Short-wave radio has been used to carry news and information to residents of North Korea. File Photo by Everett Kennedy Brown/EPA
March 25 (UPI) — The author prefers to use the lowercase “n” to challenge the Kim family regime’s legitimacy.
Culture is not decoration. It is terrain, Louis Menand wrote that “culture became a battleground of the Cold War,” and that “freedom of expression was itself the message.”
Those lines carry weight for the Korean Peninsula today. The contest with north Korea is not only about missiles, sanctions or deterrence. It is about control of thought. It is about who defines reality for the Korean people in the north.
If that is true, then strategy must begin with a simple premise. Political change in the north will not start with external force. It will begin inside the minds of its people. Ideas must move first. They must create space where none exists. They must erode the monopoly of truth held by the regime.
The Cold War offers a model. It is not perfect, but it is instructive. The United States and its partners did not defeat Soviet ideology through bombs alone. They competed in culture.
They pushed books, music, art and ideas across closed borders. They trusted that individuals, once exposed to alternative ways of thinking, would begin to question what they had been told. Over time, the state lost control of the argument. It lost control of the population.
The same logic applies to north Korea, though the environment is harsher and more controlled. The regime has built one of the most comprehensive systems of ideological control in modern history. It polices language, restricts movement and punishes curiosity. It seeks to eliminate not only dissent, but also the capacity to imagine dissent.
Yet, no system is perfect. Every closed system contains seams. Every population has unmet questions. The task is to find those seams and widen them.
The nature of the regime and the battlespace
The north Korean regime rests on three pillars — coercion, control of information and manufactured legitimacy. Each reinforces the other. Coercion enforces obedience. Information control shapes perception. Legitimacy binds the system together through myth and narrative.
Break one pillar and the structure weakens. Undermine two and it begins to shift. Challenge all three and it risks collapse.
Information is the most vulnerable pillar. It is also the most accessible to external influence. The regime cannot fully seal its borders against ideas. It has tried. Radios are fixed. Foreign media is banned. Unauthorized contact is punished.
Yet, markets have grown. Smuggling networks operate. Digital devices have spread. Chinese cell signals leak across the border. Even within a closed system, information finds a way.
This is the strategic opening.
Menand’s insight matters here. “Intellectual life was a form of resistance.” The regime understands this. That is why it fears books, films and songs. That is why it punishes those who consume them. It knows that exposure to alternative ideas can shift perception. It can create cognitive dissonance. It can lead individuals to question authority.
The contest, then, is for cognitive space — woo defines what is true, who defines what is possible, who defines what is legitimate?
Lessons from the Cold War
The CIA book program offers a clear lesson. Millions of books entered the Soviet bloc over decades. They were not all political tracts. Many were novels, detective stories or works of philosophy. They were chosen for their ability to show a different world. They demonstrated individual agency. They challenged authoritarian narratives. They invited readers to think.
The effect was cumulative. Dissidents copied and shared material through underground networks. Conversations shifted. Ideas spread faster than the state could contain them. By the 1980s, the regime faced a population that no longer accepted its monopoly on truth.
One must be careful not to overstate causation. Economic failure, political stagnation and external pressure also mattered. But culture played a role. It weakened ideological control. It expanded the space for dissent.
The key insight is simple. Information does not need to be overtly political to be subversive. A detective novel that rewards independent thinking can challenge a system built on obedience. A love story that emphasizes personal choice can undermine a system that denies it. A piece of music can carry emotion that contradicts state narratives.
The question is not whether culture matters. It is how to apply it in a more restrictive environment.
Adapting the model to north Korea
north Korea is not the Soviet Union. It is more isolated. It is more personalist. It is more repressive at the micro level. Yet, it is also more brittle in some respects. Its legitimacy rests on a narrower narrative. Its economic base is weaker. Its exposure to external information, while limited, is growing.
A strategy of influence must adapt to these conditions.
First, content must be relevant. It must resonate with the lived experience of Koreans in the north. It cannot be abstract or distant. It should address daily life, relationships and aspirations. It should show how others solve problems that Koreans in the north face. It should provide practical knowledge, as well as broader ideas.
Second, delivery must be diversified. Physical media remains important. USB drives, SD cards and printed materials can move through established smuggling networks. But digital pathways are expanding. Chinese mobile networks, satellite signals and emerging technologies offer new channels. The strategy must use all of them. Redundancy is essential. If one channel is disrupted, others must remain.
Third, distribution must be decentralized. The Cold War model relied on networks of individuals who carried and shared material. The same approach applies here. Traders, defectors and cross-border communities are critical nodes. They must be supported, not controlled. The goal is to create a self-sustaining ecosystem of information flow.
Fourth, deniability matters. Overt state sponsorship can undermine credibility and increase risk for recipients. Front organizations, private actors and informal networks can provide cover. The message should not feel imposed. It should feel discovered.
Fifth, patience is required. This is not a short campaign. It is a long term effort measured in years and decades. It seeks gradual change in perception, not immediate political action.
