The EU too has not remained passive. Germany signalled its readiness to impose sanctions, including for the first time those targeting individuals. Austria also, for the first time, called for sanctions against Dodik. The European Commission privately warned of cutting financial support to RS, while France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey issued strong warnings. Turkey’s engagement is particularly notable, given Dodik’s past assertions of close ties with president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The RS Opposition and Institutional Resilience
Domestically, the crisis has not played entirely in Dodik’s favour. For the first time since 2006, the RS opposition has found a compelling narrative – arguing that this crisis is not about the well-being of RS or Serbs but about Dodik himself, who is jeopardising the economy, stability and autonomy. State institutions, while under immense pressure, have proven more resilient than expected. Serb civil servants and officials have so far not abandoned them en masse, and institutions under attack continue to somewhat operate on the RS territory.
Dodik and his inner circle, however, show no intention of backing down. With two criminal cases against him, he has little to lose.
On 26 February 2025, the state court convicted Dodik in a first-instance ruling to a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban from public office for defying the decisions of the international high representative. Since 1997, the holder of this office, created under the Dayton Peace Agreement, has had Bonn powers enabling him to dismiss officials, impose laws, and annul decisions. In 2023, facing growing resistance, the current officeholder, former German politician Christian Schmidt, criminalised the non-implementation of his rulings – a law now being tested for the first time in Dodik’s case.
A separate investigation into Dodik, as well as RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković and the current speaker of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Nenad Stevandić, is for attempting to undermine constitutional order, and was initiated in December 2024. After the steps taken by the RS authorities in the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s decision to suspend the RS legislation, and the refusal by the RS leadership to appear for questioning, the state court announced on 17 March that it ordered pre-trial detention for all three. In theory, all law enforcement agencies, including border police, are now required to enforce this order. However, due to Dodik’s influence over RS security structures and broader stability considerations by other institutions, this has not yet been implemented. This standoff is a test of endurance.
Serbia’s Role and Two Visions for Bosnia
Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, has met Dodik twice since 26 February, while his prime minister and deputy prime ministers travelled to Banja Luka in a show of support. At home, Vučić sought to use the crisis to deflect attention from the ongoing protests challenging his rule. Abroad, he insisted he is ‘doing everything possible to… keep Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ But his actions embolden Dodik. In Summer 2024 – Vučić and Dodik orchestrated the All-Serb Assembly, which endorsed RS’s non-existing right to unilaterally reclaim all state-level competencies transferred since 1995, including defence, taxation, and law enforcement. Both knew these moves would be unconstitutional and would provoke a crisis. That was the goal.