Moscow’s greatest danger may not be a war it can win, but a carefully limited challenge designed to expose divisions within the Alliance.
Russia may be signaling its readiness for a confrontation with NATO, but its capacity for a major war against the Alliance is limited. Its army is suffering significant losses in Ukraine, the economy is under pressure from sanctions and wartime spending, and Moscow is becoming increasingly dependent on China and imported technology. At the same time, this does not eliminate the risk of limited or hybrid attacks that the Kremlin could use to test the allies’ readiness to respond together.
According to BBC.
Five reasons why Russia could not sustain a major war with NATO
The depletion of the Russian army. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia suffered around 1.4 million military casualties from February 2022 to June 2026. As many as 450,000 of them may have been killed. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates the number of fatalities at more than 300,000.
A negative trend in casualties and recruitment. In 2026, according to the cited estimates, Russian forces suffered 30,000–34,000 military casualties each month, while recruitment stood at approximately 27,000. During major offensive operations, the average advance was only 50–90 meters per day. In April and May, Russia lost more territory than it captured.
Dependence on China. According to Bloomberg, Russia obtains more than 90% of its sanctioned technologies through China. In 2024, Chinese goods accounted for 57% of Russian imports. A U.S. congressional commission described this dependence as one-sided, since Beijing is far less dependent on Moscow.
Vladimir Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline in May 2026 did not end with the expected agreement. China has also not promised Russia direct military support. Analysts at the Royal United Services Institute believe that a large-scale war with NATO would not serve Beijing’s interests.
Problems in the Russian economy. In the first quarter of 2026, the Russian economy contracted by 0.3%. The government lowered its full-year growth forecast from 1.3% to 0.4%. On September 11, the Central Bank of Russia left its key interest rate at 14%, while inflation stood at 6.3%.
Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries caused Russia’s revenues from petroleum-product exports to fall by 32% in August. To support the industry, Moscow paid companies nearly 916 billion rubles in subsidies. The liquid assets of the National Wealth Fund fell to approximately $48 billion, compared with $117 billion before the full-scale invasion.
Technological backwardness. Russia lacks sufficient domestic capacity to produce the advanced microchips needed, among other things, for attack drones. Because of sanctions, Moscow is forced to rely on intermediaries and unofficial supply channels.
By comparison, private investment in artificial intelligence in the United States amounted to $285.9 billion in 2025. The Center for Strategic and International Studies also concluded that Russia’s claimed capabilities in autonomous drones and “swarm” systems do not fully match the scale of their actual use.
The nuclear arsenal does not give Moscow an unconditional advantage. The New START treaty expired on February 5, while Russia suspended its participation in the inspection system as early as 2023. At the same time, NATO includes three nuclear powers – the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Five other Alliance members host American B61 nuclear bombs.
France has announced plans to strengthen its own nuclear capabilities and consultations with the United Kingdom and Germany. The United Kingdom is purchasing 12 F-35A fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has also drawn attention to the difficulties of modernizing Russia’s arsenal, including the failed test of the Sarmat missile in 2025.
Why the Kremlin may still take the risk
Despite the problems facing its army and economy, Russia is unlikely to launch a large-scale ground invasion against the entire Alliance. Instead, Moscow may gradually raise the level of escalation through sabotage, cyberattacks, and drone and missile strikes.
One of the most vulnerable areas could be the Suwałki Gap – the territory between Poland and Lithuania that connects the Baltic states with the other NATO countries. Even an attempt by Russia, supported by Belarus, to seize a small part of Alliance territory would raise questions about the speed and scale of a joint response.
According to U.S. intelligence estimates, the most dangerous period for NATO could be from autumn 2026 to 2029. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte says that the Alliance is rehearsing such scenarios and would respond to an attack. At the same time, the U.S. response to a limited conflict remains one of the factors contributing to uncertainty.
The Kremlin’s likely calculation may not be to defeat NATO in a direct war, but to find a weak link and test the allies’ political readiness to act together. Newsweek, citing Royal Institute of International Affairs analyst Keir Giles, wrote that Moscow might try to test the practical effectiveness of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The only way for Moscow to find out whether Article 5 works is to test it.
– Keir Giles, analyst at the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Thus, Russia lacks sufficient resources for an equal direct confrontation with the entire NATO alliance. However, the very desire to conceal its own weakness may push the Kremlin toward limited and risky actions designed to exploit divisions among the allies and the Alliance’s slow response.
