Here is the full transcript of MIT Professor and Pentagon advisor Theodore Postol’s interview on The Greater Eurasia Podcast with host Glenn Diesen, January 19, 2026.
Brief Notes: In this interview, MIT Professor Emeritus and nuclear weapons expert Theodore Postol provides a detailed technical assessment of Russia’s new Oreshnik hypersonic missile. He moves past the political hype to explain the weapon’s unique design, debunking common myths while highlighting its specialized conventional power and the lack of any current defensive countermeasures. The discussion offers a critical look at how this technology impacts modern warfare and why it is essential for policymakers to accurately understand its true strategic capabilities.
Introduction
GLENN DIESEN: Welcome back to the program. We are joined again by Ted Postol, a professor emeritus at MIT, who is an expert in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and has also worked at the Pentagon. So thank you for coming back on.
THEODORE POSTOL: Oh, it’s a great pleasure to be on. I’ve been off the air for a little while and it’s a pleasure to be back.
GLENN DIESEN: I’m glad to have you back.
Assessing the Oreshnik Missile
GLENN DIESEN: Well, the reason why I really want to speak with you is to get a professional assessment of this new weapon of the Russians, at least what we know of the weapon so far. Of course, they haven’t let you inspect it, but there’s still ways of gathering information.
We saw first one test launch with a dummy warhead, and then now a second one, an Oreshnik hypersonic missile launched from Russia into Western Ukraine in what was evidently a warning to NATO not to escalate the war any further.
But a lot of questions still remain to be answered. That is, how powerful is the weapon? Why is it such a dangerous weapon? To what extent is it a game changer?
You get the idea that the Russians have an incentive perhaps to oversell it, while the Europeans have an interest in underselling it, that is to be more dismissive in order not to suggest that the Russians have too much advantage. So it would be nice to just have a professional take on this. So hence where you come in.
I was wondering if you can inform us a bit about this. What is actually this weapon?
Updated Insights from the Oreshnik Attack
THEODORE POSTOL: It’s always a mistake to dismiss a powerful weapon, but I think that there have been overstatements and understatements made on both sides, and this attack on Lvov has given us some additional insights.
So what I might, in fact, let me just put on my first slide and we’ll—so I’m calling this little discussion here “Updated Insights from the Oreshnik Attack of January 8th on Lvov.” I’ve, as often, I’ve been benefited greatly from my collaboration with a colleague of mine, Prisca Busk, who I put on his name clearly in an email for him.
But I think we do have a much clearer understanding of this weapon now, not a full understanding, and I’ll point out where we still have things to learn about it. And it may not be pleasant when we learn these things, but we’ll see.
A Powerful Conventional Weapon
The first thing that’s important to keep in mind is that it is a very powerful conventional weapon, but it is a conventional weapon. That is to say it’s delivering munitions right now, it appears that they mostly do damage by kinetic impact. I’ll discuss this in some greater detail.
If they take the submunitions that this weapon launches—I’ll describe what I mean by submunition—and add high explosives to them, they could increase the damage-inflicting capability per submunition. But it’s not going to be a game changer.
The only game changer would be if they put nuclear weapons on top of the Oreshnik. And that of course is the ultimate game changer. And of course, like any ballistic missile of significant payload capability, this could certainly deliver nuclear weapons. And I’ll briefly talk about this possibility.
But I think the fact that an Oreshnik can deliver a nuclear weapon is really not especially relevant in the context of all the nuclear weapons that can be delivered already. So it doesn’t add any new twist to the mixture other than ultimate catastrophe and probably the end of modern civilization because of the escalation that would follow.
The Policy Concern
So this is the main concern that I have from a policy perspective. I’ll talk, of course, technology with regard to the Oreshnik. The important point I want to make here is that a nuclear response to an Oreshnik missile attack—that’s just a conventional missile attack—could not possibly be proportional to the conventional use of this missile.
My concern is really that there’s been so much hype on the capability of this missile. Many people talking about it as a sub-nuclear capability, things of that type, nearly nuclear—it’s not close to that. And I’ll explain why.
And I’m not trying to attack it as a powerful conventional weapon. I’ll discuss that. But my main concern is that the misunderstanding among policymakers could lead to a completely uninformed decision to believe that you should respond proportionally with a nuclear weapon to an Oreshnik attack. No way that would be justifiable. And I’ll explain why.
And that’s the important policy point here. This is not a weapon that approaches the strike power of a nuclear weapon. Very, very important. That’s the bottom line message.
