Cooperation comes alongside a more assertive sanctions policy. The EU has repeatedly expressed concern about the circumvention of sanctions against Russia through third countries. For example, according to the Oxford Economics Report of 2024, the exports to Russia grew by 30% for Kazakhstan. European officials have responded with diplomatic warnings, compliance monitoring mechanisms, and the possibility of secondary sanctions.
The most prominent example includes proposed sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, namely, stopping the import of machine tools and radio equipment, and adding two Kyrgyz banks (Keremet and OJSC Capital Bank of Central Asia) to the sanctions list. As these banks have been active in cryptocurrency (TengriCoin) activity that has been connected to the Russian financial sectors. This puts a severe risk on Kyrgyzstan’s reputation for western investors, and resulted in a swift reaction from the government, namely meeting with EU sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan, scheduled on February 26th and tightened governmental control of cryptocurrency operations.
This precedent demonstrates how Central Asia values the ties it has to the EU, yet is unable to evade their significant trading partner, Russia (around 15% of total trade). With another binding factor, such as remittances from Central Asian migrant workers in Russia that make up a substantial share of GDP (18-40%), Central Asian governments are unable to pursue a harsher political course.
This creates a climate where an abrupt economic and political distancing from Moscow is neither politically nor economically feasible. For Central Asian governments, Russia remains a major trading partner and migration destination. Making uncalculated moves might result in peace threats through provoked tensions at the borders of three states (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), as the borders have been heavily disputed since the fall of the USSR (resulting in armed conflicts, most notably the Batken conflict of 2022) and only recently agreed upon (Khujand treaty of March 2025). Another unwanted result might be rougher treatment of Central Asian migrant workers on Russian territory (ultimately resulting in less remittances). Currently, the downward trend is slow, but noticeable, with central asians rethinking their destinations, and the Russian government looking for other sources to the resulting low-skilled labour shortage.
At the same time, it is agreed upon that overdependence on Russia limits economic diversification and strategic autonomy of the region. The region’s leadership has increasingly pursued a multilateral foreign policy—seeking balanced relations with Russia, China, the EU, and other actors. Although countless deals have been struck, Europe’s sanctions regime tests how far Central Asian governments can go with this diversification. However, Europe’s challenge lies in the delicacy of this approach, as pressure might result in Central Asia backing away and choosing other cooperative partners.