In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine and its allies turned to international adjudication with remarkable speed and intensity. This early legal mobilisation enabled Ukraine to seize the legal narrative surrounding the conflict, ‘using its smart-power assets in a case where there’s a hard-power disadvantage and the rule of law is on their side’. Nearly four years later, however, the litigation landscape looks markedly different. While the initial phase was characterised by Russia’s relative disengagement, recent developments suggest a shift towards active and increasingly aggressive procedural participation. Rather than remaining absent, the Russian Federation has begun to deploy procedural tools in an effort to delay proceedings and reframe disputes in ways that advance its strategic interests.
This post examines that procedural turn. Focusing on inter-State proceedings, it highlights three recent developments that exemplify Russia’s emerging approach to international adjudication.
Initial Tactical Initiative
Within two days of the invasion, Ukraine instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in a relatively unusual ‘reverse genocide case’ (Application of 26 February 2022). Acting with remarkable speed, the ICJ indicated on 16 March 2022 provisional measures (Order of 16 March 2022), ordering the Russian Federation to ‘immediately suspend the military operations’ in the territory of Ukraine. Later in 2022, in an unprecedented move aimed at supporting Ukraine’s position and exerting pressure on the Court, thirty-three States filed declarations of intervention under Article 63(2) of the ICJ Statute, with almost all of them found admissible (Order of 5 June 2023). Beyond its doctrinal novelty, the case served to seize the legal narrative surrounding the invasion at its earliest stage.
Similarly, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court was triggered with striking rapidity. On 1 March 2022, Lithuania referred the situation in Ukraine to the Office of ICC Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, followed shortly by a joint referral of 38 additional State Parties. The next day, the ICC Prosecutor announced the opening of an investigation, which led, on 17 March 2023, to the issuance of two warrants of arrest against President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova. To date, six warrants have been issued. The resulting prosecutions not only constrained the diplomatic mobility of senior Russian officials and military commanders (Platt), but also generated spillover effects in the form of proceedings against States Parties alleged to have failed to execute arrest and surrender obligations (Mongolia, Tajikistan). In this sense, ICC proceedings function not only as instruments of international criminal justice, but also as tools of strategic constraint.
At the European Court of Human Rights, Ukraine lodged an inter-State application against the Russian Federation on 28 February 2022 (Application no. 11055/22, Ukraine v. Russia (X)), alleging mass and gross human-rights violations committed in the course of Russian military operations. The proceedings were later joined with Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia and twenty-six Member States were granted leave to intervene. These inter-State proceedings are accompanied by a large number of individual applications, totalling 9,264 as of February 2025.
The initial Russian response, particularly in 2022 and 2023, was largely passive and consistent with a traditional policy of non-appearance. Before the ECHR, for example, Russia neither participated in the proceedings nor nominated its representatives (¶¶ 27 & 182, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia). Similarly, it refused to appear in the ICJ proceedings concerning provisional measures (Mégret).
Nevertheless, this approach has begun to change in recent months. Russia has opted to engage more actively in ongoing proceedings, pursuing available legal instruments to further its interests, delay adjudication, and assume greater control over the narrative within international judicial fora. This shift signals a more assertive approach, characterised by procedurally aggressive tactics and, in several instances, unprecedented measures, including:
1. challenges to arbitrators in UNCLOS arbitration,
2. filing the appeal from the ICAO Council decision in the ICJ, and
3. hijacking the Allegations of Genocide case before the ICJ.
Successful challenges against arbitrators
The arbitration in Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen was instituted by Ukraine on 1 April 2019 , following the 2018 detention by Russia of three naval vessels and 24 servicemen. On 27 June 2022, the tribunal – composed of Professor McRae (President), Judges Eiriksson, Wolfrum, Golitsyn, and Greenwood – issued its Award on Preliminary Objections, confirming its jurisdiction over the dispute subject to minor limitations.
On 17 October 2023, the Russian Federation raised challenges to the impartiality of Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum, based on their votes in favour of the Institute de Droit International’s Declaration on Aggression in Ukraine of 1 March 2022. In an unprecedented Decision on 6 March 2024, the majority of unchallenged arbitrators – Judges Eiriksson and Vylegzhanin – upheld the challenges, finding that justifiable doubts existed as to the impartiality of McRae and Wolfrum. In a strong dissent, Sir Greenwood emphasised that “the IDI Declaration addressed different events, occurring later in time, and of a fundamentally different character from those with which the Tribunal is concerned” (¶ 10). He further noted that Russia had participated in other international proceedings involving eight arbitrators who were also members of the IDI, without raising comparable objections, and had even retained Professor Bing Bing Jia – himself an IDI member – as counsel.
The parties were unable to agree on the procedure for appointing replacement arbitrators. In response, Russia requested the tribunal to rule on the matter, in what appeared to be an attempt to delay the appointment by the ITLOS President. In Procedural Order No. 9 of 12 July 2024, the tribunal rejected the request, indirectly holding that Article 3 (e) and (f) of Annex II applied to situations of removal or disqualification. The President of ITLOS subsequently proceeded to appoint replacement arbitrators, including Judge Kateka.