Technical Specifications
The hypersonic submunition attack of November 21st on Dnipro told us at least it has 36 submunitions and it seems to have six, what I might call buses. By a bus, I mean a small powered vehicle that itself carries about six munitions. And each of these munitions probably weigh around 70 or 80 kilograms each, probably somewhere in this range.
The missile is not a two-stage missile as all this discussion has been going on. It’s a one-stage missile. It seems, based on comments that we’re now seeing—information now being released by the Russians—that it’s the first stage of an old intermediate range missile that was, interestingly enough, a big motivator for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
And this is the SS-20 missile.
And this was a two-stage missile which carried three warheads on it. And it was a big motivating factor that was driving the INF talks in 1986. And ultimately it was removed.
So what appears to have been the case is the Russians have taken the first stage and they have used the first stage to mount dummy submunitions that can come in at very high speed and impact. And they have an effect of an explosion because they hit the ground so hard. And the kinetic energy from the impact gets converted to kind of explosive energy. And I’ll talk a little bit more about this.
The SS-20 Connection
Here is what the transporter erector launcher for the SS-20 looks like. And so you can see this, the first stage is probably in this section here. The second stage is probably in this section here. And this extended region where the three warheads are contained without even a shroud is probably in this section here.
So if you’re carrying only one stage, then you only need a vehicle with maybe four wheels to carry it. And we see that’s what we have here. This is an image allegedly of an Oreshnik in Belarus. And the vehicle is a much shorter vehicle.
It’s a one stage of an SS-20 or sometimes called a Pioneer and weighs around 26 tons. And my earlier calculations, which I have not updated because it’s not important enough given I guessed that they were using a first stage from an ICBM. And so I had a guess that was maybe 35 tons. But the difference between 26 and 35 tons is not significant for the level of analysis we’re doing here. And also in terms of exactly the effects are general enough that there’s no big deal difference.
Missile Debris Analysis
Now we have missile debris that gives us hints about the configuration of the Oreshnik. And the reason this missile debris hits the ground at a relatively low speed and is not pulverized or literally vaporized when it hits the ground at maybe Mach 10 is it doesn’t hit the ground at Mach 10, it hits the ground at maybe Mach 0.2 or Mach 0.3—100 kilometers per hour, 150 kilometers per hour like an automobile that’s hit a wall.
And the reason for that is very easy to understand if you know the dynamics. If you have an object and it’s tumbling, the aerodynamic drag will be tremendous unless it keeps its orientation and has very low drag, in technical terminology, a high ballistic coefficient. If it tumbles, it’s going to slow up at a tremendous rate and it’ll hit the ground at rather low speeds.
In fact, I’ll show you an image of what I’m pretty sure is an actual submunition that I’m only guessing. I think it may have been deployed. There may have been an accident when it was deployed and it started tumbling. And instead of hitting the ground at 3 kilometers per second, it probably hit the ground at 150 kilometers per hour, 0.2 or 0.3 kilometers per second, very slowly.
But we got an image of what the munition looks like. And it looks pretty much like I was guessing it was going to look like. But we’ll see. I could be totally wrong. We’ll be constantly updating this.
Here is just some debris. Again, the debris is not vaporized because it’s in a piece of the missile that has been tumbling. This looks like the front end of the missile and gives you good perspective. If this is the first stage of an SS-20, this should be about 1.8 meters. We have very good dimension information on that particular missile.
And here is just a diagram that I first introduced in my first talk on this subject which was sort of taken out of Russian catalogs. And in this particular case, the missile is two stages, but it’s not. It’s a one-stage vehicle. I will update this a little bit more in some next rendition of this if anyone’s foolish enough to listen again.
The Bus System
Anyway, here is what looks like pieces of one of the six buses on this vehicle, the bus. This is a propellant section here. This is a shroud. The shroud is separated by about a meter, I’m quite sure by about a meter from the propellant section and the propulsion section is a canister that is filled with hot high-pressure gases. It’s not a rocket motor in a sense. It’s just a high-pressure chamber.
And it has six arms. And at the end of each arm is a nozzle. Here’s you can see a nozzle and there are valves that control how much gas gets to the nozzle. And this vehicle is traveling toward the ground.
Let me here, this vehicle is—here I show icons of submunitions. But the icons should really be of six separate buses. And each of these buses contain about six submunitions. And we know this because I’ll explain why we know this shortly.
