On Jan. 27, after two decades of intense negotiations, India concluded a major free trade pact with the European Union that will end tariffs on nearly all traded goods. Much media commentary, understandably, has focused on the economic significance of this accord.
However, another deal signed the same day has been almost completely eclipsed in the process: the Security and Defence Partnership. Under this agreement, the EU and India will enhance cooperation in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism, and cyberdefense.
On Jan. 27, after two decades of intense negotiations, India concluded a major free trade pact with the European Union that will end tariffs on nearly all traded goods. Much media commentary, understandably, has focused on the economic significance of this accord.
However, another deal signed the same day has been almost completely eclipsed in the process: the Security and Defence Partnership. Under this agreement, the EU and India will enhance cooperation in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism, and cyberdefense.
It is reasonable to argue that these two accords would not have been reached at this juncture were it not for the acute disruption that the Trump administration has brought to its relations with both India and the EU. With a $4 trillion economy and burgeoning defense needs, India turned to the EU and finally acted with alacrity on both fronts.
India’s defense needs are acute, particularly as it faces adversarial relations with Pakistan and China. In the past five years, it has had militarized conflicts with both states, and relations remain fraught. Despite a robust, if highly asymmetric, trade relationship with Beijing, the two states are still locked in an enduring rivalry. To cope with these threats and confront a growing Sino-Pakistani strategic nexus, India urgently needs to bolster its existing military capabilities.
Yet, despite decades of investment in trying to build a viable domestic defense industrial base, India has fallen woefully short of addressing its shortcomings through its own efforts.
For decades, especially during the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied most of India’s defense needs. Even after the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia remained an important weapons supplier. New Delhi was largely unable to wean itself off its dependence on Moscow until recently. Even three decades after the end of the Cold War, between 60 and 70 percent of its arsenal remained of Soviet or Russian origin.
Yet, over the last decade or so, India started to diversify its sources of supply, partly because of Russia’s unwillingness to provide weapons systems and spare parts at concessional rates as the Soviet Union had done. More recently, New Delhi accelerated this process as Russia’s own defense needs in its war in Ukraine led to its failure to deliver on existing defense contracts.
Accordingly, India increasingly turned to the United States and various European nations, notably France, to meet its defense needs. Since 2008, India has agreed to purchase more than $20 billion worth of military equipment from the United States. It also bought 36 French-built Dassault Rafale aircraft in 2016 and has signed a $7.4 billion deal to buy 26 more. Meanwhile, in the past few months, it successfully concluded negotiations with Washington to purchase combat vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and naval reconnaissance aircraft—though these have reportedly been put in abeyance amid the Trump administration’s draconian tariffs of up to 50 percent on some goods.
Overall, in the past five years, Russia’s defense supplies have dropped to around 45 percent of India’s imports, while other suppliers, including the United States and France, account for the remining 55 percent.
Given the unreliability of defense supplies from Russia and the continuing fracas with the United States over trade issues, it is unlikely that New Delhi will turn to Washington for any major arms acquisitions in the foreseeable future. And given the many bottlenecks within its own defense production base, it can ill-afford to rely on domestic manufacturing for its security needs. Indeed, in an incautious moment, Indian Air Force chief Amar Preet Singh said the quiet part out loud last February, when he chastised the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. for its persistent failures to deliver promised fighter jets in a timely fashion.
Under these circumstances, India has little choice but to turn to EU countries to address its pressing security needs. Because New Delhi already has a working defense relationship with France, it is reasonable to surmise that it will continue to build on it. India is also now close to buying a fleet of submarines from Germany to bolster its naval capabilities. These are vital for its maritime security amid the growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Admittedly, the public announcement of the just-signed defense agreement with the EU focuses on defense cooperation in both traditional and emergent threats, from the defense of its territorial integrity to cyberthreats. It does not include any immediate commitments to purchase military hardware. Nevertheless, it signals New Delhi’s interest in and willingness to partner with the bloc to guarantee its national security. Despite the renewal of a 10-year defense accord with the United States late last year, India is clearly attempting to diversify its security options beyond just procurement.
This deal is also entirely in keeping with India’s preference for—and oft-stated commitment to—the forging of a multipolar world. In the view of India’s foreign-policy elites, such an international order would give New Delhi greater room to maneuver in international politics.
In the wake of this agreement, the key question that lies ahead for both Brussels and New Delhi is whether they can ensure that it is not merely a statement of good intentions and lofty aspirations. Given the many uncertainties that the Trump administration has introduced into the global order, India and the EU, working in concert on shared security concerns, could restore a degree of stability—but only if they succeed in giving substance to this agreement.