Building on its earlier procedural success, Russia then challenged the impartiality of Judge Kateka, citing his association with the IDI Declaration, notwithstanding his abstention from the vote, his social media activity, and his participation in provisional measures proceedings in respect of the arbitration before ITLOS. This time the tribunal rejected the challenge, albeit with a strong dissent of Judge Vylegzhanin. Notably, the dissent called attention to the broader issue of whether ITLOS judges should abstain from arbitral proceedings that overlap with matters previously examined in their judicial capacity (¶ 48).
Most recently, the tribunal was forced to postpone the merits hearing scheduled for 8-9 January 2026 following the late withdrawal of the Russian arbitrator, Judge Vylegzhanin, on health grounds.
These developments in Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen illustrate a marked shift in Russia’s litigation strategy. After an initially inactive posture, Russia adopted aggressive procedural tactics aimed at the constitution and composition of the tribunal, seeking both to delay the proceedings and to cultivate a narrative of bias. These tactics proved partially successful: two prominent figures were disqualified and, following the recent withdrawal, the tribunal’s composition remains unsettled. Importantly, successful challenges to arbitrators in inter-State arbitration are virtually without precedent, underscoring the exceptional nature of this episode.
ICAO Appeal before the ICJ
On 12 May 2025, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) made its first-ever determination on the merits of a dispute between Member States under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. Upon the claims brought by Australia and the Netherlands, the Council found that Russia had failed to comply with its obligation under Article 3bis of the Convention in relation to the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (Woodworth). Significantly, the decision addressed the issue of reparation and urged the parties to enter into negotiations ‘expeditiously’ (decision available here).
On 18 September 2025, Russia responded by filing an appeal before the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. This marked the first occasion on which Russia had initiated proceedings before the World Court, notwithstanding its previous appearances as a respondent (7 times, including as the USSR). While the appeal alleges errors in law and in fact, its central thrust lies in claims that the ICAO Council fundamentally violated requirements of due process and fair procedure (¶ 5). By contesting the decision on these grounds, Russia seeks not merely to delay its legal consequences, but to recast the dispute as one concerning the fairness and legitimacy of the process itself.
Appeal from the ICAO Council was entered onto the ICJ’s General List under No. 201, and on 27 November 2025 the Court fixed time-limits for the written pleadings. Even at this early stage, the appeal reflects a broader pattern in Russia’s recent engagement with international adjudication: the strategic deployment of arguments to deflect attention from substantive responsibility and to challenge institutional authority. In this respect, the ICAO appeal aligns with other instances of Russian procedural offensive, notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding its eventual outcome.
Hijacking Allegations of Genocide
Allegations of Genocide have already attracted extensive scholarly attention (e.g. Papadaki, Milanovic). One aspect nevertheless warrants particular emphasis. Despite Ukraine’s innovative jurisdictional strategy and its success in securing provisional measures that isolated Russia at an early stage, the Russian procedural counteroffensive has significantly altered the trajectory of the case.
The ICJ’s Judgment on Preliminary Objections of February 2024, and even more so its recent Order of 5 December 2025 finding Russia’s counterclaim admissible (Schneider), have shifted the focus of the proceedings away from the illegality of the invasion towards allegations of genocide and related conduct attributed to Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine is now required not only to disprove the alleged genocidal acts, but to defend itself against detailed accusations (Weller) of attempt, complicity, conspiracy, incitement, and failure to prevent, investigate and punish.
Russia also seizes the evidentiary initiative, as in its counter-memorial, which was accompanied by thousands of pages of annexed documents, ca. 300 witness statements, and numerous expert reports (pardon the propaganda in the link). In a context characterised by the difficulty of ‘proving a negative’ and uncertainty regarding the allocation of the burden of proof (see Declaration of Judge Tomka, ¶ 19, Marchuk), this procedural development exemplifies how counterclaims can function as instruments of narrative and evidentiary strategy.
Conclusion
These three developments signal a discernible Russian procedural counteroffensive and illustrate a change in its approach to international adjudication. After an initial period of strategic disengagement, the Russian Federation has turned to active participation in an effort to delay proceedings, contest institutional legitimacy, and reshape the narrative within international fora. These developments lend support to the increasingly evident proposition that, in contemporary inter-State disputes, engagement with international courts is often more advantageous than abstention (e.g. Tzeng). Procedural participation enables a respondent State not only to safeguard its immediate litigation interests, but also to influence the pace, scope, and framing of proceedings.
While these procedural victories are unlikely, in themselves, to determine the ultimate outcome of the legal disputes arising from the invasion of Ukraine, they nonetheless underscore the increasing salience of procedural manoeuvring in contemporary conflict. They also raise broader questions for international courts and tribunals concerning the capacity of existing procedural frameworks to accommodate – or resist – the strategic use of procedure as a tool of confrontation rather than adjudication.