So this is the high-pressure gas generating set. There’s the nozzle with the flow control. And so what happens is the canister is pushed off the vehicle, the rocket stage, and it’s oriented downward and it maneuvers using these low-pressure—it has almost no velocity, total velocity capability, but it doesn’t need it. You don’t want it.
You just want to maneuver it so that you can separate. You could put six munitions on a particular target of concern within a footprint on the ground. So it can attack up to six independent targets with a cluster of six of these submunitions.
Submunition Design
So here is an updated, not totally updated, but I’ve been working real time with new data, but here I have put in icons of what I think these munitions look like. I think we have a reasonable first guess of what their shape is. I won’t get into a discussion of that for now. For people who are more interested, I could discuss this in some other talk.
And we know that they hit the ground at about 3 kilometers per second. Now this is an important point. I’ve gotten some emails from people who are trying to be helpful suggesting to me that this munition would penetrate deep into the ground, go after underground bunkers. It’s just not the case.
When this munition hits the ground, it’s going to impact the ground. It’s going to compress up very fast. Its energy is going to be converted into thermal energy, heat, and it’s going to vaporize. And all of this metallic material, which is probably tungsten, is going to be superheated to a very high temperature and it’s going to expand violently outward and in a generalized way it’s going to look like an explosion. And I’ll show you that. I’m going to show you that with actual videos.
Here is what the munition looks like. Notice that it has a little bit of an extended body, a cone-like structure in front to keep the aerodynamic drag low, and a kind of a skirt. And the reason for the skirt is you want aerodynamic forces on the back of the vehicle so that the center of pressure of the vehicle is moved backward. Otherwise it would tumble end over end. If it tumbled end over end, they would all hit the ground at 150 kilometers per hour. They must remain oriented vertically into the atmosphere.
Here is an image of what I’m guessing is an actual submunition. So this thing is probably two and a half, three feet long. Notice you have a section in the back here where it’s probably sitting on a nub. There probably are six nubs in the canister where the vehicle sits. And probably there’s a very small explosive cap that just detonates and just very gently pushes the vehicle off. That’s my guess. There are lots of ways to do this. It’s not necessarily right.
But notice there are these two objects here. Those are probably very small rocket motors that cause the thing to spin up. So you push it off and you spin it up. And you spin it up because you want it to remain stable.
So we have what looks like a piece of one of these submunitions, this thing. For some reason, this thing got started tumbling. So instead of hitting the ground at Mach 10, it hit the ground at maybe Mach 0.1 or 0.2, so just hit the ground and just buckled up. That’s basically what we’re seeing.
Flight Trajectory
The flight trajectory, as I mentioned, is very high. And this is important too. It’s very high. First of all, it’s only traveling 700 or 800 kilometers. And when the Russians talk about it, they say—they say it, not just me—that it takes 15 to 17 minutes for the submunitions to reach their target.
Well, the reason for that is this thing is lofted on a very high trajectory. You could use the velocity to get things to the target in very short time. But they would reenter the atmosphere at a low grazing angle. And because they reenter the atmosphere at a low grazing angle, they would slow up very substantially. And if they slow up substantially, they’re going to hit the ground at speeds that are not hypersonic.
So what you want to do is you loft this thing. So they come in at a—they only travel through a very small piece of the atmosphere, and they remain at a very high speed, hypersonic speed.
So, for example, if this were an ICBM warhead coming in, of course it would be coming in at a very shallow trajectory. It would be coming in initially at about 7 kilometers per second, not 3 or 4 kilometers per second as shown here, but it would be traveling at a grazing angle. And in fact, a very high-performance strategic warhead would hit the ground at about the same speed as these submunitions hit the ground—about 3 kilometers per second.
So atmospheric drag is a really important quantity here. It really determines what happens.
Attack Patterns
So if we look at the first attack was from Kapustin Yar to Dnipro. And this other attack was from somewhere in eastern Belarus. This is a guess, I have no idea. Roughly the same speed, same distance, and it landed in Lvov and it attacked probably—in fact, we know, we could see from the videos of the attack that there were several targets that were hit with clusters of six submunitions.
Again, we have no information about the damage, so we just have to speculate about what we can.
So if we look at this is a high-definition video from Dnipro. And the reason it’s good—there are others. This particular video camera was high resolution. And so you can see the streak of each of these submunitions coming in. This is the Dnipro. This is not Lvov.
