the Magyar government has ordered a review.
‘With Hungary still heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas and winter approaching, the shift is not without risks’
While during the campaign and immediately after the election Tisza communicated that it intended to maintain pragmatic energy cooperation with Russia in order to secure cheap energy supplies as prices once again rose across the region, that approach now seems to be changing significantly.
Economy and Energy Minister István Kapitány said on Friday that Hungary expects to be able to meet its gas needs from sources outside Russia by October 2027, when EU rules are due to end the use of long-term Russian gas contracts, and Budapest has begun talks with Croatia on using the Adria oil pipeline at full capacity. Paks II is also being reassessed, with a decision expected by the end of the year; Rosatom has said it remains ready for talks with the Hungarian authorities.
Against that background, the MOL–Naftogaz memorandum carries broader strategic significance. Hungary is moving to host infrastructure designed specifically to shield Ukrainian fuel reserves from Russian attacks just weeks after the Magyar government formally described Moscow as a security threat.
With Hungary still heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas and winter approaching, the shift is not without risks: a Russian lawmaker has already suggested that energy deliveries could be put ‘in question’, although the Kremlin has announced no such measure. The agreement therefore highlights the potentially vulnerable transition Budapest now faces—deepening energy cooperation with Kyiv and accelerating diversification while Russia retains considerable potential leverage over Hungarian supplies until alternative routes can fully replace them.
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