Content as a weapon
What should be sent into the north?
The answer begins with Menand’s observation that “art was not just aesthetic; it was political.” Content carries implicit messages about how the world works. It shapes expectations.
Several categories of content are particularly relevant:
• Narratives of everyday life in open societies. These show how people work, interact and make choices. They normalize freedom without preaching it. They allow readers and viewers to compare their own conditions.
• Stories of individual agency — These emphasize problem solving, initiative and personal responsibility. They counter a system that discourages independent action.
• Historical accounts of political change — These show that systems can evolve. They provide examples of transitions that did not lead to chaos. They offer hope without making promises.
• Practical knowledge — Agriculture, health, small business practices and technology improve daily life. They build trust. They demonstrate the value of external information.
• Cultural products — Music, films and literature that evoke emotion and curiosity. These can reach audiences that political content cannot.
The aim is not to tell Koreans in the north what to think. It is to give them the tools to think. It is to expand the range of ideas they can consider.
Building a modern samizdat
The Soviet term samizdat described the underground copying and distribution of banned literature. A similar phenomenon can emerge in north Korea, though it will take different forms.
Digital media changes the equation. A single USB drive can hold thousands of books, films and documents. It can be copied quickly. It can move discreetly. It can reach multiple users.
Networks can form around trust. Individuals who access external content can share it with family and friends. Small groups can form. Conversations can spread.
The role of external actors is to seed the network, provide content, enable distribution and reduce risk where possible. Then step back.
Over time, the network can become self-sustaining. It can adapt to countermeasures. It can evolve with technology.
The regime will respond. It will increase surveillance. It will punish offenders. It will attempt to block channels. That is expected. The strategy must account for it. It must be resilient.
The psychological dimension
Information alone is not enough. It must translate into perception. It must create cognitive effects.
• Exposure. Alternative ideas can produce several outcomes.
• Curiosity. Individuals seek more information. They begin to question.
• Comparison. They evaluate their own conditions against others.
• Doubt. They question the accuracy of state narratives.
• Discussion. They share ideas with others.
These are small steps. They do not lead immediately to political action. But they accumulate.
At a certain point, the gap between state narrative and perceived reality becomes too large to ignore. Legitimacy erodes. Compliance becomes more fragile.
This is the strategic objective — not immediate change, but gradual erosion of the regime’s ideological foundation.
Risks and pushback from critics
A strategy of information infiltration is not without risk. It can provoke repression. It can endanger those who access or distribute content. It can be slow. It may not produce visible results for years.
Critics may argue that it is insufficient. That only pressure, sanctions or force can change the regime. That the population is too controlled to respond.
These concerns are valid. Information alone will not transform north Korea. It must be part of a broader strategy that includes deterrence, diplomacy and economic measures.
But dismissing information as ineffective ignores historical evidence. Closed systems fear ideas for a reason. They know their power.
Another risk is misalignment. Content that does not resonate can be ignored. Content that is too overtly political can be rejected. The strategy must be informed by deep understanding of north Korean society. The execution of the strategy must include voices from the north. Who is the Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn of north Korea?
Integration with alliance strategy
The United States and South Korea must align on this approach. It cannot be unilateral. It must be integrated into a broader alliance strategy.
South Korea has a unique role. It shares language, culture and history with the north. Its cultural products already circulate informally. Its experience is directly relevant.
The United States brings resources, global reach, and experience from past campaigns. Together, they can design and implement a coordinated effort.
This requires political will. It requires acceptance of risk. It requires sustained commitment.
It also requires a shift in mindset. Information operations are not secondary. They are central to the contest.
Toward political change
The ultimate goal is political change and new leadership in north Korea. That will not come from external imposition. It must emerge from internal dynamics. Give Kim Jong Un’s new policies he outlined at 15th Supreme People’s Assembly, now is the time for the alliance to implement a new strategy.
Information can shape those dynamics. It can influence how individuals think about authority, legitimacy and possibility. It can create a population that is more aware, more connected and more willing to question.
At some point, internal pressures may align with external conditions. Economic strain, elite fractures or leadership transitions may create openings. A population that has been exposed to alternative ideas will be better positioned to respond.
This is not a guarantee. It is a probability. Strategy operates in probabilities.
A final reflection
Menand’s insight that “books crossed borders when people could not” captures the essence of the approach. Ideas move where people cannot. They carry with them the possibility of change.
The question is whether we are willing to act on that insight.
Are we prepared to invest in a long term campaign of influence that may not yield immediate results?
Do we trust that individuals, once exposed to new ideas, can shape their own future?
Can we accept the risks inherent in empowering a population we do not control?
Or will we continue to focus only on the visible instruments of power and neglect the quieter forces that shape outcomes over time?
The answers to these questions will determine whether we contest the terrain of ideas in north Korea — or cede it to the regime or follow a new path to solve the “Korea question;” the unnatural division of the Korean peninsula.
Unification, first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
David Maxwell, executive director of the Korea Regional Review, is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he works on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.