Japan’s Takaichi will shape Asian geopolitics

 

Michael Green

 


The author is the CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

 

 

 

The landslide victory of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae in the recent Lower House election will influence Japan’s foreign policy and the strategic balance in Asia for years to come. At a time when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is encouraging Europeans with the idea that they can move away from the United States and chart a more independent path between Washington and Beijing, Takaichi has chosen the opposite strategy — strengthening Japan’s alliance with the United States. Her approach reflects the realities of Asian geopolitics and may ultimately prove relevant for Europe as well.

 

 

Just a month ago, Takaichi appeared politically vulnerable. She led a minority government with only the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and faced economic and diplomatic pressure from China. Reports also described her calling bureaucrats late at night to push them harder, a criticism that surprisingly worked in her favor. Many Japanese voters interpreted the stories as evidence that she was forcing the bureaucracy to work more effectively on behalf of the public.

 

When voters went to the polls, however, the situation changed dramatically. The LDP secured a majority in the powerful Lower House of the Diet. The victory consolidated Takaichi’s authority and signaled strong public support for her firm stance toward China. The Economist recently described her as the most powerful woman in the world. Some observers have even compared her influence to that of Regent Empress Gensho in the eighth century, making her arguably the most powerful Japanese woman in modern political history.

 

What direction will she take with this mandate?

 

Some in Korea and the United States have worried that Takaichi might push Japan too far to the political right. Those concerns appear exaggerated. While she rose within the conservative wing of the LDP, her political background is more complex. When the author first met Takaichi in 1989, she was working as an intern in the office of U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder, one of the most progressive Democrats in Congress at the time.

 

During her campaign for the presidency of the LDP, Takaichi — like her mentor Abe Shinzo — pledged that she would visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. Yet neither Abe nor Takaichi ultimately did so. Both leaders placed greater emphasis on national power and international standing than on ideological symbolism.

 


 

Where Carney speaks of reducing reliance on the United States, Takaichi is moving closer to Washington. Part of that dynamic comes from the fact that U.S. President Donald Trump views her as a political ally. More importantly, Takaichi believes that American power remains essential for balancing China’s growing ambitions in Asia.

 

Japanese public opinion supports this strategy. Polls show that only 22 percent of Japanese trust the United States, yet 92 percent support maintaining the alliance. Takaichi’s challenge now is to demonstrate that Japan can effectively harness American power in ways that serve Japanese national interests.

 

To do that, she is expected to continue Abe’s strategy of making Japan indispensable to the United States — as a technology partner, a major investor and a forward bastion of security in the Indo-Pacific. Even amid concerns about Trump’s unpredictable diplomacy and his criticism of allies, Japan has remained firmly committed to the alliance.

 

One reason is the growing strategic challenge posed by China. Another is Tokyo’s belief that the broader American political establishment — including Congress and public opinion — continues to support Japan and other Asian allies. Historically, the United States has sometimes wavered in its policies toward China, Taiwan and North Korea. Yet in the end, Washington has repeatedly returned to cooperative strategies with its allies.

 

Takaichi’s leadership may also stabilize relations between Japan and Korea. Her unexpected friendship with President Lee Jae Myung — symbolized by their shared enthusiasm for rock drumming — has been viewed as a promising sign for bilateral relations and for both countries’ ability to work with Washington.

 

In the past, relations between Seoul and Tokyo were often strained when politics in Korea shifted leftward or politics in Japan moved sharply to the right. Yet Lee is unlikely to be constrained by pressures from the left in Korea, while Takaichi has strong authority within Japan’s conservative camp. Paradoxically, their ideological differences may actually provide stability, recalling the logic behind Richard Nixon’s historic opening to China.

 

 

Takaichi’s approach to the United States also offers lessons for Europe. Many European governments have been angered by Trump’s rhetoric and policies, including his threats toward Greenland and his criticism of European politics. Some European leaders have responded by discussing a “post-American” strategic vision centered on the European Union.

 

Yet that idea still lacks solid foundations. The United States continues to account for roughly 70 percent of NATO defense spending, and European governments have struggled to maintain public support for significantly higher military budgets. Efforts to expand defense production in Europe have also produced fragmented national markets rather than a truly integrated continental defense industry capable of rivaling the United States.

 

For Takaichi, however, cooperation among democracies remains essential. Like Abe before her, she places importance on maintaining solidarity among democratic nations through institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7). Abe worked hard during Trump’s first presidency to preserve unity within the G7 and strengthen trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific security cooperation.

 

Takaichi is likely to carry that same message of cooperation to future G7 meetings. The only regret for some observers is that Korea is not a member of the group. Many analysts believe that Korea — along with Australia — would be a natural addition to the forum in the future.