The interests of the USA, China, Russia and Japan on the Korean Peninsula and their common diplomatic efforts to establish a peace architecture have not been successful yet. However, in the complex situations of geopolitics, middle powers could play a facilitating role in the dialogue between the respective interested parties. Thus, neutral, credible and able to form coalitions, middle powers on the one hand and their usefulness that depends on the coordination with the major powers on the other hand are at the centre of the author’s analysis. Without this dual-track approach, the peninsula is likely to be stuck in rivalry and stalemate.
Each of the major powers has its own interest-based, and as a result, narrow-oriented, strategies for dealing with the Peninsula. In the case of denuclearisation of North Korea as a precondition for engagement with the North Korean regime, the same demand is perceived by Pyongyang with deep suspicion and even distrust. China’s involvement in and its leverage over the North are open to many doubts; however, China’s diplomacy in relation to the North is based on its own self-interest to maintain its own regional influence. Therefore, even though China is involved in the Peninsula’s diplomacy, it is not necessarily always a positive factor. Russia, on the other hand, plays the role of a spoiler. North Korea is supported by the U.S. and other Western countries, and thus, Russia’s involvement in the Peninsula’s affairs is naturally negative. In addition, from a geographical point of view, Japan is a far distance from North Korea, and therefore naturally does not wish to be engaged with the North. It keeps a safe distance from Pyongyang and coordinates with the U.S. in the region. As such, it is not in Japan’s interest to be dealing with North Korea in diplomacy. The interest-based strategies of the major powers towards the Peninsula result in incompatibility of their interests and therefore prevent meaningful diplomacy from taking place, and the roles that Seoul can play are accordingly limited.
In general, middle powers can fulfil a variety of roles with respect to conflicts; for small states in particular, they can serve as a conduit to the great powers as well as a facilitator of contact with other states which are also in the midst of conflict. Several middle powers have in the past already fulfilled the roles of a facilitator or even of a mediator in a conflict. With respect to the Korean Peninsula, there are a variety of roles that middle powers can play as well. For one, they can serve as neutral venues for summits. In addition, they can offer support for back-channel contacts that are currently taking place between the two sides on the Korean Peninsula, and they can continue to stress, in multilateral forums, the need for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Their involvement in such activities could shift focus away from a rivalry-oriented view of the relationship on the Korean Peninsula to a peace-oriented view.
However, it is not to be overestimated. First, middle powers are not able and do not want to force the DPRK to denuclearise. Second, they cannot force the US and/or China to make concessions. For peace efforts to work, sustained diplomacy, embedded in a political framework of great powers and additional smaller countries, is required.
First, middle powers should try to coordinate their policies in relation to the major powers so as to legitimise a strategy of engagement with North Korea by the international community of nations, rather than turning it into individual concessions of each of the countries concerned. To this end, it is also necessary to prevent Chinese mediation from turning into a one-man show and to try to bring as many countries and actors as possible into the negotiations, while dealing with Russia, the cost to the country of its attempts to keep the peninsula at war should be increased by having as many countries as possible involved in attempts to bring peace. When dealing with Japan, middle powers should provide Washington and Pyongyang with neutral arenas for dialogue and negotiations.
An integrated approach to Korean peace is extremely valuable in so many ways: it can help to decrease polarisation, increase the legitimacy of peace efforts and enable much-needed space for actual diplomacy to function in a situation where coercion has thus far failed to bring about the desired end. The involvement of middle powers can also serve as a protective shield to any single country’s attempt to hijack peace efforts. The involvement of middle powers in facilitating Korean peace would thus serve to enhance the credibility of the efforts at peace of the South Korean government and, indeed, provide a model for effective regional diplomacy in the current security environment.
However, the role of middle powers in peace efforts towards the region can be meaningful only if these powers maintain a consistent line of policy towards the region and refrain from being mere symbols. They have to maintain their neutrality, i.e. not to take the side of one power or another of the conflicting powers, and to be credible enough to be of use to interested parties. And in order to get Pyongyang involved, they have to convince the North Korean leadership that by being involved, it will get some benefits, and that Washington, Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo will not misuse their involvement for their own purposes to jeopardize core interests of these powers.
Major powers need to be stabilised and institutionalised within regional multilateral frameworks so that middle powers can play constant roles as stakeholders. Hence, there is no option but to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula through a collective effort of a variety of middle powers who hold dialogues to resolve conflicts and share various interests of other powers and, step by step, strive to achieve their objectives.
The opinions expressed in this article are his own.
References
- Lee, Y. W. (2026). Status politics: The changing meanings and practices of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. Global Policy, 17(S1), S84–S93.
- Jeon, K.-j. (2026, April 30). Pyongyang’s northern turn is reshaping the Korean Peninsula. Brookings.