But the important thing is that they’re moving really fast, moving at Mach 10. So they create a track. And this track is partly due to probably to a wake and partly due to the slow speed of the camera. So this thing is moving across the camera field of view while the camera is exposed. So we don’t know exactly why the streak, what’s causing the streak. But we do know it’s a combination of the wake and the speed of the camera, the slow speed of the camera frame.
Comparison to ICBM Impacts
If we look at a similar kind of situation—this is Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. And what we have here are three video frames of an ICBM warhead coming in and hitting the ground at this atoll.
Okay, so here is one-thirtieth of a second. Is it beginning? One-thirtieth of a second later you can see things are getting very bright. Things are getting even brighter still another third of a second and then I’ve jumped about three or four frames. So you can see the outcome of all these light-producing events because everything is very high temperature from the impact and all the kinetic energy being converted at the surface of the Earth into an explosive gas that’s expanding outward.
And you see this looks like an explosion. You see a cloud. The impact in Lvov has similar characteristics. We don’t actually see the impact point. But if we look, these frames are—I think they’re roughly a tenth of a second apart. I’m sorry, I put this thing together quickly.
So what you look here, you can see the sky is becoming slightly brighter as this munition comes through the clouds. There’s a cloud top. And you see it gets brighter and brighter and brighter and then dims. And this is exactly the phenomena, except you can’t see the explosion on the ground, but it’s exactly the same. This thing is depositing all of its energy into the ground at a surface point where it is.
So let’s take a look at a video. Okay, so what you’re going to see here is the—this is a video taken at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific for a Peacekeeper ICBM test. So the warhead is coming in at about a 30-degree angle relative to horizontal. So it’s not coming in near vertically like an Oreshnik submunition would come in.
And you can see when it arrives. Okay, now it’s off. See the first arrival, see the second arriving behind it. You see there’s a big debris cloud here. This looks like an explosion. All the energy is deposited into the surface.
Now we’ll see in slow motion, just to give you a sense. You see the tremendous amount of light that is generated because all of this kinetic energy is very quickly converted into an explosive hot mess of gas from the warhead. And now we’ll see the
The Main Advantage of the Oreshnik Weapon
GLENN DIESEN: So what is the main advantage then of this weapon? If you would compare it, I guess, to a regular ballistic missile or, well, or a nuclear weapon? Well, what makes this so distinctive?
THEODORE POSTOL: Well, it’s different. I mean, is it more destructive than an Iskander? It’s comparable. I mean, an Iskander hitting a structure is going to do a lot of damage. It’s got a bigger warhead, it might do somewhat less or somewhat more damage. I mean, you’d have to do a very detailed analysis, the kind of analysis that a weaponeer would make.
But it’s like choosing. It’s like people who choose general purpose bombs versus incendiary bombs versus, you know, you choose your munition depending on the kind of damage and the level of damage and the kind of target you’re shooting at.
So if you had a very, very hardened structure where troops are fighting from it, I would choose a FAB-1500 or an Iskander. If you had a building where you wanted to spread the damage out more uniformly but do very heavy damage in a more uniform way over the building, then I’d choose an Oreshnik. And would it be bad? It would be bad no matter what you were hit with. If you were hit with a significant munition, these munitions are very lethal. You know, it’s easy for me to talk from my office here about it. I mean, it’s very lethal stuff.
GLENN DIESEN: So besides the size of the and destructiveness of the warhead, is part of the way this missile is assessed also by, again, how fast it travels?
THEODORE POSTOL: Well, the psychological impact. I mean, the whole sky is lit up. I don’t think people should underestimate the psychological impact of the sky lighting up, you know, like the hammer of God coming down on you. That has a psychological impact on the people in the target area. That’s also useful from the point of view of the attacker, whether it’s worth, you know, the level of destruction, though, is still comparable.
The Impossibility of Intercepting the Oreshnik
GLENN DIESEN: How difficult is it to intercept the Oreshnik?
THEODORE POSTOL: There’s no interception. This thing is not interceptible. People who are talking about intercepting it, there’s no intercepting it. And the reason you wouldn’t be able to intercept it is because of the trajectory it takes. It has this high trajectory. It releases the warhead at a very high altitude. It releases the warheads at a very high altitude.
The munition accelerates to about nearly 4 kilometers per second in one minute. If you’re here in the defensive area, what can you do about it? Now it coasts to a very high altitude. It’s close to 750 kilometers altitude. I mean, that’s tremendous. It reorients itself at some point. It can do it anywhere along this trajectory and then deploys the canisters.
