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  1. Full article: Russia’s mercenaries were supposed to save Mali. The military regime of Assimi Goïta granted itself five more years in power last December, but is totally reliant on Russia’s “Africa Corps” to survive the Islamist militias who have [besieged the country’s capital](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/30/mali-bamako-violence).

    But Putin’s troops are currently surrounded there, as fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) torch fuel trucks and drag women off public transport. Large swathes of the country are under terrorist control and the Russian mercenaries have all but given up trying to retake them.

    The upside for Vladimir Putin is that he has plunged yet another part of the West’s periphery into permanent instability.

    Spin the globe to Iran and the pattern of Russian involvement tells the same basic story. The Russian- made air defences were largely destroyed last year and are finished now. But Moscow has supplied Tehran with real-time targeting intelligence, allowing precision strikes on US radars and airfields in the Gulf. And when Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, Russia combined with China to prevent the UN Security Council backing moves to reopen it.

    Spin again to the Southern Caucasus and Russian hard power is in retreat. Its traditional ally and client, Armenia, has moved decisively to strengthen links with the US and Europe.

    Spin to Ukraine and Russia remains bogged down in its four-year war. Ukrainian long-range drones are meanwhile striking [deep into Russian territory](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-has-new-attack-strategy-risks-russia-nato-clash-4355311?srsltid=AfmBOoqB6lg4PnYPG8MgSaedPpJSdse-1qiED48MwQn9lsuTUYPutxuK&ico=in-line_link), degrading the oil terminals as far away as Samara, on the Volga, and Usk-Luga on the Baltic Sea. These strikes have taken more than 300,000 barrels a day out of production.

    And the economic stress is beginning to show at home. Promsvyazbank (PSB) – the state-owned bank that channels lending to Russian defence firms – posted a massive loss in March. Although the entity is state-owned, it is largely funded by deposits from the Russian defence firms it lends to. Last year, many struggled to service their debts, signalling rising stress among Russian defence firms.

    Basically, Putin’s war economy is faced with a slow-motion debt crisis, leaving Russia more dependent than ever on China for supplies, goodwill and oil revenues.

    And it is fuelling mounting disquiet. Though open opposition is a suicidal pastime, complaints from otherwise loyal figures are rising. The boss of the Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, has warned that “the economy is about to collapse”.

    An even more influential figure – Monaco-based Russian TV star [Victoria Bonya](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/putin-pr-problem-myth-crumbling-4370048?srsltid=AfmBOoqfV721a-IlfjK7WFQnaWanRwLDUxsXOFgjfTagC1IC2BNbfINE&ico=in-line_link) – unleashed an 18-minute tirade that garnered 30 million views. “Vladimir Vladimirovich,” she tells Putin, “you are dead. Bloggers fear you. Artists fear you…” She tells him that no regional governor will tell the truth about the state of the economy – that the people are “coiled like a spring” and about to snap.

    This is the context for Putin’s attempt to strangle the messaging app Telegram – once the vehicle of choice for Russian propaganda – and force people to use state-run channels instead. That’s been accompanied by a weird media campaign against the “open” internet, telling citizens that it is awash with scams and disinformation – and a crackdown on the virtual private networks Russians use to circumvent internet censorship.

    Given Telegram was the main vector of regime propaganda, and its amplification by “milbloggers” who often demanded escalation of the war against Ukraine, the move signals how beleaguered and in need for top-down hierarchy the regime must feel.

    It has lost Syria. Its Iranian ally is weakened. Its grip over Armenia is slipping. It has caused nothing but chaos in Africa. And the Ukraine war is a stalemate.

    For any rational imperialist strongman this catalogue of failure, and the prospect of financial peril and dissent might signal it was time to call it quits. But Putin is not rational. I don’t mean that he is crazy – but that his fundamental strategic aim, for Russia to become a “great power” capable of dividing Europe, conquering Ukraine and permanently destabilising the West, is a tall order for a country whose GDP is the size of Italy’s.

    One of Putin’s most chilling remarks was uttered in 2018 when, asked whether he would ever use nuclear weapons, he asked: “Why do we need a world if Russia is not in it?” During the Ukraine war, this has become the mantra of ultra-nationalist TV hosts, who delight in showing animations of Russian nuclear missiles and torpedoes laying waste to Western capitals.

    It is an explicit threat to destroy human life on the planet if the regime somehow faces failure, and though that moment is a long way off, the remark is the best guide to what Putin is most likely to do next: foment chaos.

    Though the impoverished and terrorised people of Mali seem a long way from the centres of power in Europe, their condition – helplessness amid chaos – is what Putin intends for all of us. And though his armies are failing, his proxy regimes tottering, it does not matter so long as he can project disinformation, hatred and division into Western society.

    Right now, his target is Poland. In February, Russian-trained saboteurs blew up a railway line. But the country’s security services report “dozens” of probing attacks – including cyber-warfare, drone intrusions or just outright sabotage attempts. The physical and digital intrusions are accompanied by relentless disinformation designed to sow fear and set parts of the population against each other.

    During last year’s election in Poland, Russia activated dozens of bots on [X.com](http://X.com), which had been tweeting about cryptocurrencies and now, suddenly, began to claim that pensioners would lose out because of money channelled to Ukraine.

    Putin, in short, is engaged in a relentless battle to shape the way we think about the problem. His top generals advocate a theory called “reflexive control”, in which cognitive and behavioural science is mobilised to force what they call the “victim state” – ie Britain and its allies – to frame problems in ways that will make us behave how Russia wants.

    One of my biggest frustrations with extreme political activists – both on the right and left – is their refusal to see this happening, even as they become unconscious vectors of Kremlin cognitive warfare. When you see masked pro-Palestinian protesters harassing Jews, or fascist thugs attacking asylum hotels, you are not just seeing dark domestic political impulses played out. You are seeing the Kremlin playbook in action – and I do not mean that metaphorically. There is [an actual set of instructions](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/SO-20/Derleth-New-Generation-War-1.pdf), and these effects are in it.

    To keep Ukraine in the fight, to support the Westward turn of countries like Armenia, and to keep places like Mali from failing completely, requires the populations of Western countries to maintain the will to do so. It requires us to hate each other, to turn such hatred into low-level intimidation and harassment, and to disintegrate our democratic resilience.

    Despite his failing economy, a slow-mo debt crisis and massive casualties among his troops, Putin knows that – should European voters lose the will to maintain our own democratic resilience, he can pull victory from the ashes of the defeats he’s experienced over the past four years.