The Open Balkans is resurrected like Lazarus; after being declared politically exhausted and having disappeared from regional conferences and daily rhetoric, it is now returning to us in a new costume – in German on the pages of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In a joint statement, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić call for a new version of European Union enlargement that requires functional integration before full membership. According to them, if the EU door is slow and narrow, then let the window of the common market, Schengen, and gradual institutional harmonization open without waiting for full membership in the European Union.
This is presented as a “realistic” way to overcome the enlargement stalemate. The idea is essentially simple: while the EU is “tired” of enlargement, let it offer a “shortcut” with transitional functional integration that opens markets, facilitates movement, increases interdependence and economic integration with the idea that political integration will come later. According to them, the Balkans cannot wait indefinitely for an EU where the war in Ukraine and the Middle East, mass migration, the energy crisis or internal tensions have shifted its priorities.
At first glance, this proposal sounds like reasonable pragmatism, but when stripped of diplomatic rhetoric and placed in the current context of internal developments in these two countries as well as in the perspective of Kosovo-Serbia relations, this proposal is not simply something technical, but an attempt at a radical reconfiguration in the Balkans with incalculable costs for the future of Albanians in particular and the entire region in general.
First of all, this proposal in itself constitutes an attempt to offer partial integration as an alternative to the radical transformation required by the accession process. In this way, they have consciously overlooked the essential fact that integration has never been just a matter of the common market, but above all a normative project where the achievement of a functional democracy with full implementation of the law and respect for the highest standards of human and minority rights is at the forefront. Both governments of these leaders are today classified as “hybrid democracies”, where institutions are captured and democratic space is regressing, and naturally this proposal sounds like a perfect alibi to gain access to European funds and markets, without surrendering to the transparency and accountability checks that full membership requires. This proposal comes at a time when both leaders are facing massive protests in the squares of Tirana and Belgrade; with serious corruption scandals affecting the highest levels of power and known to have undertaken systematic violations of the law and have control over the media and electoral processes (actions that have already been documented and reported internationally).
Therefore, by shifting the focus to the market, these leaders seek to alleviate domestic and international pressure for the decline of democratic standards and colossal abuses of power. Still, even though Europe may be tired of enlargement, the Balkans should by no means be tired of liberal democracy. However, the argument of the Rama-Vučić binomial for a functional economic integration as a priority over the political one, forgets a great lesson of history which is best argued by Nobel laureate Daron Acemoglu when he says that “building strong and inclusive institutions is the only guarantee of prosperity”. So, the benefits that come to Albanians from genuine democratization and the rule of law far exceed those that any simple economic integration or entry into Schengen can bring. In fact, we already enjoy a good part of these economic benefits through the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and visa liberalization.
The problem in our countries does not lie in the lack of economic space, but in the lack of institutions that guarantee justice and accountability. Without these institutions, any kind of common market risks remaining a mechanism that enriches the elites of a hybrid democracy, leaving citizens in a permanent economic and political stagnation. Without these institutions, the common market risks turning into a space where only the elites connected to power “reap” the benefits, while the ordinary citizen remains poor and unprotected from corruption and arbitrariness.
However, beyond the economic calculations and attempts to use this proposal as a political survival lifeboat, this initiative constitutes a stab in the back for Kosovo in the most vital plane of state interest and national dignity. The biggest risk in the “realistic” proposal for a functional integration is that it removes the only real pressure for the recognition of Kosovo by turning Chapter 35 from an essential condition into toilet paper. For Serbia, Chapter 35 of the negotiations with the EU is not just a homework assignment; it is the “Achilles’ heel” and the only rope that keeps Belgrade tied to the obligation to recognize the reality of Kosovo. This chapter is designed as a blocking mechanism. However, if Belgrade manages to “tear off” the benefits of the single market, free movement and billions of European funds through this “functional integration”, without being forced to make any concessions on Kosovo’s statehood, then Chapter 35 is annihilated .