So now you have six separate canisters, you know, moving away from the body. How are you going to reach them? This thing is coming in at 4 kilometers per second, and it’s taking minutes to come in. You’re going to launch interceptors. Those interceptors are going to take minutes to get out. They’re only traveling at maybe a couple of kilometers per second. By that time, the canisters will have released the subunitions. So where’s the defense?
This is, you know, there is no defense. There’s no way you can put together a defense against this thing. You know, it’s a pipe dream. It’s just something that someone who has no, who hasn’t done any simple arithmetic will come up with and make a claim. It’s just not true. There’s no way you can. The speeds and distances just don’t allow you to launch any interceptors at this thing.
And once the subunitions are off, what are you going to do? You’re going to try to hit the subunition that’s traveling at 3.5 kilometers per second above the atmosphere. You’re going to launch an interceptor at each subunition. It’s ridiculous. There is no defense against this. So it does have that effect.
And you know, an Iskander potentially could be intercepted. But I think if you look at the situation with the Iskander, it really can’t be intercepted because the Russians know that if you maneuver intentionally, as the Iskander can do, the Patriot interceptor will not be able to match the lateral motions of the incoming Iskander, and hence it won’t be able to intercept it. That’s why the intercept rates are so low.
So the Iskander is potentially interceptible with a low probability of intercept, but not zero. But the Oreshnik is a zero probability of intercept. So the Iskander, though, is not something that could be easily intercepted either. It’s basically a missile that’s nearly impossible to intercept with current systems and with essentially any new systems that I can imagine.
So I’ve been asked to go to Poland in March and give a talk at a missile defense conference. And I have tried to tell the people at this conference, holding a conference at a military university there, that I’m going to disappoint the audience because what I’m going to tell the audience is you can’t do any kind of missile defense against these ballistic targets.
You can shoot down airplanes, drones, airplanes, hypersonic missiles? No. But the speeds of these things are too much, too high a speed. The closing speeds are much too high for a standard interceptor like a Patriot or anything that looks like anything like an air defense interceptor to be able to maneuver and hit. There’s just no way to do it.
There’s no technology. You can’t see the target early enough to maneuver. You can’t see the target with enough precision to know exactly where it is as it’s coming at you at far enough range. You just don’t have time to maneuver to hit it. It’s just that simple. Hypersonic missiles are not going to be subject to air defense intercepts.
Russia’s Response to NATO Missile Defense
GLENN DIESEN: Well, this is interesting because Putin recently made the comment that the United States or NATO forced his hand in terms of developing this weapon. So essentially, yeah, Washington became the author of this, as the Russians warned ever since Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty back in 2002, that if NATO was going to establish this ballistic missile defense or strategic defense, the main concern of the Russians were that this was an effort by NATO to convert nuclear weapons from a defensive weapon, that is as a deterrent, to an offensive weapon by being able to, essentially by building a massive ballistic missile defense system to intercept the retaliatory capabilities of Russia after it would have been struck by a first strike.
So this doesn’t mean that NATO was planning a first strike. But it’s always dangerous to give one side illusion or assumption that they have these capabilities, that they can climb up the escalation ladder in this way. But anyways, the Russians said this is unacceptable, which is why they began developing these missiles to begin with. So is this the main thought, that if they strap a nuclear warhead on this hypersonic missile, then the deterrent is safe?
THEODORE POSTOL: I think a nuclear warhead would be fine. You don’t need an Oreshnik to deliver nuclear warheads because the decoys will defeat any of the exoatmospheric defenses that we’re building. We, the Americans, are foolishly building, because this thing here is well outside the atmosphere. So any object, whether it’s a balloon or a heavy warhead, is going to travel the same way. There’s no aerodynamic drag to affect their motion. So decoys are very effective.
The Fiction of Trump’s “Golden Dome”
GLENN DIESEN: So what’s the purpose of this Golden Dome, which Trump wants to invest all his…
THEODORE POSTOL: It’s fiction, pure fiction. Maybe I should give a talk on Golden Dome. Have I talked on Golden Dome for you?
GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, no, we spoke previously about the Golden Dome. I’ll leave a link in the description, because I thought that was fascinating, but I was wondering how that could interact with the Oreshnik.
THEODORE POSTOL: But that would be nothing. There’s no question that neither Trump nor Hegseth, our Secretary of War, I guess, had any idea what they were talking about when they were talking about this Golden Dome, because they were basically saying that we, the United States, were going to launch 1,500 satellite interceptors into a low Earth orbit in order to be able to intercept one ICBM somewhere on the surface of the Earth. Because these things are moving.
