Anton Shekhovtsov is a political scientist and one of the world’s foremost researchers into the radical right in Europe. Born in Sevastopol during the Soviet period, he is the founder, along with Dr. Andreas Umland, of the Centre for Democratic Integrity, a non-profit association established in 2020 to monitor and analyze attempts of authoritarian regimes based on illiberal value systems to wield malign influence in Europe. Shekhovtsov speaks to Kyiv Post about psychological warfare and why the opening of KGB-archives in Ukraine upsets Russia.
Stefan Schocher: We are currently seeing a whole series of violations of airspace and territorial sovereignty by Russia in Western Europe. What is this?
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Anton Shekhovtsov: To me, it looks like psychological warfare against those countries that support Ukraine. There have been such incidents in Romania, Poland and the Baltic states, but not in Slovakia or Hungary. The Russians have also said that they had no targets in Poland. So they have not attacked any bases, facilities or buildings.
Russia’s main goal is to undermine support for Ukraine. The Russians seem to be using the emotions and fears of the population to convince their governments to abandon their support for Ukraine. Even when Russian fighter jets violated Estonian airspace, they did not have any military targets. The goal was to exert psychological pressure.
But something like this can also backfire.
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We haven’t seen that happen yet, though. And now NATO is divided on how to respond to these violations. Drones can simply be shot down. With jets, it’s different. If you can’t defeat your enemy in kinetic combat, you make sure that the enemy splits. And that is one of Russia’s goals.
Russia operates on many different levels. Can this flow be systematically captured?
The narratives that Russia uses can be divided into two categories: strategic and tactical. Strategic narratives are those that the Russian authorities actually believe in. For example, they believe that the West poses a threat to Russia. They believe that Western democracy and Western values pose a threat. They also say: We are the true representatives of Western values. They also believe that most of Ukraine is part of Russian civilization.
And then there are tactical narratives that serve to reinforce the strategic narratives, or are simply disruptive factors. For example, that Ukraine is a kind of Nazi regime. At the same time, they have the tactical narrative that Ukraine has no ideology. Ukraine is simply nothing. But you can’t be both: either you are a Nazi regime, or you have no ideology.
This Nazi narrative, from the Soviet era, raises questions of whether Russia has ever truly accepted that Ukraine is not Russia. And it makes one wonder how long Russia has been planning this war.
It is the Russian leadership that has a problem with this. But it is one thing to see a problem and another to do something about it. Sometimes you have ideas, but if you don’t have the resources to implement them, you don’t do it. At some point they thought: Yes, we have enough money, we have enough influence over European countries. So, let’s give it a try.
When do you think this idea originated?
I believe they had this idea from the outset. Putin is a KGB man. And that is precisely the difference between politicians with a civilian background and people from the security services. For security services, there are no gray areas. There is a threat – and you eliminate it. Politicians with a different background negotiate. For Putin, there are no negotiations.
Another principle is secrecy. Kyiv has opened its KGB archives. How much of a blow is that to a Russian government that consists mainly of KGB people?
It is a blow. Ukraine was part of the Soviet era – a central part. In the Baltic states, for example, there were no higher KGB schools because Moscow never trusted the Balts. But they trusted the Ukrainians. That is why Ukraine has so many files. The opening of these archives is seen as a hostile act. If you look at who Putin is targeting with assassinations, it is mainly people who have defected from the security services. They are considered traitors. And there is only one way to deal with traitors: you eliminate them. From the Russian regime’s point of view, Ukraine is a traitor.
Russia’s view of Ukraine is expressed in rhetoric of pure hatred. Is this Ukrainophobia a reaction to Ukrainian resistance, or is it inherent?
The simplest definition of Ukrainophobia is denying the Ukrainian nation the right to exist as a separate nation from the Russians – this has its roots in the Russian Empire – where it was inconceivable that the Ukrainian ethnic community could be treated as a political nation; instead, it was regarded either as a negligible group of uneducated people or simply as part of the larger Russian nation. Today’s Moscow denies Ukraine its sovereignty and the right to exist as an independent nation. Ukrainophobia is deeply rooted in Russian political culture.
In an information war, there are two sides: the sender and the receiver. What role do gaps in knowledge ultimately play when Russia disseminates its narrative?
When it comes to a subject you don’t know much about, you pick up the first bits of information that come your way and stick with them. It’s a psychological phenomenon. Many people lack information. And then Russia comes along and says: Well, Ukraine doesn’t exist. That’s one of Russia’s strategies.
But it also works the other way around. Recently, a well-known German comedian said that he initially supported Ukraine, but then informed himself and now considers Russia’s actions to be legitimate, and that he is in favor of peace with Russia.
This narrative about peace is extremely effective. And this narrative is not new either. The Soviet Union did two things with regard to the West: In countries where communist or socialist parties were legal, they financed these parties. And in countries where communist parties were either illegal or marginalized, the Soviets provided funding for peace movements and those who opposed militarization or the production of weapons.
And now the Russians have succeeded in winning over the far right to this protest against war. By war, they mean Western support for Ukraine. The idea is that the sooner you stop supporting Ukraine, the sooner the war will be over. That would, of course, be a military victory for Russia. And then the Russians manipulate this narrative and say: if you are in favor of this [support for Ukraine’s defense], then you are in favor of war. Then you are in favor of all the terrible things that come out of war.
Is there sufficient awareness of what the Soviet Union actually was?
I believe there is little understanding in the West. There was never a tribunal. And there was never a real discussion about the inhumanity of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union killed millions of people. After the Second World War, however, these crimes were forgiven – and in my opinion, that is one of the reasons why Russia behaves the way it does today. This evil, this political evil, was not punished.
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