“The reduction of the population in Ukraine is not a unique case. This is a global process, which in demographic science is called the ‘demographic transition’. What is unique is the situation in which Ukraine finds itself,” explains Oleksander Gladun of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
Given the often significant loss of military as well as civilian lives, war never has a positive impact on a country’s demographics.
Furthermore, Gladun continues, “mortality also rises due to worsening chronic illnesses, stress and, in some cases, the inability to receive timely medical care”.
At the same time, birth rates fall, and people are postponing the decision to have children. “It’s a natural reaction,” Gladun said.
According to data published by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice and cited by the Kyiv Independent, in 2024 Ukraine recorded 495,090 deaths. This figure is nearly three times higher than the number of births.
According to the latest figures announced by president Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine has lost 55,000 military personnel (both career soldiers and conscripts) in the war against Russia since February 2022.
This figure is widely considered to be a significant underestimate.
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, estimates the death toll to be between 100,000 and 140,000, compared to 275,000–325,000 for the Russian army.
Decline began in 1993
Ukraine has been suffering a population decline since 1993. “[And] the war has greatly accelerated this process. According to our forecasts, the population will continue to decline. However, the pace of this decline depends on the year and conditions under which the war ends,” Gladun explains.
Since 1991, when it gained independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has lost almost half its population: “According to my estimate, the population of the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine was about 28 million people at the beginning of 2026. At the end of 1991, the population was 51.7 million people”.
A projection by the United Nations, cited by Ukrainian Pravda, puts the population at 15.3 million by 2100.
However, as Gladun explains, these figures need to be placed in context.
“Firstly, the territory currently under government control is approximately 20 percent smaller than it was in 1991. Secondly, we do not know the population figures in the territory not controlled by the government. Thirdly, we do not know how many people will return to the country from among those currently fleeing the war in other countries”.
How many Ukrainians are refugees living abroad?
The Centre for Economic Strategy (CES) is an independent Ukrainian non-governmental research centre founded in Kyiv in 2025.
According to the centre’s fifth report on refugees, at the start of 2026, 5.6 million Ukrainians were refugees living abroad. Of these, four million left Ukraine via the western borders.
“We also have over four million internally-displaced persons. Therefore, more than 10 million people have left their homes, which is around 20 percent of the pre-war population,” adds Gladun.
“Ukraine continues to lose population after four years of the full-scale invasion,” confirms Iryna Ippolitova, senior researcher at the CES. “The main reason for demographic losses is migration. According to estimates by the CES, about 300,000 people left Ukraine in 2025. In addition, the population is declining due to losses among both military personnel and civilians caused by the war, as well as due to falling birth rates”.
In late August 2025, the Ukrainian government liberalised cross-border movement for men aged between 18 and 22, and allowed men aged 23 and over living abroad to return temporarily to Ukraine. Up to that point, martial law in force since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022 had prohibited all men aged between 18 and 60 from leaving the country, with rare exceptions.
The aim was to ensure the army had a sufficient number of recruits. “We want Ukrainians to maintain as many ties with Ukraine as possible,” prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated.
Thus, the government has to balance the demands of war with the need to preserve the younger generations and safeguard the nation’s future.
According to data from the CES, approximately 96,000 men emigrated between August and November 2025.
“Roughly one out of every seven young men between 18 and 22 years of age exited the country since August,” the report states.
How many will return?
The CES estimates that between 1.3 and 2.2 million people could return to Ukraine once the war ends, depending on the scenario.
“The decision to return will be influenced by a whole range of factors: the availability of housing in Ukraine, employment opportunities, social infrastructure for children, etc. People will compare what they have in their host country with the opportunities in Ukraine. The degree of adaptation to the new country will also play a role,” explains Gladun.
And, of course, a key factor is how – and under what conditions – the war will end. “Two years ago, a survey showed that 25 percent more people would return if the war ended within the 1991 borders than if it ended along the current front line”.
It is a widely held view “that if the war ends at the front line, the Russian Federation will resume it in a few years,” says Gladun.
Of Ukrainian citizens abroad, 66 percent are of working age (18–65). Young people (those under 35) account for more than half of Ukrainian refugees (56 percent). They are the country’s lifeblood.
However, according to CES data, they are also the demographic segment that will be less inclined to return.
