Iran has witnessed deadly protests since December 28, 2025. What began as demonstrations by merchants and traders in Tehran following a sharp currency collapse quickly escalated into nationwide unrest against the Islamic Republic. The scale and intensity of the protests have led many observers to describe them as the largest uprising since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The Iranian state’s response has been uncompromising. Acting under the direct orders of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, security forces reportedly used live ammunition against protesters. The ensuing crackdown resulted in mass casualties, with numerous protesters killed. Images and reports emerging from Iran have once again raised concerns about the regime’s willingness to deploy extreme force to maintain control amid mounting economic distress and political dissatisfaction.
The situation in Iran quickly drew international attention, particularly from the United States. The US President Donald J Trump issued warnings of “strong military actions” against the Iranian regime while repeatedly stating that the United States stood with the Iranian people in the face of violent repression. These statements sent ripples across the region, prompting immediate reactions from key regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Ankara’s Spillover Fears and Strategic Anxiety
Among these, Turkey’s response has been particularly telling. On January 15, Ankara said that it firmly opposes any form of military intervention against Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stressed that the tensions brewing within Iran should be resolved domestically, without external interference. Turkey’s position was clear: foreign military action would only aggravate instability rather than address Iran’s underlying problems.
Fidan argued that Iran’s current crisis was being mischaracterised internationally. According to him, the economic grievances driving the protests were being “misunderstood as an uprising against” the Islamic Republic itself. This framing reflects Ankara’s broader discomfort with narratives that legitimise regime change, especially in a volatile region where the collapse of state authority has often produced long-term chaos rather than democratic transitions.
Turkey has also accused Israel of exploiting the unrest in Iran and positioned itself, along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as a leading voice opposing any military action against Tehran. Ankara has repeatedly warned that a sudden collapse of the Iranian regime could have severe destabilising effects across the region, potentially unleashing sectarian conflict, refugee flows, and security vacuums reminiscent of post-2003 Iraq. At the same time, Turkey has urged both Iran and the United States to pursue dialogue as the preferred path forward.
In this context, Fidan has indirectly offered Turkey’s services as a mediator. During a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, he emphasised the need for diplomatic engagement to defuse current regional tensions. Turkey’s attempt to position itself as a stabilising intermediary reflects both its regional ambitions and its deep anxieties about the consequences of further escalation next door.
Ankara’s concerns are not merely diplomatic. Turkey’s defence ministry has confirmed that it has stepped up security measures along the Turkish–Iranian border, even while stating that it has not detected a mass influx of people fleeing the unrest. The emphasis on border security underscores Turkey’s fear of spillover effects should Iran’s internal situation deteriorate further.
Officially, Turkey fears that Iran could descend into a civil war similar to Iraq following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. This fear is not unfounded. Iran is a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society, and prolonged instability could ignite fault lines that extend far beyond its borders. However, beneath this stated concern lies another, more sensitive anxiety—one rooted in Turkey’s own domestic vulnerabilities.
Domestic Faultlines in Turkey
The unfolding instability in Iran inevitably raises uncomfortable parallels for Ankara. For Turkey, the Iranian crisis may serve as a reminder of the Arab Spring, which engulfed much of West Asia and triggered widespread domestic upheaval across the region. Although Turkey largely escaped direct disruption during that period, the political and economic conditions within the country today are markedly different from a decade ago.
Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has faced mounting domestic challenges in recent years. Concerns related to democratic backsliding, judicial independence, media freedom, economic mismanagement, education, and healthcare have increasingly dominated public discourse. While the Turkish government continues to project confidence and stability, signs of public dissatisfaction have become harder to ignore.
Public Discontent
In March 2025, Turkey witnessed one of its largest protest movements since the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations. The protests were triggered by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on charges of corruption and terrorism—allegations that the opposition has strongly denounced as politically motivated. İmamoğlu is a particularly significant figure in Turkish politics. He defeated President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s candidate in the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election and was re-elected in 2024. More importantly, he has since been confirmed as the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) presidential candidate for the 2028 elections.
