Our integration path risks being “Macedonianized.” No one knows this better than a Macedonian. They have seen this movie. They know exactly how it will end. Therefore, the choice now remains ours. The only thing we will not be able to say tomorrow is that our friends did not warn us.
We are in the final days of the Kurti 2 Government. Consequently, it is time to assess its performance in the field of European integration. The most appropriate way to do this is to assess the Government against the objectives it has set for itself.
In this regard, on May 7, 2021, the Government approved its government program for the period 2021-2025. There, among other things, it outlined its objectives in the field of European integration. They can be grouped into three key objectives: (1) visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens, (2) advancing contractual relations with the EU, and (3) increasing EU funds.
Let’s start with liberalization. This is an objective that the Government fully met. Twelve years after the launch of the visa liberalization process, this journey has finally come to an end. Although previous governments met the vast majority of the criteria, they failed to cross the “finish line”. This privilege went to the Kurti 2 Government. Part of the credit certainly goes to the Kurti 2 Government, as it managed to convince skeptics within the EU that it had set a new standard in the fight against corruption – the latter criterion on which the EU insisted regarding visa liberalization. But part of the credit – as is often the case in life – also goes to fate. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the importance of enlargement took on a completely different weight within the EU. The EU decided to take a series of decisions in the enlargement process to bring the region even closer to the EU. Albania and North Macedonia formally opened membership negotiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina received candidate status, while we received visa liberalization. Thus, an unplanned and unrelated event to Kosovo created a favorable political environment for visa liberalization for Kosovo.
The second objective of the Government in the field of European integration was “advancing contractual relations with the EU”. In this context, the Government pledged that “within the first mandate of the government, Kosovo will be ready to receive the status of a candidate country”. This goal was clearly not met. Although in December 2022, Prime Minister Kurti submitted the application for the status of a candidate country, this application remained dusty in the drawers of the EU institutions. The key reason is the lack of progress within the framework of the dialogue for the normalization of relations with Serbia. In fact, not only did the Government not “advancing contractual relations with the EU”, but it degraded them, placing Kosovo for the first time under the regime of punitive measures, which were imposed on it in 2023 by the EU.
The third objective of the Government was “to increase the benefits from IPA III funds”. This goal was clearly not met either. Not only were the funds not increased, but they were also suspended as a result of the EU’s punitive measures. The contracting of national IPA projects was suspended. Kosovo was also blocked from approving applications under the regional infrastructure funds under the Western Balkans Investment Framework. The Government also abdicated its responsibility for donor coordination. Although the Government had established structures responsible for donor coordination in Kosovo, it failed to establish a structured, regular and effective dialogue with international development partners.
So, we can slowly come to the conclusion that out of the three objectives set, the Government managed to fulfill only one of them: visa liberalization. Two other objectives were not fulfilled, due to the lack of progress in the dialogue with Serbia. And here, of course, the Government will justify itself by saying that the responsibility for the lack of progress on Kosovo’s European path lies with the EU.
The EU, on the other hand, will definitely have the opposite position. But leaving this quibble aside, the fact remains that Kosovo is now slowly entering its tenth year without advancing its integration path. Next year will “celebrate” the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the SAA, the last step that marked progress on our integration path. Thus, Kosovo’s integration path risks being “Macedonianized”. So, we risk our integration future being sacrificed for the sake of bilateral relations with Serbia. And in this regard, it is not unimaginable that another four years will pass us by, staying exactly where we are.
At least the EU is giving no indication that there will be any change in its approach to the dialogue. As recently as this week, the EU High Representative, Ms. Kallas, said that “what is important for us is the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, because without this neither of them can continue on their European path.”
Try to find any difference here with what Borrelli, Mogherini or Ashton said. So, the EU is clear: the course remains the same. What remains is for Kosovo to decide what it wants to do?
And in this regard, Kosovo’s leaders must put an end to the illusion that our integration future will advance without painful compromises within the framework of the dialogue. And for this, you should not believe the words of my little one, but precisely a Macedonian woman, who has learned our mistakes in her own skin. “Sometimes compromises are painful, but they are worth it… Therefore, yes, political compromises are costly, they are costly for us as politicians, but they are always beneficial for the citizens,” NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ms. Radmila Shekerinska, told TIME last week. Ms. Shekerinska’s advice is not accidental. She has seen this film. She knows exactly how it will end. Therefore, the solution now remains ours. The only thing we will not be able to say tomorrow is that we were not warned.