Iran is not an Arab country. This seemingly simple statement carries profound implications for understanding six decades of geopolitical risk in the Middle East. While Western analysts persistently misread Tehran through sectarian or ideological lenses, Iran’s strategic behaviour becomes coherent only when viewed through the prism of Persian civilisational identity—a consciousness that has generated consistent risk patterns across revolutionary and pre-revolutionary regimes alike.
The Continuity Beneath the Revolution
The 1979 Islamic Revolution appeared to represent a radical rupture in Iranian foreign policy. The Shah’s pro-Western alignment gave way to revolutionary export and ‘neither East nor West’ non-alignment. Yet beneath this ideological transformation, Persian strategic logic persisted with remarkable consistency.
Both Pahlavi and Islamic Republic Iran have pursued regional hegemony as a natural right. Both have resisted subordination to external powers. Both have viewed Arab neighbours with a mixture of cultural condescension and strategic competition. The Shah sought to become the Gulf’s policeman; the Ayatollahs seek to become its revolutionary vanguard. The methods differ; the underlying conviction that Iran deserves regional primacy remains constant.
This continuity matters for risk assessment. Analysts who attribute Iranian assertiveness solely to revolutionary ideology will perpetually overestimate the potential for regime change to moderate Tehran’s regional posture. A post-theocratic Iran would likely pursue similar strategic objectives through different means—because those objectives derive from Persian identity rather than Islamic revolutionary fervour.
Six Decades of Risk Escalation
The 1970s established Iran as a regional risk factor through conventional military accumulation. The Shah’s petrodollar-fuelled arms purchases and intervention in Oman’s Dhofar rebellion signalled Tehran’s hegemonic aspirations. Western powers indulged these ambitions, viewing Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and Arab nationalism.
The 1980s transformed Iranian risk from conventional to revolutionary. The Iran-Iraq War, while devastating, reinforced Persian narratives of civilisational resistance against Arab aggression backed by Western powers. The conflict’s human costs—approximately 500,000 killed and over one million total casualties—seared into Iranian strategic culture a profound distrust of international norms and external guarantees. The war also birthed Tehran’s proxy strategy: Hezbollah emerged as Iran’s most successful export, projecting Persian influence into the Levant through Shia networks.
The 1990s saw Iranian risk evolve toward asymmetric capabilities. Contained by sanctions and weakened by war, Tehran invested in what strategists now call ‘forward defence’—cultivating non-state actors across the region while developing ballistic missile capabilities. This period established the risk architecture that persists today: Iran as a state that fights through proxies, threatens through missiles, and negotiates through ambiguity.
The 2000s elevated Iranian risk to potential nuclear dimensions. Tehran’s atomic programme, whether oriented toward weapons capability or strategic latency, represented the ultimate expression of Persian exceptionalism—a civilisation-state demanding recognition as a threshold nuclear power. The programme also demonstrated Iran’s willingness to endure extraordinary economic punishment rather than accept strategic subordination.
The 2010s witnessed peak sanctions pressure alongside regional expansion. The apparent paradox dissolves when viewed through Persian identity: economic hardship reinforced nationalist narratives while regional chaos—Syrian civil war, Iraqi fragmentation, Yemeni collapse—created opportunities for influence projection. Iran emerged from the decade economically weakened but strategically ascendant, with proxy forces positioned from Beirut to Sanaa.
The 2020s have introduced new risk variables. The Abraham Accords formalised an anti-Iranian regional alignment, validating Tehran’s narrative of encirclement while potentially accelerating its nuclear timeline. The October 7th aftermath has simultaneously showcased Iranian proxy capabilities and exposed their limitations, as Hezbollah’s measured response suggested Tehran’s preference for strategic patience over apocalyptic confrontation.
Risk Implications for the Coming Decade
Iran’s Persian identity generates several durable risk factors that transcend regime type or leadership succession.
First, nuclear latency will persist as a strategic objective. A civilisation that once ruled from the Indus to the Nile will not permanently accept technological inferiority to regional rivals. Whether through negotiated thresholds or sanctions evasion, Tehran will maintain nuclear hedging capabilities.
Second, proxy networks represent strategic culture rather than tactical expedience. Iran’s ‘forward defence’ doctrine reflects centuries of managing buffer zones against hostile powers. Expecting Tehran to abandon Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, or Yemeni Houthis misunderstands their function in Persian strategic geography.
Third, regional hegemonic aspirations will survive any conceivable political transition. Democratic Iran, authoritarian Iran, or theocratic Iran—all would pursue primacy in the Gulf as a natural expression of civilisational status. Risk analysts should model Iranian behaviour as structurally revisionist regardless of regime ideology.
Fourth, Persian-Arab tensions will continue generating regional instability independent of Israeli-Palestinian dynamics. The civilisational competition between Tehran and Riyadh predates modern borders and will outlast current rulers. Investors and policymakers should anticipate this rivalry as a permanent feature of regional risk.
Conclusion
The shadow of Cyrus stretches across six decades of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Iran’s risk profile—nuclear ambitions, proxy networks, sanctions resistance, regional revisionism—coheres not as revolutionary excess but as Persian civilisational assertion. Until Western analysts internalise that Iran operates according to a historical logic distinct from its Arab neighbours, risk assessment will remain perpetually miscalibrated.
Iran is not an Arab country. It is the heir to an empire—and it behaves accordingly.
Iran’s Geopolitical Risk Profile: A Six-Decade Analysis
Table 1: Decade-by-Decade Risk Matrix—Iranian Geopolitical Risk Evolution (1970s–2020s)
Future Governance Scenarios and Strategic Continuity
Table 2: TRUMPIAN LENS Iranian Governance Scenarios—Projected Strategic Behaviour Under Alternative Regimes?
Religion: Church of England/Interfaith. [This is not an organized religion but rather quite disorganized]. Views and Opinions expressed here are STRICTLY his own PERSONAL!