The government’s response to the March protests was swift and harsh. President Erdoğan denounced the demonstrations as “street terror”, reinforcing a narrative that portrays dissent as a threat to national security. In recent years, sidelining or punishing perceived critics has increasingly become a routine feature of Turkish politics. The line between legitimate opposition and criminal activity has been blurred, shrinking the space for peaceful protest and political contestation.
The crackdown has not been limited to political figures alone. Journalists and media organisations have also faced mounting pressure. In 2025 alone, nearly 105 journalists were detained across Turkey. According to the Tigris Euphrates Journalists Association (DFG), restrictions on journalism intensified significantly during the year. Authorities imposed access bans on 113 websites, blocked 464 news reports, and restricted 1,519 social media posts. These measures have further eroded press freedom and contributed to a climate of fear and self-censorship.
Economic Distress
Beyond political repression, Turkey’s economic woes continue to deepen. The country’s economic situation has deteriorated sharply, exacerbating public frustration. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the economy contracted by 0.2 per cent in both the second and third quarters of 2025, officially confirming that Turkey has entered a recession. Household consumption declined by 0.3 per cent quarter-on-quarter, while government consumption fell by 0.4 per cent—indicators of weakening demand across the board.
Inflation remains persistently high, standing at 48.6 per cent annually. In response, the central bank has been forced to maintain its key interest rate at a staggering 50 per cent for eight consecutive months. These conditions have placed immense strain on ordinary citizens, particularly public sector employees and fixed-income earners. As prices soar and purchasing power erodes, economic grievances have once again driven people onto the streets.
On January 14, hundreds of Turkish civil servants marched through Ankara demanding realistic pay increases to cope with rising living costs. Their protests reflect a broader sense of economic despair. A survey conducted by Gündemar Research revealed that 82 per cent of the Turkish public believes the economy is on the wrong track, while only 17 per cent describe it as improving. Such figures underscore the depth of public dissatisfaction and the growing disconnect between official rhetoric (Turkish authorities stated that Turkish GDP in the second quarter of 2025 expanded by 4.8 per cent in comparison to 1.2 per cent in the beginning of last year) and lived realities.
Taken together, these political and economic pressures present a sobering picture for the Turkish government. President Erdoğan has weathered significant challenges before—not least the failed coup attempt in 2016, which, while unsuccessful, enabled him to consolidate power and clamp down on dissent. Yet, the long-term sustainability of governance through coercion and nationalist mobilisation remains uncertain.
Iran as a Mirror for Turkey’s Unresolved Contradictions
The crisis in Iran may therefore resonate more deeply in Ankara than officials are willing to admit publicly. Watching a neighbouring country confront mass protests fuelled by economic collapse and years of suppression may prompt uncomfortable questions at home. How long can appeals to nationalism, national pride, and external threats offset domestic grievances? At what point do economic hardship and political repression overwhelm narratives of stability and strength?
Meanwhile, signs of potential de-escalation have emerged on the international front. Following his earlier warnings of “strong military actions”, President Trump signalled a possible easing of tensions, stating that the killings in Iran appeared to be coming to an end. This shift may partly reflect pressure from regional actors—including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—who have urged Washington to avoid military strikes out of fear that any attack could spiral into a wider regional war.
Another factor behind US restraint may be Iran’s explicit warnings to West Asian countries hosting American military bases. Tehran has indicated that these bases could become targets if the United States launches an attack. Despite this tentative de-escalation, the pressure remains palpable, with the White House continuing to stress that “all options remain on the table.”
As Iran stands at a critical crossroads, the implications extend far beyond its borders. For Turkey, the Iranian unrest is not just a regional crisis—it is a mirror reflecting its own unresolved contradictions. Whether Ankara can prevent external instability from becoming an internal reckoning remains an open and deeply consequential question.
(Indrani Talukdar is a Fellow at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
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