In this scenario, recognition of Kosovo ceases to be a condition sine qua non (necessary) and turns into an optional desire that Belgrade can push to infinity. This is a pure act of diplomatic betrayal on Tirana’s part: while talking about “realism”, in fact Kosovo is being deprived of the only weapon that forced Serbia to sit at the table. By giving Serbia everything it wants (the economy) without asking for anything that hurts it (recognition and democratization), Tirana is transforming European integration into an instrument that finances Serbian hegemony in the region, leaving Kosovo as a “geopolitical remnant” awaiting the mercy of an unrepentant and incorrigible recidivist aggressor.
It should be noted here that, even without this absurd proposal, the very 13-year-old ardent flirtation of official Tirana with Belgrade (while maintaining ice walls with Pristina) has given and continues to give Serbia a “certificate of innocence” in front of the world. The message that this close rapprochement with Belgrade conveys to international chancelleries is that Serbia can now claim that it has no problem with Albanians (since it is “building” the open Balkans with Albania), and that the only obstacle remains the “stubbornness” of the government in Pristina. This strategy of diplomatic isolation of Kosovo, paradoxically fueled by Tirana, tends to frame the conflict not as an unresolved issue between the two peoples, but as a political whim of a certain prime minister or government in Pristina.
At this point, political hypocrisy reaches its peak. You cannot, on the one hand, have this organic connection of interests with Belgrade, and at the same time express solidarity with the leaders of the KLA in The Hague. It is a blatant contradiction to lament a dubious and tendentious judicial process that has been cooked, nurtured and maintained by the very structures of Belgrade, while rolling out the red carpet for the authors of that strategy. This new “realism” becomes even more cynical when you see that, while there is talk of common markets and regional Schengen, Kosovo’s security is directly undermined by the same Vučić. Here, the attacks in Banjska and the nerve center of Ibër-Lepenc cannot be ignored, which have already been proven to have been orchestrated by the structures of Serbia. How can there be regional “functional integration” with a state that, on the one hand, promises facilitation of the movement of goods and, on the other, organizes paramilitary operations and sabotage of its neighbor’s critical infrastructure. This contradiction is not simply a technical obstacle, but evidence that Belgrade’s project does not aim at peace, but at the subjugation of Kosovo through a double isolation, whether diplomatic with cooperation from Tirana or physical through destructive actions on the ground. This dualism of Tirana is not diplomacy at all, but an abandonment of principles that undermines Kosovo’s position at every negotiating table, leaving it alone in the face of a Serbia that is reforming on paper, but remains the same in its chauvinistic project for the region.
In conclusion, this proposal for a functional integration is not a creative solution to Brussels’ slowness, but a pragmatic pact that sacrifices the real democratizing transformation of our countries for the sake of the survival of hybrid elites. By selling this model as “the only realistic path”, the Rama-Vučić duo is seeking to legalize a status quo where the market replaces the rule of law and where the free movement of goods hides the paralysis of mutual recognition. For Kosovo and our national interests, this is not simply an economic experiment, but a crushing blow to Chapter 35; a tool that frees Serbia from the obligation of recognition, rewarding it with access to the European market while it continues to orchestrate destabilization.
This project risks nailing the Balkans to a permanent gray average, a exploitable periphery where obligations towards the EU are real, but decision-making power remains zero. Here we also connect to the other problem of the democratic deficit, because countries will be forced to implement European rules without having full decision-making rights, taking on obligations without proportional representation. Therefore, by abandoning the normative process of membership for bargaining political, official Tirana is not only undermining the state dignity of Kosovo, but is leaving the entire region exposed to the geopolitical influences of the East. The Balkans do not need a market window that recycles autocracy, but the open door of liberal democracy. Any shortcut that bypasses justice, democracy, and mutual recognition does not lead to the West but to the East and simply prolongs the agony of a region that is wasting time, chances, talents, and future in the name of a false stability.