Ottawa’s core military spending already outpaces the Canada Health Transfer in cash terms, and Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne’s second budget would widen that gap to $31.5 billion by the end of the decade. Budget 2026 projects core defence spending of $99.2 billion in 2030-31, or 2.6 percent of GDP. The health transfer is forecast to reach $67.7 billion that year. But the budget’s year-by-year defence figures stop at 2030-31, five years short of the NATO deadline that drives the steepest part of the climb.
The comparison depends on the yardstick. Those defence figures are on a cash basis, the measure NATO uses. On the accrual basis Ottawa uses for its own books, which spreads the cost of ships and aircraft over their useful lives, core defence comes to $65.1 billion in 2030-31, still slightly below the health transfer.
The health transfer, the largest of Ottawa’s major transfers to the provinces and territories, stands at $57.4 billion this fiscal year. Its guaranteed 5 percent annual increase runs through 2027-28, after which growth follows nominal GDP with a 3 percent floor. Core defence spending, which covers equipment, munitions and personnel, overtook it in 2025-26. That year Ottawa spent $65.9 billion to reach NATO’s 2 percent target, up from $43.9 billion the year before.
The budget, tabled Thursday under the title “Masters of our destiny,” says total defence investment will top $700 billion in cash over the next five years. Under NATO’s broader definition, which adds security-related spending such as Arctic infrastructure and border enforcement, it puts Canada at 4.1 percent of GDP from 2027-28 onward.
At their June 2025 summit in The Hague, NATO allies agreed to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence by 2035: 3.5 percent on core military spending and up to 1.5 percent on related security and infrastructure. The alliance plans to review the targets by 2030.
Projections stop at 2030-31
Champagne argued the plan is more open than those of allies facing the same targets. “In terms of spending on defence … you’ll see more transparency than most G7 countries,” he told reporters, according to The Canadian Press. “You’ll see the spending on a cash basis for every year until 2030.”
Prime Minister Mark Carney has said a full plan to 2035 would quickly go stale given how fast warfare is changing. Former parliamentary budget officer Kevin Page disagrees, CP reported, saying that halting the numbers at 2030 leaves Canadians in the dark.
The budget’s own figures show why the cutoff matters. Core spending reaches 2.6 percent of GDP in 2027-28 and stays there through 2030-31. Reaching 3.5 percent by 2035 would require a jump of nearly a full point of GDP in the five years after the projections end. The budget itself cautions that its defence forecasts do not account for future government commitments.
The second half of the decade is where the money is. The parliamentary budget officer estimates that meeting the 3.5 percent core target will take $163.6 billion in cash in 2035-36, about $64 billion more than the budget’s 2030-31 figure. Budget officer Annette Ryan’s office puts the difference between spending 2 percent and 3.5 percent of GDP at roughly $70 billion a year. In February, the PBO estimated that financing the increase with debt would add $63 billion to the deficit in 2035-36. Economist Trevor Tombe has calculated that the target would require cuts to non-military spending approaching 3 percent of GDP.
Little of the near-term climb is new money. Budget 2026 adds $755 million in net new defence funding over five years. Most of its other defence measures, including $7.6 billion to extend the Latvia deployment, draw on funds already set aside or on existing departmental budgets. Nor does it set aside money for the biggest pending purchases: a fleet of up to 12 submarines, with Germany’s TKMS named preferred supplier in July, and six GlobalEye early-warning aircraft from Sweden’s Saab, both still under negotiation.

A reordering of federal priorities
Richard Shimooka, a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy, calls the Carney government’s embrace of the military one of the sharpest reversals from the Trudeau era, after nearly a decade in which Ottawa put off major investments. Canada now spends about $60 billion, or 2 percent of GDP, on defence after hovering between 1 and 1.4 percent for decades, he notes. Honouring the 2035 pledge would mean nearly tripling that.
Shimooka argues that public support for the buildup rests less on a sober reading of the threats from Russia and China than on a generalized anxiety about the United States. To shore it up, he writes, Ottawa has pitched military spending as an economic program, including a Defence Industrial Strategy goal of 125,000 defence industry jobs over a decade.
Philip Deck argued in The Hub that Liberal and Conservative governments alike had long followed voters who preferred entitlement spending to the armed forces. Deck is a software entrepreneur and former CEO of Certicom Corp. who has also served as lead director of the Bank of Canada. In his view, the pace of technological change should now dictate where new money goes. “Increasingly, warfighting will be robot-to-robot, the victor being the one who runs out of robots last,” Deck wrote.
On the budget’s own numbers, the military is the faster-growing claim. Core defence spending rises about 50 percent between 2025-26 and 2030-31, while the health transfer rises about 24 percent.
The budget doesn’t say how the post-2030 climb would be paid for, whether through new revenue, spending cuts or larger deficits. Its long-term debt projections assume program spending simply grows with the economy after 2031, and they mention “additional defence spending” only as a future pressure. That question will fall to the first budget that extends Ottawa’s defence projections past 2030. By then, NATO will be weighing whether the targets still stand.
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