Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson has warned that Iceland would hand over decision-making authority over its fisheries if the country joined the European Union.
In an opinion article published in Morgunblaðið on 13 May, Gissurarson, Professor Emeritus in the Faculty of Political Science at the School of Social Sciences at the University of Iceland and Director of Research at RNH, argued that EU membership would place Iceland’s fishing grounds and quota shares under the authority of institutions in Brussels.
He wrote that the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy is an area of exclusive EU competence.
“The Common Fisheries Policy is, however, an exclusive competence of the EU, so individual member states must in fisheries matters submit to decisions of a majority of EU member states, including states that do not border the sea,” Gissurarson wrote.
“No state has a veto over such decisions.”
For Iceland, where control over fish stocks has long been regarded as central to national sovereignty and economic independence, that point is likely to carry considerable political weight.
Common Fisheries Policy Adopted “In a Hurry”
Gissurarson argued that the Common Fisheries Policy was introduced in 1973 partly because the then European Economic Community anticipated membership applications from countries with extensive fishing grounds.
“The Common Fisheries Policy was adopted in a hurry in 1973, when the expected membership applications of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway and Denmark were known,” he wrote.
“Together, these countries controlled vast fishing grounds, which the EEC wanted to seize.”
“It therefore agreed to add to the EU’s regulatory framework a new rule on equal access for member states to all fishing grounds. Exemptions would only be temporary.”
His central argument is that the legal structure of the policy gives priority to collective EU decision-making rather than permanent national control.
British Experience Cited as a Warning
The professor said the United Kingdom’s experience demonstrated the risks facing countries that rely heavily on fisheries.
“Edward Heath, however, assured British fishermen that their interests would not be harmed by membership,” he wrote.
“When the powerful fishing nations Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986, they were granted access to most of Britain’s 200-mile fishing zone.”
“It emerged, when documents were published in 2001, thirty years after the accession negotiations, that Heath had, against his better judgment, deceived British fishermen.”
Gissurarson presented this as an example of how political assurances given during accession negotiations may not provide lasting protection once a country is fully subject to EU law.
Relative Stability Offers No Permanent Guarantee
The professor also questioned the legal security of the principle of relative stability, which allocates quota shares among EU member states based on historical fishing patterns.
“It is true that individual fishing nations can invoke the principle of relative stability,” he wrote.
“But the principle of relative stability is not part of the treaties or primary legal framework of the EU, and therefore a majority of member states can alter it at will.”
In Gissurarson’s view, that means quota shares currently enjoyed by member states are based on political agreement rather than immutable treaty protections.