So this Hegseth is sitting there and he’s saying, standing there like a, I mean, it’s a fool. The guy’s a fool. I mean, besides lots of other issues that are raised by his behavior, but, and he says it’s going to stop cruise missiles. Ridiculous. It’s going to stop airplanes. Ridiculous. It’s going to stop ballistic missiles. Well, if you can launch enough interceptors. And by the way, there are easy countermeasures.
Because if I launch 100 ICBMs from a silo field, then you need 50, 150,000 satellites in orbit to engage them. In principle. In practice, you know, the system is so cumbersome. These guys, they were sitting in a living room somewhere, didn’t ask anybody a question about what’s involved technically here and just shot off their mouths.
Not unlike I might say Mr. Biden who said that by cutting the, by putting massive sanctions, economic sanctions on Russia, he was going to cut the finance, you know, the economy of Russia in half. He obviously never asked anybody who was an expert in economics what would be the result of trying to do that. He obviously never asked anybody.
So Biden is just as reckless because we know, you know better than I do, in fact, that what happened is Russia just turned its economy toward BRICS. The BRICS people just traded normally. The big loser was Europe who lost the ability to trade with Russia.
Russian economy got a big influx of extra capital because instead of spending money buying high technology European goods, people went and turned to China and bought the goods from China with almost essentially no impact on the quality of life. In fact maybe an improvement because it was cheaper to get technology devices of higher quality from China. And then that result was the Russian economy grew.
Now I don’t have a high regard for many economists but there are guys like Jeffrey Sachs around who do know what they’re talking about. And I’m sure if somebody asked Jeffrey Sachs, if Biden asked Jeffrey Sachs what would be the effect of massive sanctions, he would have told them not very much, in fact, you might help them.
And you know, so when people want to look at Biden and say well he was more responsible and knew what he was doing, not so clear to me. But I’m just a physicist, I’m not an economist so you might want to get Jeffrey on and have him talk about this issue.
But totally brain dead people in the press and this is what people like Putin are concerned about. If you listen to Putin carefully, he’s really worried that he’s going to deal with a president who has no idea what he’s doing and that he’ll launch nuclear weapons against Russia thinking he can achieve something. That’s a fiction.
And that’s why Putin has so carefully tried to make it clear that any attack on Russia will be suicidal. It’s not just talking about Oreshnik, it’s talking about the Dead Hand system. It’s talking about Poseidon, this underwater nuclear drone. He wants the most imbecilic American president to know that attacking Russia and trying to use missile defenses would still result in suicide. That’s what he wants to do.
And I think his actions are pretty clear to me at least. I don’t see any inconsistencies in his actions. He’s one of the few adults in the room, as far as I can see.
The Danger of Misinformation and Political Stupidity
GLENN DIESEN: Well, Professor Postol, thank you so much for this fascinating insight. It’s, as you said, I think it’s, yeah, misinformation and the stupidity of politicians.
THEODORE POSTOL: It is stupidity on a scale, but…
GLENN DIESEN: It has become a huge problem, a massive security threat. So it’s good to get a proper understanding of what these weapons do and what they can’t do, though.
THEODORE POSTOL: Rhetoric. Talking about somebody doing stupid things and ruining their economy. You know, like you were saying about Venezuela. I mean, what’s he doing to Germany anyway? I must say, I’m only a physicist, but I’m hoping then you’ll apprise me of the truth.
GLENN DIESEN: Well, this is another thing, the arrogance. You see, the same leader, after everything he’s done, he feels, no, seems to have no problem to lecture other countries about how to run an economy, how to manage human rights, how diplomacy should be done. I mean, it’s just, it’s really crazy that there’s no self-reflection here.
THEODORE POSTOL: Yeah, that’s why we’re all in danger. That’s why we’re all in danger. And that’s why Putin is so carefully laying out the threats because he doesn’t know what he can, he can’t predict what these guys are going to do because they’re not informed and they’re not rational and they are reckless. That’s what he’s dealing with. That’s the way I perceive Putin and that’s the way I interpret his statements.
GLENN DIESEN: Well, if they pump out thousands of these Oreshnik missiles like a sausage machine, then that will definitely change a lot of the, yeah, strategic picture though. And all our air defense systems and the missile defense have to be rethought, which is again the main purpose of this. So.
THEODORE POSTOL: Yes. Yeah.
GLENN DIESEN: Well, thanks again as always.
THEODORE POSTOL: Thank you so much as always.
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