Regarding the procedure for conducting an information war against Lithuania

LRT published something we have felt for some time. Coordinated bot networks and bought Facebook groups artificially increase the popularity of “Nemunas Aušra”. At least 25% of shares are from fake accounts.

Therefore, it is worth noting that together with the attempt to politicize LRT and limit the freedom of the media, Lithuanian democracy is experiencing a systematic and very effective informational attack and it is probably a great time to organize and create a strategy so that we – civil society – will systematically, consistently and patiently defend and attack.

~40,000 peacefully protesting in front of the Seimas was incredible, 143,000 who signed the petition – a record. Protests are necessary – they show that we are not the silent majority, they create pressure, they give hope.

But the unpleasant truth – protests alone will not be enough.

People protested in Hungary. In Slovakia, 15,000 formed a living chain around RTVS. Protests in Georgia have been going on for two years. And yet – Orban consolidated power, the Slovak broadcaster was taken over, Georgia is sinking. There were protests, but they were not enough.

Since we are not the first to face identical attacks, it is useful to dig deeper into what has worked and what has not worked in other countries.

1. Peaceful resistance works when the number of participants reaches 3.5% of the population.
   Erica Chenoweth, a political scientist at the Harvard Research Center, analyzed 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns. Conclusion: non-violent movements involving 3.5% of the population have never lost. Harvard Kennedy School

   In Lithuania, this would be approximately 100,000 permanently active citizens. 143,703 signed a petition for LRT, but signing is definitely not the same as active and consistent opposition that requires organizing.

2. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute researchers foundthat when 10% of the population hold strongly to the belief, the majority eventually adopt it. This directly applies to comment sections. So now “Nemunas Aušra” is successfully manipulating public opinion, but civil society can use this principle to their advantage.

3. Prebunking > Debunking. Cambridge University researcher Sander van der Linden proved itthat “prebunking” — exposing manipulation techniques before people are exposed to misinformation — is more effective than refuting disinformation once it has spread.

4. Taiwan for 11 consecutive years is one of the countries most attacked by foreign disinformation in the world. Nevertheless, Taiwan remains a functioning democracy.
   It is installed in Taiwan golden hour principle – ministries must respond to disinformation within 60 minutes. It has been observed that if answered within an hour, the answer has a “prebunking” effect. Subsequent answers only have a “debunking” effect, which has little effect on public opinion. (D+C interview, 2025; CPJ interview, 2019)

5. The Polish KOD (Komitet Obrony Demokracji) operated from 2015 until its victory in 2023. They didn’t just protest – they created an iconic sign (“Konstytucja"), established chapters abroad, pressured opposition parties to unite and combined street energy with electoral strategy. The result: youth voter turnout jumped from 46% to 69%. A record 74.4% turnout in the elections defeated PiS. Journal of Democracy

Otpor of Serbia (1998-2000) is another example. 130 decentralized groups, ~70,000 members. Used humor and non-violent resistance. Forced the divided opposition to unite and nominate a single candidate against Milosevic.

The difference between success and failure

What matters is not the size of the protests, but what happened between them. In the successful cases, there was a long-term organization, they used a variety of tactics, they were linked to elections, and the structures were decentralized, which could not be cut down with one blow.

What can we do?

So perhaps the most important thing we can do now is to get together in small groups. 5-12 people, with those who realized that the threat is extremely serious. It is worth creating a “group chat” where you can discuss, plan and support each other. Research shows that groups of this size hold energy for long periods of time, with larger numbers dissipating and smaller numbers burning out.

What we can do with bots right now

• Speed ​​matters – whoever appears first in the comments sets the tone.
• Let’s write civil comments, especially under the posts of news portals, so that others can “support” them
• “Like” and “upvote” civil comments – this changes the opinion of other readers
• Report bots (especially when the comments are identical, shared in many groups at the same time)
• Write replies to trolls and bots. It is important to remember that the answer is not for them, but for the civil society reading the answer. Debunking Handbook 2020
• Let’s not repeat lies – people remember better what they read first. Instead of “It is not true that LRT spreads propaganda” it is better to write “LRT meets the highest journalistic standards and has an independent editorial staff.” (Debunking Handbook 2020, MediaSmarts)
• Create memes – humor spreads faster

Civil society can do more than just comment. Several directions:

• Monitor and document – botnets leave traces. Anyone who knows how to program or analyze data can help track it down.
• Report bots in an organized manner – one Meta message means nothing. A hundred at once is already a signal.
• Contribute to Debunk.euBaltic Elves. In Taiwan, there is a crowdsourced debunking Cofacts platform, where ordinary people jointly verify and refute false information.
• Organized pressure on social democratswho may still have some remnants of conscience.

Influence campaigns in the Lithuanian social space are now proven. The beneficiary is clear. It would be very naive to expect them to expire by themselves, like balloons. If we do not learn to resist, we will have to live with very painful consequences.

Alone in the field is not a warrior. But together we can do a lot.

They expect us to be tired. Nevarkime.