Albin Guevara and Mickoski: Defactoring Albanians in North Macedonia

Albin Guevara and Mickoski: Defactoring Albanians in North Macedonia

Written by Adri Nurellari

The recent political events in the Republic of North Macedonia; from the symbolic debates over the missing anthem in the Vlen Assembly to the student protests over the use of the Albanian language; are not simply isolated episodes but the tip of an iceberg of an older and more dangerous strategy for a factual and metaphorical “de-Albanization” of the state, turning Albanians from state-forming factors into political decorum. At the core of this dynamic lies a kind of “political sado-masochism” that has characterized the extremists of VMRO-DPMNE over the years. This is a sense of inferiority towards Western internationals and neighbors, which is attempted to be compensated through an arrogance and display of superiority towards Albanians at home.

For years, this elite built the narrative that Albanians “have taken too much power,” that the Ohrid Agreement has gone “too far,” and that the character of the state is changing. Today, this propaganda is reaping its fruits because we are seeing how an attempt is being made to create a reality where the state functions with “disciplined” and submissive Albanians who dare not even place the national anthem inside their party assembly. Albanians have also become scapegoats for every crisis, every frustration and blockage, while the real problems of the state remain corruption, inflation, party capture of institutions, lack of reforms, and stagnation of integration.

In this climate, the role of Albin Kurti also enters, who instead of strengthening the political subjectivity of the Albanians of the RMV, has in many cases defactored it. By packaging the VLEN as a kind of local branch of the LVV and appearing as a political authority over the Albanian parties there, he has diminished their political autonomy and made them more negotiable in relation to the Macedonian partner. Because naturally, a factor that is perceived as a political satellite of Pristina is not treated as a real state-forming partner, but as a tool of external influence.

This is precisely what the Macedonian nationalist narrative has been missing for years, concrete evidence that Albanians are not an authentic state-forming factor, but an extension of the external influences of Tirana or Pristina. Every time Kurti appears as the “leader of the Albanians of the region” in Tetovo or Skopje, he feeds nationalist paranoia and makes it easier to relativize the political role of Albanians in the state. This behavior of his has only given oxygen to the Macedonian nationalist and extremist fiction with Gogol of “Greater Albania”, a paranoia that has been used for years for political mobilization and to justify the weakening of the Albanian role in the state. Any perception that an ethnic community is controlled by another capital produces a defensive nationalist counter-reaction from the other ethnic community, and we have seen this in endless analogous cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Moldova; Ukraine; Georgia, Cyprus, etc.

And all this is happening while the Mickoski government is gradually dismantling the very foundations of interethnic coexistence through minimizing or preventing the use of the Albanian language, marginalizing Albanian representation in institutions, attempting to dilute the spirit of the Ohrid Agreement and removing the “balancer” mechanism, one of the main instruments that guaranteed ethnic representation in the administration. The reader outside the RMV should understand that this post-Ohrid state was not conceived as a classical numerical democracy (winner takes all), but, as Arend Lijphart would define it, a consensual multi-ethnic state where stability depends on the balance between communities. So, the attack on the “balancer”, the relativization of the Albanian language or the minimization of the Albanian partner are not simply administrative decisions, but a violation of the post-2001 constitutional architecture itself.

Instead of extinguishing the climate of ethnic paranoia and strengthening the position of Albanians as state-building partners, Kurti gave Macedonian ultranationalists precisely the propaganda “evidence” that Albanians are an imported political project and not an authentic local stakeholder and factor. By proclaiming himself a pan-Albanian leader, he fueled ethnic suspicion and armed the most radical anti-Albanian circles with evidence. Today, for a part of the Macedonian public, VALEN is not perceived as an organic representative of the Albanians of North Macedonia, but as a political extension of Pristina; and this is a disaster for the long-term position of Albanians there. At the same time, for international diplomats who see that Albanian parties in the RMV are perceived as branches of foreign political centers (Pristina/Tirana), they simultaneously lose the main attribute of the state-forming actor, namely local political sovereignty, and meanwhile the perception is strengthened that Albanians are not co-owners but instruments of external influence (proxy).

The other problem with the exported populist revolution “à la Che Guevara” is that it replaces the vital interest of the Albanians of North Macedonia with populist folklore and emotional spectacle. Albanians there do not need political mythology and egocentric exhibitionism, but strong institutions, serious representation and real negotiating power. Kurti transferred to North Macedonia his typical anti-establishment debate about the “fight against the old elites” and corruption, as if the main problem of the Albanians there was identical to that of Kosovo. But the existential challenges of the Albanians in North Macedonia are first and foremost ethnic and constitutional. So they are institutional representation, language, balance in the administration, the Ohrid Agreement and the preservation of the status as a state-forming factor. By imposing a populist narrative from Kosovo, he shifted the debate from these essential issues of the Albanians towards an anti-elite spectacle that in the end only weakened the real position of the Albanians in the state.

Albanians there do not need populist demagogic rhetoric, but rather the unblocking of European integration; strong institutions, negotiating power and constitutional stability. The moment local leaders start seeking a stamp from Pristina instead of a mandate from Tetovo or Struga, Albanian representation begins to rot from within. Albanian parties should build their authority on local figures; ideas, institutions and citizen support, not by importing Kurti’s legitimacy. This also weakens them in relation to their Macedonian ally, because a partner who is perceived as a political satellite is never treated as a real decision-making factor.