“Currently,” explains Iryna Ippolitova of the CES, “we see that young people under 35 are much less likely to return to Ukraine than older people, especially those over 50. There are many reasons for this. These include better integration in host countries, economic factors such as jobs and salaries, and most importantly, security risks. The return of these people is possible under certain conditions. First, there must be security and an end to the war. The format of how the war ends also matters: most refugees consider returning only if the war fully ends and civilian flights resume in Ukraine. A frozen conflict would have a much smaller impact on refugees’ willingness to return.”
Case study: ‘Vitaly’ and Antonina
Vitaly (a pseudonym) is one such refugee. 19-years old and living in France for the last two years, Vitaly is originally from the south of Ukraine, and moved to the west of the country when the war broke out. He came to France to continue his studies, because the outbreak of war meant he lost the chance of a scholarship. Vitaly considered a number of destinations, including the Czech Republic and Poland.
He ultimately chose France. Today, he works on building sites or as a sales assistant. In September, he aims to enrol for an engineering degree.
Vitaly is one of countless young people who have embarked on a tough and complicated journey in another country, and who now aim to establish a new life for themselves. Vitaly has a plan, a vision for the future, and is eager not to “waste” the sacrifice he made. “I’d like to stay here; I’ve already learnt French, worked hard, and I want to go to university”. Vitaly misses Ukraine, his family and the places he knows, but returning doesn’t seem like a viable option.
“I’d say I’d go back if I were lucky enough to find a good, well-paid job in Ukraine. But at the moment, Ukraine’s economy has deteriorated,” says Antonina, 27, who has been in Italy with her mother since 2022.
Originally from Kharkiv, Antonina is now a master’s student in European and International Studies.
In terms of security, the situation in Ukraine remains very precarious. “One of the main reasons is that we don’t know when the war will end. We don’t know if we’re at the beginning, or right in the middle of it. I don’t want to put my life on hold. I believe the right thing to do is to start my career, and perhaps I’ll be successful, perhaps I’ll meet my partner and start a family.”
Currently, Ukrainians benefit from “temporary protection” in EU countries. This special status allows Ukrainians to study, work, and access the national healthcare system.
Introduced in March 2022, it is set to expire in March 2027.
For the moment, it is not known what EU countries will do after this date. German chancellor Friedrich Merz has already reiterated that he wants to limit the number of Ukrainian men seeking asylum. The plan is to facilitate the return of refugees to their homeland, so that “they can help their own country”, he says.
And what about EU membership?
“It is still difficult to clearly predict the effects of Ukraine joining the EU,” says Ippolitova of the CES. “The experience of central European countries suggests that some people may leave, as they will gain the opportunity to work legally in the EU”.
However, freedom of movement may also “encourage some migrants to return and support circular migration among Ukrainians who currently do not consider returning because they are afraid of losing their right to work and live in the EU”.
According to demographer Oleksander Gladun, accession remains a distant prospect. Assuming it happens, “it is unlikely to trigger a mass exodus of the population”.
Ukraine was already partially integrated into the European labour market by 2022: “By the end of 2021, 1.6 million Ukrainians held residence permits in EU countries, 900,000 of whom were there for work purposes,” he said.
“For Ukraine, this will have a negative impact in both demographic and economic terms. For the EU, it will most likely be positive: Ukraine has long been a supplier of labour to EU countries, and this trend can only intensify following accession,” says Gladun.
Population decline and demographic replacement
Around 20 percent of Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Russian army. And the country’s future depends in part on what happens in those territories. “What is unfolding in the occupied territories of Ukraine – in Mariupol above all, but also across swathes of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts – is the deliberate erasure of a Ukrainian population and its substitution with a Russian one,” writes researcher Jade McGlynn in Engelsberg Ideas.
The case of Mariupol, explains McGlynn, is particularly telling: the city had a population of around 450,000 people before the 2022 invasion; today, according to various estimates, there are 100,000 residents, 70 percent of whom are over 60. The birth rate here is much lower than in the rest of Ukraine, and people are leaving every month. The city, the scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, is dying out.
At the same time, a process of replacement is underway: “According to data provided by the Centre for the Study of Occupation on settler inflows, the number of Russian citizens in Mariupol increased by at least 80,000 between 2023 and 2025, at a current rate of approximately 2,200 per month. On these projections, Russians will numerically outnumber those who called Mariupol home before the invasion by the end of this year; within three years, by more than two-to-one; within a decade, the replacement will be near-total”.
This article was produced as part of the cross-border European journalism collaboration “EU NEIGHBOURS east,” of which EUobserver is a member. The original version was published by Voxeurop.