The current political crisis in Romania, precipitated by the break-up of the coalition government, offers more than just another sign of domestic instability. Without a doubt, it’s one symptom of a broader movement in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Europe as a whole. Recent events in Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest – which should not be treated as isolated episodes – illustrate a quiet yet significant reconfiguration of political balances within the European Union. This comes at a particularly delicate time, when the EU is simultaneously facing negotiations for its next multiannual financial framework (MFF), maintenance of its support for Ukraine, and a redefinition of its strategic relationship with Russia.
For the past 16 years, the focus of tension in the region has been Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, who became a disruptive actor at the Council, capable of blocking key decisions and straining Union consensus from within. His departure from power has been greeted in Brussels with both relief and expectation: relief because the systematic veto that paralyzed fundamental projects is finally gone; expectation because this raises the possibility of greater fluidity in decision-making. However, to reduce the European problem to the figure of Orbán would be a diagnostic error. What is now unfolding is a more complex scenario, less visible in terms of friction but not necessarily more stable.
Romania provides a good example of this new phase. Traditionally seen as a reliable partner in European politics – especially in terms of support for Ukraine, and in alignment with positions taken by Brussels – its current political crisis is injecting an element of uncertainty that transcends the domestic. The breakdown of the coalition between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the liberal bloc came in response to an accumulation of tensions around fiscal policy, power-sharing, and the management of growing social unrest. The withdrawal of parliamentary support by the PSD – the central force in the country’s political system – leaves the executive without a majority and betokens a prolonged period of instability, with possible departures by several ministers, a minority government, and perhaps even early elections.
“Romania carries one of the highest public deficits in the EU and has had to adopt unpopular measures that have eroded the legitimacy of the coalition”
That political fragility is being aggravated by a demanding economic context. Romania carries one of the highest public deficits in the EU and has had to adopt unpopular measures (from tax increases to containments of social spending) that have eroded the legitimacy of the coalition. On top of this comes another highly sensitive factor in a European key: the risk of compromising access to some €28 billion in EU funds linked to the Recovery Plan. The inability to sustain stable governance doesn’t just affect the country’s internal equilibrium but limits its credibility as a partner in the EU framework.
At the same time, the erosion of traditional parties has fueled the growth of populist and far-right forces like the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which capitalize on social discontent and question the pro-European consensus. The coalition that emerged following the 2024 elections was largely defensive in character, looking to stop that growth – but the absence of a coherent political project made the coalition unviable. As such, the Romanian crisis isn’t only institutional or economic but a crisis of representation, in a context where confidence in the political system has been weakened by episodes like the recent controversy around the presidential elections, and by perceptions of external interference.
While Hungary has provided the visible face of disagreement for years, Bulgaria is currently aimed at a more ambiguous form of distancing. After a decade marked by electoral instability and parliamentary fragmentation, the recent political shift in Sofia has produced not so much a strategic clarification as a redefinition of balances. The emerging leadership, although formally committed to EU membership, shows a greater willingness to explore intermediate positions on key issues, especially as regard the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia. This ambivalence doesn’t necessarily translate into explicit vetoes, but it does foretell greater difficulty in building solid common positions on foreign policy.
“Viktor Orbán’s departure won’t eliminate Europe’s problem of internal disagreement, but it will transform it”
In this new context, Orbán’s departure won’t eliminate Europe’s problem of internal disagreement, but it will transform it from an easily identifiable model of open confrontation to a more diffuse logic of fragmentation, where disagreements are expressed in less visible but equally effective ways. Decision-making in the European framework – based on delicate balances and gradual consensus – gains complexity not because of one intransigent actor but rather due to the proliferation of unstable or strategically ambiguous national positions.
This change in pattern is particularly relevant in the context of negotiations for the next MFF. Historically, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have acted as a somewhat aligned bloc in advocating cohesion policies and an ambitious budget. However, current internal fragmentation is threatening to weaken that capacity for joint action. The budget negotiations – already among the most complex exercises in European politics – could be further stressed by a lack of clear and stable positions from some of these Member States.
An additional element is the possibility that European funds will be increasingly used as an instrument of political conditionality. Hungary – where access to Union resources has been linked to compliance with rule-of-law standards – has set a precedent that can hardly be ignored going forward. In a scenario of political instability (as in Romania) or strategic ambiguity (as in Bulgaria), the relationship between Brussels and the Member States could become more transactional, introducing new tensions into the internal operations of the EU framework.
All of this converges on the most sensitive region of Europe’s current agenda: positioning the Union vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine, plus the bloc’s relationship with Russia. The end of the Hungarian veto permits significant progress in the short term, facilitating the approval of aid packages and sanctions. But European cohesion remains fragile in this area. Energy dependencies, internal political dynamics, and varying perceptions of threat continue to condition the positions taken by the Member States.
What’s at stake are the EU’s ability to respond to the crisis in Ukraine and its ability to sustain a coherent foreign policy in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. Far from vanishing after the political change in Hungary, the diversity of national interests will take on new forms that might complicate the forging of a unified European voice.
“At stake are both the EU’s ability to respond to the crisis in Ukraine and its ability to sustain a coherent foreign policy”
In short, recent developments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary suggest that the EU is entering a new phase in which the main challenge won’t be to manage direct opposition from certain members but to deal with an increasing, often unpredictable heterogeneity. European governance, based on the constant search for balance, will have to adapt to a more fragmented environment where stability can’t be taken for granted, even in countries traditionally seen as reliable partners.
While Orbán’s departure has removed an obvious obstacle, it has also laid bare a deeper reality. European cohesion no longer depends solely on the absence of disruptive actors but on the existence of solid political consensuses, now largely in the process of being redefined. Here is where much of Europe’s immediate future is in play – precisely when the EU needs greater firmness and political coherence, internally as well as externally.