Migrant agreements: What benefits Kosovo and why are they criticized?

Migrant agreements: What benefits Kosovo and why are they criticized?

The southeastern corner of Europe, including Kosovo, is becoming the terrain where the most powerful states are trying to shift one of their dilemmas: what to do with migrants they don’t want within their borders?

Recently, Kosovo has agreed to host 50 migrants from third countries who were staying in the US, while it has also expressed its willingness to host asylum seekers rejected by the United Kingdom.

The Kosovo government, along with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will be tasked with implementing the agreement with the US, have not responded to Radio Free Europe’s questions regarding this topic.

What Kosovo gains from this agreement has not been indicated by the US State Department, which has only said that the US is “grateful to our partner, Kosovo, for accepting third-country nationals deported from the United States.”

Later, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Kosovo, Anu Prattipati, thanked Kosovo for X, saying it became “the first country in Europe to announce that it will accept third-country nationals being deported by the United States.”

“Securing the American border is a top priority of the Trump administration, and I appreciate the Government and people of Kosovo for their partnership,” she added.

What does Kosovo gain?

Do these agreements really constitute strategic progress for Kosovo? Donika Emini, from the European Balkan Policy Advisory Group, says that these agreements should be understood “as a form of bilateral cooperation, and not as a transformative moment in Kosovo’s international positioning.”

“This strengthens Kosovo’s image as a reliable partner, but does not fundamentally change the dynamics of relations, especially when key political issues, such as the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, continue to be a source of tension between the two countries,” Emini tells Radio Free Europe.

As evidence of this, she cites an agreement between the European Union and Turkey on Syrian refugees, which she says shows that “cooperation on migration management does not necessarily translate into improved broader relations if deeper political disagreements remain unresolved.”

Even former US ambassador to Serbia, Christopher Hill, says that it is not enough for Kosovo to show that it wants to help the US address its challenges.

“Symbolic gestures of this kind, while important and useful, need to be accompanied by a broader approach that ensures that Kosovo is not on the list of problems,” Hill tells Radio Free Europe.

But Kosovo is not the only one in the Balkans that is accepting such responsibilities for managing migrants.

Albania has an agreement with Italy to accept migrants, North Macedonia has been mentioned as a potential location for an agreement with the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina has cooperation with the EU on migration management, receiving funds and support for reception centers.

Late last month, Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the United Kingdom and the European Union not to use the Balkans as a “warehouse for migrants.”

Michael Bochenek, from this organization, tells REL that the Balkans have become the target of such plans by more powerful states for several reasons.

“Balkan countries don’t have a truly horrific history of human rights violations [compared to other countries that have been used for these plans, like Rwanda, South Sudan, Libya],” he says.

Bochenek adds that the influence that the European Union has on the countries of this region also plays a role.

“For better or worse, these governments may have a sense of obligation to the European Union and therefore may be more open to these types of demands,” says Bochenek.

Why are we talking about the European Union?

For three main reasons, says Olivia Sundberg Diez, from Amnesty International, which has been monitoring and criticizing such agreements for many years.

There are three steps, she says, that the European Union has recently taken to process migrants outside the EU’s borders, as a way to deal with a large wave of migrants.

In recent months, the European Union has introduced proposals that allow for the rejection of an applicant’s asylum request, on the grounds that he or she can also seek asylum elsewhere; facilitating the rejection and expulsion of asylum seekers from countries that the EU considers safe, as well as the possibility of sending rejected asylum seekers to countries with which they have no connection.

“There is a deliberate attempt to shift responsibility for refugee protection to countries outside the EU, without clear legal guarantees and with a lot of uncertainty about responsibility,” Diez tells REL.

And, the discussion about where such return centers could be built for migrants who were aiming for the EU, but whose asylum requests were rejected, has specifically included the Western Balkan countries.

Emini says these countries must understand that such agreements bring benefits, such as investments or specific support, but not progress towards EU membership.

“In the future, Kosovo and other Western Balkan countries should aim to position themselves not simply as providers of sensitive services that richer countries do not want to take over, but as proactive and strategic actors in the international arena,” says Emini, adding that the Western Balkan region is being “instrumentalized without real and long-term benefits.”

In a similar agreement that also sparked criticism, in 2022, Kosovo and Denmark agreed to lease 300 prison cells at the Correctional Institution in Gjilan to house foreign prisoners who are expected to be deported from Denmark after completing their sentences.

In return, Kosovo will benefit from over 200 million euros, which will be invested in the Correctional Service and renewable energy projects.

The first prisoners from Denmark are expected to be transferred to the prison in Gjilan in the first half of 2027.

Previously, Kosovo had also sheltered around 1.900 Afghan citizens, who were evacuated from Afghanistan after the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

What do migrants lose?

Alongside the debate about the diplomatic benefits of the Western Balkan states, such agreements are also raising serious concerns regarding the rights of migrants.

Bochenek of Human Rights Watch says that “these agreements are political and an attempt to circumvent human rights obligations.”

He adds that they often create legal uncertainty for migrants, especially for those who have no ties to the host country.

“People don’t know where they are, they don’t understand why they were sent there, they feel lost and isolated,” he says.

Diez points out that such agreements create the risk of arbitrary detentions, restrictions on access to legal aid, and difficulties in pursuing legal appeals.

“You can’t implement this [agreement on return centers] in a way that is consistent with human rights,” she says.

The agreement between Italy and Albania on the transfer of migrants has encountered such difficulties since its implementation. More than 70 people initially sent to Albania have been returned to Italy, following court decisions or due to medical needs.

“We have ample evidence from extensive international research that shows that such schemes – attempts to shift responsibilities as far away as possible from the borders of the European Union, removing people from sight and mind – do not work and cannot be implemented in a way that is humane,” says Diez.

Like her, Bochenez emphasizes that such schemes are also expensive for the states that finance them.

For this reason, they would prefer that more powerful states invest in their capacities to manage migrants.

“It seems like an extremely complicated way to approach this issue, unless the real goal is simply to push people away and leave the problem to others,” says Bochenez.

For Diez from Amnesty International, the lack of transparency that accompanies such agreements between states is also a serious problem.

“Agreements are often negotiated in a non-transparent manner, without the involvement of parliament or civil society organizations,” says Diez, adding that this makes any independent scrutiny difficult.

She and Bochenek say it is important for activists and civil society in countries targeted for such return centers to also question their governments’ decisions.

“The more politicians and legislators are aware of the existence of local objections, the more they will be forced to take them into account,” says Bochenek.

He adds that such agreements are often presented as good, as it is said that the state will benefit from funds or will look good in the eyes of a more powerful state.

“But if these agreements are not carefully examined, if their negative sides are not highlighted, if public opinion is not taken into account, and if the true cost they carry is not understood, then the risk is great,” says Bochenek.

He adds that in other cases of these agreements around the world – such as with Costa Rica, Panama, or South Sudan, “these agreements have proven to be much more problematic for the host countries than initially anticipated.” /REL/