Russia’s plan to form a new “fifth column” in the South Caucasus has received documentary confirmation. A confidential analytical report has leaked into the public domain, outlining Moscow’s intention to build systematic efforts to construct social and political groups loyal to the Kremlin among the Russian-speaking populations of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
The document in question is an internal paper prepared for a new division within the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation responsible for “soft power” instruments and humanitarian-political influence abroad. The text details state policy priorities toward so-called “compatriots” — the Russian diaspora — viewed not as a cultural community but as a potential resource for foreign-policy leverage and a channel for political mobilization.
The report was first published on January 24 by Michael Weiss, editor of The Insider, who described it as a modern adaptation of KGB methodological guidelines from 1968 on managing overseas diasporas. Following its publication, the document was picked up by several other media outlets, including Armenian ones.
The author of the report is Yevgeny Kozhokin, a professor at MGIMO who previously worked for Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Since 2002, he has been a member of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s governmental commission on compatriots abroad and specializes in sociological and behavioral analysis of diaspora communities. As such, the text is not journalistic but applied and managerial in nature, reflecting the institutional logic of state policy.
The fifteen-page document is dated December 2025 and emerged amid discussions in the Kremlin about the need to modernize Russia’s humanitarian presence strategy, particularly in the Armenian direction. It explicitly declares Russia’s objective of increasing the loyalty of Russian communities abroad and transforming them into a sustainable instrument of political influence.
The author divides the diaspora into three segments.
The first group consists of individuals with a pronounced Russian identity who are already engaged in defending the interests of the Russian Federation and are potentially ready for organizational mobilization.
The second group includes those who are distanced from the current political course — a category that expanded after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In official terminology, they are labeled “sympathetic to foreign agents” and are therefore considered ideologically unreliable.
The third and largest category is described as politically inert: these individuals maintain cultural and social ties with Russia but avoid open political participation. This segment is identified in the report as the primary target for gradual “soft” integration.
Although the report provides a global overview, particular attention is given to the South Caucasus as a zone of competition among external actors and a sensitive perimeter for Russia’s security.
Azerbaijan, along with several Central Asian states, is described as the most difficult operational environment. The report emphasizes the high level of institutional control exercised by the state. According to the author, Russian-speaking citizens in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics are subject to closer scrutiny by security services and law-enforcement agencies, which significantly limits opportunities for informal political influence and the creation of loyalty networks.
Armenia, by contrast, is characterized as a more favorable field of operation due to the preservation of elements of democratic procedures and a lower density of state control. However, the report notes that historically established Russian communities there are small in number, while new migrants tend toward social isolation, reducing the potential for collective mobilization.
Georgia is viewed as the main hub for post-war emigration from Russia: according to the data cited, 15.5 percent of those who left Russia have settled there, making the country a priority for long-term humanitarian and organizational work.
One of the key channels for communication with the diaspora is identified as the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the author warns against the direct politicization of church structures, insisting on an outwardly apolitical format of presence. The logic is clear: religious and cultural institutions should function as infrastructures of trust rather than platforms for overt agitation.
A special role is assigned to Sunday schools, which are seen as an effective mechanism for early socialization and identity formation. The document explicitly states that straightforward propaganda is unacceptable, as it may provoke rejection and undermine the effect of “soft power.”
Among the practical recommendations is the activation of Russian Centers of Science and Culture — the so-called “Russian Houses.” They are encouraged to shift their focus from elderly audiences to family and youth programs, thereby building long-term loyalty through cultural and educational projects.
Kozhokin proposes familiarizing young compatriots with an image of the Soviet Union as an era of “vibrant and creative thought,” effectively using a nostalgic narrative as a tool of symbolic integration. He assesses contemporary Russian cinema as having “lost its reputational potential” and recommends promoting selectively curated content, including films related to the war in Ukraine, as well as tightening quality control over cultural products distributed abroad.
In conclusion, the report proposes resuming engagement with wealthy members of the diaspora — entrepreneurs, millionaires, and billionaires — viewing them as a resource for financial and institutional lobbying, and restoring their ties with Russian universities after the end of military hostilities.
Taken together, the document demonstrates that Moscow views the diaspora not as a humanitarian phenomenon but as an instrument of geopolitical power projection. It outlines a systematic policy aimed at forming loyal networks of influence capable of providing informal support for Russian interests in the countries of the South Caucasus.
This is precisely why Azerbaijan is classified in the text as “the most difficult environment,” where a high level of state sovereignty and control makes the implementation of such strategies maximally costly and politically risky.
Ilkin Shafiyev
Haqqin.az