In a paradoxical way, the political relationship between Kurti and Mickoski has become almost similar and symbiotic. Both, each in their own way, avoid facing the real problems of citizens by shifting the debate to the madness of the other ethnicity that coexists in the state. Mickoski avoids responsibility for economic stagnation, high prices, mass emigration and the blockage of European integration by mobilizing fear of Albanians. Kurti, on the other hand, similarly, exports his identity populism and shifts attention from the real problems of Kosovo towards regional protagonism and permanent political conflict. As Chantal Mouffe argues, populism feeds mainly by constantly creating a political and emotional “enemy”. And both of them feed on ethnic polarization because it helps them keep alive the propaganda with which they get votes and avoid responsibility for failures.

However, the political history of our nation has repeatedly shown that the most dangerous moments have not come only from the nationalisms of our neighbors, but also from the phenomenon of “Honest Albanians”; “honest”, “acceptable” Albanians who have been used as political notaries to validate decisions against the Albanian national interest itself. From those who voted in March 1989 to suppress Kosovo’s autonomy, to the elites who in April 1939 handed over the royal crown to Victor Emmanuel, selling servility as realpolitik. The Balkans have continuously produced Albanians who are promoted by the government because they are useful for neutralizing the Albanians themselves. Here lies the greatest danger with VLEN, with the Prime Minister of Kosovo and with the representatives of the main opposition party of Albania who preferred the political photo with Mickovski even when the Albanian anthem was missing. Because every time the Albanian elites relativize the symbolic and institutional weakening of Albanians in the name of “pragmatism” or “moderation”, they risk becoming political lubricant for the gears of submission, discipline and gradual defactorization of Albanians in the RMV.

Albanians have also often paid the price of the geopolitical bargains of their capitals. The Chams were sacrificed in the name of regional balances and diplomatic flirtation with Athens, while state terror in Kosovo for decades was treated as an acceptable cost in the function of Enverist Tirana’s relations with Tito and Yugoslavia. Albanians in Montenegro feel similarly today when they see the Albanian prime minister campaigning for Djukanovic and Abazovic and not encouraging the unification and strengthening of Albanian parties there. The same happens in the Presevo Valley when they see Kurti using them as a chess piece for dialogue or see Rama behaving like the poor brother of Belgrade’s Sandri, justifying him for not imposing sanctions on Moscow or co-writing articles to pressure Brussels. This is why Albanians in the region have developed a strong sensitivity to any attempt to be used as a bargaining chip in the prime ministerial games of regional protagonism.

But in our case, the problem is that Kurti, with this behavior, is not only harming the Albanians of North Macedonia but is also gradually harming Kosovo itself, which is losing the role it once had as a point of unity for Albanians. Pristina had influence because it was seen as a moral center and a symbol of solidarity for all Albanians, and not as a sponsor of one party against another. By openly entering the political competitions of Albanians in North Macedonia (as in Albania and the Presevo Valley) and taking sides against one Albanian party, he has lost Pristina’s traditional role as a moral and neutral arbitrator that had influence over the entire Albanian political spectrum.

Moreover, it harms Kosovo in the international arena. For years, Pristina has tried to build the image of a small peace-loving, goodwill-loving state that seeks recognition, stability and Euro-Atlantic integration and that tries to solve the remaining problems with its neighbors through dialogue. But when its prime minister directly intervenes in the political contests of Albanians in neighboring countries and behaves as a regional political patron, the perception is created of a state that exports political tension, ethnic polarization and instability.

This behavior also damages relations with the West. The US and the EU seek stability, pragmatism, and coordination in the region. When Kosovo begins to be seen as a country that increases political and ethnic tensions among its neighbors, the will of some partners to support it without reservations on its main international issues weakens. There is even a perception that Kurti is exporting to the region the same spirit of confrontation that he has often had with the EU and the US in Kosovo. Kurti is currently the godfather of an Albanian alliance that is in coalition with VMRO-DPMNE, which is blocking constitutional changes and keeping North Macedonia’s European path frozen. This creates the dangerous impression that official Pristina is directly or indirectly supporting precisely those factors that are keeping the region outside the EU.

This policy damages the very idea of ​​Albanians as the most modern, pro-European factor in the entire Balkans. Instead of Albanians being perceived as a community seeking functional institutions, Euro-Atlantic integration, and liberal-democratic coexistence, the old Balkan narrative is restored, where every Albanian mobilization is interpreted as a destabilizing regional nationalist project. And this is the greatest gift that can be given to anti-Albanian circles in the region, starting from Belgrade.  

In conclusion, the irony is that Macedonian nationalists and Kurti’s regional populism today feed off each other. One needs fear of Albanians to cover up its own failures, the other needs permanent ethnic polarization to project itself as a figure of international weight. One side wants Albanians silent and “disciplined”, the other side uses them as fuel for political electoral protagonism and diplomatic bargaining.

In this theater of polarization, the Albanians of North Macedonia risk remaining simply electoral “cannon fodder”. The Albanians there do not need either Mickovski’s paranoia or Kurti’s regional narcissism. They need real negotiating power, institutions, European integration and a political elite that receives a mandate from its own citizens and not a blessing from Pristina. Because when Albanian politics becomes filial and Albanians are treated as an extension of someone else, the only winners are the anti-Albanian circles that have been preventing coexistence with equal Albanians for decades, but are trying to produce obedient, manageable and politically neutered Albanians.